Active Processing in Implicit Learning by Huddy, Vyvyan
Active Processing in Implicit Learning
Vyvyan Huddy
Department of Psychology 
University of Glasgow
Submitted for the degree of Ph.D. to the Higher Degree Committee of the 
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow.
August, 2001
ProQuest Number: 13818524
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13818524
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Glasgow^
UNIVERSITY 
^LIBRARY; ,
U)P\ \
Acknowledgements
I express gratitude to my supervisor, Mike Burton, for his guidance and support. I 
also would like to thank my friends, family and my girlfriend, Jane.
This research was supported by an ESRC scholarship, R00429834476.
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the phenomenon of implicit learning. Implicit 
learning occurs "when there is a performance increase on some task, without an 
associated increase in verbal knowledge about the causes of this performance 
increase" (Bright, 1993 - p9). In chapter 1, two theoretical interpretations of this 
type of learning are described. The first proposes that implicit learning reflects 
the operation of a unconscious learning system (e.g. Reber, 1989). The alternative 
episodic processing view (Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993) suggests that implicit 
learning occurs when there is an indeterminate relationship between the explicitly 
held knowledge acquired during training, and the way this knowledge is used in 
the test.
Two main experimental findings reported in the chapters 2 - 5  allow for a choice 
between the two main accounts mentioned above. Firstly, two implicit learning 
tasks (invariance learning [McGeorge and Burton, 1990] and sequence learning 
[Nissen and Bullemer, 1987]) demonstrate that learning is dependent on active 
processing of training stimuli. Secondly, findings from the invariant learning task 
indicate that episodic knowledge, rather than an abstract rule, is acquired in this 
type of learning. Both these findings are consistent with the episodic processing 
account of implicit learning, and not the separate system view. Furthermore, a 
specific prediction of the episodic account is also confirmed by the data reported 
in this thesis. This prediction is that the processing demands of the training and 
test periods must be consistent for successful performance.
This support for the episodic processing account of implicit learning is 
accompanied by a caveat in chapter 6. It is suggested that the episodic processing 
view is unsuitable for understanding the type of processes occurring in all 
implicit learning tasks. A possible resolution is offered, in the suggestion that 
broadening the theoretical scope to a more general consistency model may allow 
the wider experimental context of implicit learning to be explained.
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Chapter 1 Interpretations of implicit learning
1.1 Introduction
The role of conscious awareness in mediating fundamental learning processes has 
attracted a considerable amount of interest in recent years. This interest largely 
stems from the claim that learning can proceed without concurrent awareness of 
what is being learned, and this has been termed implicit learning. This claim has 
been interpreted as reflecting the operation of an unconscious learning system 
that operates separately from learning in more typical situations, where learning 
does occur with full awareness (e.g. Reber, 1989). An alternative account 
suggests that it is unnecessary to invoke the idea of an unconscious learning 
system to explain implicit learning. Instead, implicit learning results from the 
incidental task demands that are used in experiments that demonstrate learning 
without awareness. This thesis is concerned with the predictions made by each of 
these accounts and attempts to test these predictions.
The first chapter of this thesis is concerned with introducing the concept of 
implicit learning and its theoretical interpretations. The main points of the first 
chapter are summarised below -
• Firstly, a brief description of early conceptions of the relationship between 
learning and awareness is presented.
• Then, the concept of implicit learning will be introduced, elucidated by full 
description of each of the experimental tasks that are claimed to demonstrate
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implicit learning. This will allow the reader to appreciate the wide 
experimental context of implicit learning research.
• The experimental tasks will then be drawn together by three main attributes 
they have in common.
• Next, the methodological problem of determining when learning can be said 
to occur without awareness is considered.
• Once the methodological context and problems of implicit learning have been 
described, it is possible to turn to the theoretical interpretations of implicit 
learning. The three main accounts of implicit learning are considered in turn.
• Finally, a general overview of the main aims of this thesis is presented.
1.2 Learning without insight
Thorndike (1898) studied learning in animals using an apparatus he called the 
puzzle box, which consisted of a wooden crate with a door in the front panel. In 
the box there was a latch or a rope that when triggered, allowed the door to open. 
A bowl of food was placed outside the box that was visible through the slats. 
When a hungry cat was placed inside the box, it tended to struggle to get out by 
clawing at the sides of the box in order to reach the food. After some time, the cat 
would inadvertently pull the lever or rope, triggering the door mechanism, 
allowing it to escape and eat the food. Some time after, Thorndike placed the cat 
back in the box once again. It would repeat its struggles to escape and eventually 
pull the lever as before. There was, however, an important difference to this
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behaviour. The amount of time, or latency, it took for the correct response to be 
performed was generally shorter on the second trial than the first, shorter again on 
the third trial than the second, and so on. The time to escape became 
progressively shorter on each trial.
This experiment is quoted in virtually every introductory text on Psychology to 
illustrate the phenomenon of instrumental conditioning. That is, when a response 
to a stimulus is followed by a reward, that response becomes stronger, such as 
pulling the lever in the puzzle box. Further to this, Thorndike (1911) suggested 
that the reward would strengthen any response that preceded it and that no 
response had some essential property that set it apart from others to the animal, 
except subsequent reinforcement. In his view, reinforcement occurs 
automatically. If there had been an insight into this relationship, the cat would 
have pulled the lever after the initial trial, resulting in an abrupt drop in latency. 
Contrary to this, such a rapid reduction was not observed, after entering the box 
the cat would pull the lever with a generally decreasing latency on each 
successive trial. Indeed, Lieberman (1993) quotes Thorndike (1911) (Pg. 74) as 
suggesting:
'The gradual slope of the time-curve . . . shows the absence of reasoning.
They represent the wearing smooth of a path in the brain, not the
decisions of a rational consciousness."
This conclusion appears to suggest that learning does not require insight, that any 
association between reward and response can be formed. Indeed, if reinforcement
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acts automatically, conscious awareness should not be necessary to mediate an 
association between reinforcement and a response. Greenspoon (1953) tested this 
prediction in an experiment involving verbal conditioning in college students. In 
an interview situation the students were given twenty minutes to say all the words 
that came to mind. Whenever the word produced was a plural noun, the 
experimenter would provide some reinforcement by saying “mmm-hmm”. As the 
session progressed, the number of plural nouns increased, but the post 
experimental interviews revealed no awareness that only plural nouns were 
reinforced. This experiment suggested that reinforcement can proceed with no 
associated verbalised knowledge, and that the two effects can be dissociated.
Following the Greenspoon (1955) study, concerns were raised over the possibility 
that the subject could notice the strange attempts the experimenter was making to 
reinforce the plural nouns. Hefferline, Keenan and Harford (1959) carried out a 
similar conditioning experiment that was less likely to arouse the suspicion of the 
subject. In their study, electrodes were attached to various locations on the 
subjects’ body to assess muscular movements. Subjects were told they would be 
participating in a study designed to assess the effects of stress on body tension, 
and to this end randomly alternating periods of harsh noise or soothing music 
were played to subjects. In reality, and unbeknown to the subject, the movement 
of a small muscle in the subjects’ left thumb controlled the alternation of the 
sound. This movement was so small it could not be detected visually by the 
subject, but the electrode could detect it. Over the course of the session, there was 
a marked increase in the contractions made of the thumb by the subject. In the
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post experimental interview, the subject was unable to verbalise anything about 
the relationship between the sound and the movement of the thumb. More 
recently, Lieberman, Sunnucks and Kirk (1998) reported similar learning without 
awareness using a highly convincing cover task. Subjects were instructed that 
they would be taking part in a ESP experiment, and the task was to say which of 
two words the experimenter was thinking about. In fact, the reinforcement 
contingency was linked to how loudly the subject spoke when responding. The 
probability of reinforced responses grew as the session progressed, even though 
the subject reported no knowledge of the relationship between their responses and 
trial outcomes.
It appears then, that there is some support for Thorndike’s suggestion that the 
association between a reinforcement and response is formed automatically. 
Furthermore, there is evidence which indicates that certain associations can be 
hard to verbalise, prompting the suggestion they can be formed without 
awareness. These experiments involve very simple associations between a 
response and the reinforcement. This leads to the question of the generality of 
these findings to more complex learning in humans. The opposite end of the 
spectrum in terms of complexity, are skilled activities such as driving a car.
1.3 The Acquisition of Skills
When one considers a skilled behaviour it is clear that attempting to describe 
one’s actions is not always possible. This inability to describe the basis of a 
skilled behaviour occurs because this action can be performed automatically, with 
no apparent conscious guidance. Hasher and Zacks (1979) have described such
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automatic processes as effortless, fast, and operating outside of attentional 
control. Does the existence of these processes represent evidence for learning 
without awareness of complex behaviours? Simply because skilled behaviour can 
be performed with so little conscious control does not imply that these behaviours 
were always carried out in this manner. When learning to drive, for example, a 
great deal of effort is required to perform actions that will subsequently become 
automatic. One approach to this problem has been to set a distinction between 
procedural and declarative knowledge. Whilst declarative knowledge is always 
reported easily, procedural knowledge is acquired when declarative knowledge is 
transformed into procedural and the verbalisation of knowledge is lost.
Fitts’ (1964) model of skill acquisition incorporates a progression from 
declarative to procedural knowledge. Within Fitts (1964) account there are three 
stages of skill development. Knowledge is initially explicit and rule based 
requiring a large amount of attentional resources, with associated performance 
tending to be error prone and slow. Refinement of the performance strategy 
follows, with progression to an associative stage. Here, appropriate strategies are 
strengthened on the basis of feedback, whereas inappropriate features are 
weakened. In the final stage, the components of the performance strategy then 
become so highly practised that they require little attentional resource to guide 
them. This account has been taken forward by Shiffrin and Schneider's (1977) 
automatic versus controlled processing view, Anderson’s (1982) ACT skill 
acquisition model and Logan’s (1988) instance theory of automisation.
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So, it appears that complex behaviour may, in the initial stages at least, be 
acquired through the application of explicit strategies. This notion of a 
progression from a set of declarative knowledge that becomes increasingly 
procedural does not, however, account for a range of findings in the implicit 
learning literature. This literature suggests that learning, under certain 
circumstances, can proceed in a manner similar to that originally suggested by 
Thorndike (1911).
1.4 Implicit Learning
Unlike the progression from declarative to procedural knowledge described 
above, 'implicit learning’ appears to proceed from the very start with no 
associated explicit knowledge. There is a large and expanding literature claiming 
to have demonstrated such “implicit learning” (Reber, 1967, Berry and 
Broadbent, 1984, Nissen and Bullemer, 1987, McGeorge and Burton, 1990).
There are numerous definitions of implicit learning in the literature, each placing 
emphasis on different aspects of the phenomenon, and these will be considered 
below. At the most general though,
“implicit learning occurs when there is an observed increase in 
performance on some task, without an associated increase in verbal 
knowledge about the causes of this performance increase” (Bright, 1993 - 
p9).
Dienes and Berry (1997) contrast implicit learning with explicit learning, 
suggesting that explicit learning occurs when the stages of the development of a
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given set of knowledge are readily stated, such as learning how to solve an 
arithmetic problem by hypothesis testing. Dienes and Berry (1997) claim that 
implicit learning occurs when the stimulus material is observed or memorised, 
and the structure is not directly experienced by the subject.
1.5 Experimental Approaches to Implicit Learning
In the aforementioned literature, there are other aspects that have been associated 
with implicit learning which would be described better following some 
experimental context. The description below will focus on the initial findings of 
implicit learning tasks without going into the extensions to these early findings, 
as these will be dealt with at a later stage. Various tasks have been used to 
investigate implicit learning, the most prominent of these being Artificial 
Grammar Learning (from here on AGL).
Artificial Grammar Learning
The earliest evidence Reber used to support the existence of implicit learning was 
the findings of work on the AGL task (Reber, 1967). In a AGL study, subjects are 
asked to memorise a series of grammatical strings of letters generated by a finite 
state grammar (see below for an example).
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These strings of letters can be generated by this grammar by entering the diagram 
from the left side and following through pathways until the exit on the right (e.g 
creating strings such as VTVTM or XMXRVM and so on). This produces strings 
that conform to the grammar, called grammatical strings. Ungrammatical strings 
could also be produced by violating the order of working through the system (e.g 
by producing the string VXM or VRTM). Initially, subjects memorise a series of 
grammatical strings. Following this, subjects are informed of the existence of a 
rule structure that constrains the order of the letters and are asked to classify 
novel grammatical and non grammatical strings. In an initial study, Reber (1967) 
found that subjects could classify novel grammatical strings significantly above 
chance levels. In addition, Reber (1967) found that subjects were unable to 
verbalise the rules of the grammar, and subjects claimed that they had no basis 
on which to make these decisions.
In a variation of the original task, Reber and Lewis (1977) demonstrated 
sensitivity to the grammar in a different test task. Following exposure to
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grammatical strings as before, subjects demonstrated an increased ability to 
reorder scrambled strings back into their original grammatical order, 
demonstrating some knowledge of the grammatical structure.
Dynamic Systems Tasks
A second type of task that has provided a substantial amount of data in support of 
implicit learning is the dynamic systems task. This task presents subjects with a 
stimulus set that is complex in nature and is also more realistic than the AGL 
task. The subject typically interacts with a computer program which takes input 
from the subject and provides a response value that is altered according to an 
underlying rule.
An example of a dynamic systems task is the “sugar production task”, as used by 
Berry and Broadbent (1984). In this task, subjects take on the role of a manager 
of a sugar production factory. The task is to reach and maintain the level of sugar 
output by varying the numbers of workers involved. The subjects enter the 
number of workers they consider will maximise output, the sugar production total 
is then updated and this process is repeated over the session. The sugar 
production level relates to the number of workers by an underlying rule that 
correlates the current level of production with the previous output and the number 
of workers. Berry and Broadbent (1984) found that subjects were able to improve 
their ability in controlling the sugar production task. Like the AGL studies, 
subjects reported that they were unable to describe the basis of their actions, or 
they were “unable to put into words” how they went about the task.
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The Serial Reaction Time (SRT) Task
A further line of support for the process of implicit learning comes from work by 
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) and Lewicki et al.. (1987), who introduced a simple 
but effective technique called the serial reaction time task. There are numerous 
versions of serial reaction time tasks in the literature, and the most prominent of 
these will be considered below.
In the Nissen and Bullemer (1987) version of the task, a stimulus is presented in 
one of four locations and the subject’s task is to respond to the location of the 
stimulus with a corresponding response key as fast as possible. The stimulus 
moves on to another of the four locations, the subject makes a response, the 
stimulus again moves to a further location, and so on. The instructions to the 
subject emphasise only that they should respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible, but in fact the location changes follow a repeating sequence. Subjects 
showed a rapid decrease in response time to the location changes as training 
progressed. Moreover, when the repeating sequence was changed to a random 
pattern, reaction times increased substantially. This indicates that subjects had 
become sensitive to the structure of the sequential material. As in the grammar 
learning studies, subjects were unable to verbalise anything about the sequence 
and often reported inaccurate information.
Lewicki et al. (1987) used a slightly different procedure involving a visual search 
task. Subjects had to indicate, by pressing a button, which of four quadrants 
contained a target digit. The trials were separated into “simple” and “complex” 
trials. The “simple” trials were arranged so that the target stimulus was the only
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item on the screen and was easy to detect, while in complex trials the target was 
presented among a field of 35 distractors hence making a decision more difficult. 
The task was structured into sections of seven trials, six “simple” trials followed 
by a seventh “complex” trial. Four of the six “simple” trials predicted the location 
of the seventh “complex” trial, and each location of the target on the “complex” 
trial was associated with a unique conjunction of locations on the simple trials. 
After a period of training on these relations between “simple” and “complex” 
locations, response time to detect the target on the “complex” trial had decreased 
significantly. Following training, Lewicki et al. changed the relations between the 
simple and complex trials so that the target location in the “complex” trial was 
diagonally opposite to its original location. This change resulted in a large 
increase in the response time to detect the target object in the “complex” trial. 
Like the Nissen and Bullemer (1987) task, this indicated learning of the 
sequential material presented during training. Also like Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987), subjects did not report any useful information about the rules used to 
determine the relationship between “simple” and “complex” trials.
The Invariant Learning Task
In an attempt to simplify the relational structure of the stimuli, while maintaining 
the complexity of individual training instances, McGeorge and Burton (1990) 
introduced the Invariant Learning task. In the original McGeorge and Burton 
(1990) study, participants were asked to perform some task (such as arithmetic) 
on 30 four-digit numbers. Each four digit number contained a “3” digit; this fact 
was not divulged to the participants. In a subsequent recognition task, 10 pairs of
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four-digit numbers were presented to subjects one at a time. In each pair, one 
number contained a “3” {positive) and one did not {negative). Subjects were then 
falsely told they had seen one of the numbers in the study phase and they must 
indicate which of the numbers they had seen. A robust effect was observed for 
participants choosing the positive over the negative. This effect was seen to 
persist over different encoding tasks, and when the format of test materials was 
changed from study to test phase (i.e. the training items were seen in digit format 
and test items appeared as words). In a post task question session, subjects were 
unable to report anything pertinent to the invariant digit. They concluded that 
performance on this task was driven by semantic knowledge of the invariant 
feature, and that this knowledge was implicit.
Bright and Burton (1993) extended the findings of McGeorge and Burton (1990) 
by using alternative clock face stimuli in place of the digit strings. The invariance 
rule was a time range that was consistent over all of the training items so that all 
of the training items were clock times that varied between 6 and 12 o’clock. As in 
digit invariance these times were referred to as positives. At test, novel positives 
were set against negatives (clock times between 12 and 6 o’clock) in a two 
alternative forced choice. Bright and Burton (1993) demonstrated a preference for 
positives at test, with no associated verbalisation of the invariance.
1.6 General definitions and attributes of Implicit Learning
It can be seen from these tasks that implicit learning is demonstrated in a number 
of different experimental contexts. Indeed, there are further demonstrations of 
effects that have been termed implicit learning (e.g Reber and Millward, 1968;
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Shanks, Green and Kolodny, 1994). This proliferation of tasks has resulted in 
many different perspectives on implicit learning and hence a large number of 
different definitions. As noted by Frensch (1998), there are “literally dozens of 
definitions that have been offered and continue to be offered in the literature”. 
Rather than replicating the list of definitions reported by Frensch (1998), 
definitions will be quoted throughout the current review according to the 
theoretical context.
The main experimental tasks that claim to demonstrate implicit learning are 
diverse in methodology. However, there are three main attributes that can be 
associated with implicit learning, these are that -
• It occurs without accurate verbalisation of the knowledge used in the test.
In all of the experimental tasks described earlier on, subjects performed at 
above chance levels on the performance test without being able to 
describe the source of their success. This is the aspect of implicit learning 
that has provoked a heated debate, and a great deal of effort has been 
expended on attempting to define criteria forjudging whether learning can 
proceed unconsciously.
• It is revealed by sensitivity to the structural properties of a stimulus 
domain.
The stimuli used in implicit learning tasks are generated using a rule 
structure which determines the relationship between the elements that 
make up the training material. Subjects show sensitivity to this structure
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by demonstrating facilitation when responding to this structure (e.g 
sequence learning) or by exhibiting a preference for items that conserve 
the structure in a test (e.g. AGL). It is important to note that this statement 
is neutral with respect to the information used by subjects to demonstrate 
sensitivity.
• It tends to be associated with incidental training conditions.
During training, subjects in implicit learning tasks are not directed 
towards the underlying structure of the stimuli. The training task usually 
involves an observation or memorisation task, rather than deliberate 
hypothesis testing. A caveat should be made at this point that the 
incidental nature of the training conditions does not imply that subjects 
are inactive during training. Indeed, Wright and Whittlesea (1998) state 
that "the absence of hypothesis testing... do not make the learner a 
passive or unselective recipient of structure". Thus, incidental training 
should be understood as describing the methodology used in implicit 
learning tasks, rather than defining the cognitive processes that occur 
during training.
Of these three characteristics, the first has resulted in the most extensive debate 
and controversy. This debate centres on the validity of the methodology used to 
determine the degree of conscious awareness in implicit learning studies. This 
issue will be addressed in the following section.
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1.7 Criteria for verifying when learning occurs without awareness
“implicit learning experiments have universally adopted the dissociation 
logic of attempting to demonstrate learning in absence of any detectable 
degree of awareness”
Shanks and St. John (1994) -  p 370
In their review of the implicit learning literature in 1994, Shanks and St John 
(1994) identified a weakness in implicit learning studies. It had been assumed that 
if subjects could not verbalise the structure of the stimulus domain to which they 
have been exposed, and yet they showed sensitivity to that domain in a test, they 
must have learned the structure of the domain unconsciously (e.g. Reber, 1989). 
This relies on the assumption that the awareness test accesses any conscious 
knowledge that the subject may have. However, Shanks and St John (1994) 
argued that attempting to determine the awareness of subjects during training by 
examining the content of verbal reports after testing is not the best way to 
establish unconscious learning. Nonetheless, they argue that if this methodology 
is to be used, certain criteria should be met before any findings can be claimed to 
be valid.
Two criteria for characterising unconscious learning
Shanks and St John (1994) suggested that before making an assumption that the 
awareness test was accessing all conscious knowledge, a more stringent method 
for determining the validity of tests of awareness should be used. This method 
involved assessing the awareness tests used in implicit learning experiments
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according to two criteria. The first of these concerns the ability of the awareness 
test to access the critical information that the subject acquired during training. 
Shanks and St John called this the Information Criterion. The second criterion 
addressed the problem of the sensitivity of the test of awareness, this was called 
the Sensitivity Criterion.
According to Shanks and St John (1994), the Information Criterion requires that 
“it must be possible to establish that the information the experimenter is looking 
for in the awareness test is indeed the information responsible for the 
performance changes”. That is, if the experiment requires a subject to learn 
information x, but unbeknown to the experimenter other information y allows the 
subject to perform at above chance levels, probing the subject about information x 
may not yield any useful verbal report. This would result in an incorrect 
conclusion that the subject had unconsciously learned information x. It is 
necessary, therefore, to determine whether the test of awareness is assessing the 
same information that the subject uses in the test task.
The Sensitivity Criterion requires that the test of awareness is sensitive to all the 
conscious knowledge that the subject possesses. This criterion ensures that 
performance on a test task (e.g. classification test in AGL) is not superior to that 
of the awareness test simply because the classification test is more sensitive, and 
therefore results in a higher performance value. Shanks and St John (1994) 
considered a situation where a single source of knowledge is accessed by a 
classification test and an awareness test. Above chance performance occurs on 
classification, with no associated verbalisation on the awareness test. If test
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sensitivity is not taken into account this would lead to the incorrect conclusion 
that unconscious knowledge is used on the classification test. A more accurate 
theory is that conscious knowledge is present and is an influence on the 
classification test, whereas the less sensitive awareness test fails to detect its 
presence.
Shanks and St John (1994) propose that this inability of the awareness test to 
access the relevant information may occur as a result of the difference between 
the context of the awareness test and the training period. Considering the Nissen 
and Bullemer (1987) task, the sensitivity to the sequence is normally 
demonstrated by the change in response time to the location of the stimulus. The 
sequence is learned by interacting with the sequence in a very similar way, by 
responding to the stimulus as it moves from location to location. The awareness 
test used in one version of this task (Lewicki et al., 1987) involved simply asking 
subjects if they noticed a sequence in the stimulus movements. Since the subject 
was now interacting with the experimenter and not the stimulus itself, it is clear 
that there was a substantial change in context. This change in context could 
contribute to the insensitivity of the awareness test
Shanks and St John (1994) suggest that the Sensitivity Criterion could be met by 
ensuring that the performance test and awareness test are made as similar as 
possible, with only the task instructions separating them. This would be more 
likely to encourage the subject to retrieve as much conscious knowledge as 
possible. Under these experimental circumstances, a dissociation between
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performance and verbal report would be more compelling evidence for 
unconscious learning.
Shanks and St John (1994) extensively reviewed the implicit learning literature 
with reference to the Information and Sensitivity criteria. They concluded that no 
study had met these criteria to a level that unequivocally demonstrated the 
existence of unconscious learning processes. For example, a substantial part of 
the AGL literature is concerned with determining what knowledge subjects use 
when making classification judgements. Shanks and St John (1994) report that 
the evidence for the use of rule knowledge is weak, and other knowledge is more 
likely to be employed (see later on for a description of these studies [sect 1.8]). 
This means that asking subjects whether they noticed a rule structure in the 
stimuli fails to meet the information criterion because this is not the knowledge 
they used in the test.
Subsequent work carried out by Jimenez, Mendez and Cleeremans (1996) has 
used awareness measures that are closer to those required to meet the Shanks and 
St John (1994) criteria. Jimenez et al. (1996) used direct and indirect tests to test 
the influence of conscious and unconscious influences. Here tasks are matched in 
all respects, such as context and demands, except instructions differ in the two 
conditions. In direct tests subjects are instructed to use whatever conscious 
knowledge they may have. In indirect tests the instructions do not refer to any 
conscious knowledge. Jimenez et al. (1996) assumed that the direct test would be 
more sensitive to conscious knowledge and greater sensitivity to some aspect of 
the stimulus in the indirect test must be a result of unconscious influences.
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Jimenez et al. (1996) used these tests in a sequence learning task and claimed to 
have demonstrated the influence of unconscious learning. However, Shanks and 
Johnstone (1999) carried out a similar experiment using direct and indirect tests 
in a sequence learning task which appears to contradict the findings of Jimenez 
(1996). They claimed that their direct measures of awareness revealed that 
conscious knowledge of sequences was fully accessible on these objective tests. 
So it appears that using direct and indirect measures does not result in conclusive 
evidence of unconscious learning in all cases.
Verifying unconscious learning with a subjective criterion 
Dienes and Berry (1997) argued in favour of applying alternative criteria for 
unconscious learning that are closer to everyday notions of consciousness. They 
suggest that this leads to more positive conclusions on presence of unconscious 
learning processes than are allowed by the two criteria proposed by Shanks and St 
John (1994).
As a starting point Dienes and Berry (1997) suggested that criteria used in the 
subliminal perception literature may be useful when examining unconscious 
learning. In a subliminal perception experiment (e.g. Marcel, 1983), subjects are 
presented with a series of trials where a subliminal stimulus is presented for a few 
milliseconds preceding a target stimulus on some of the trials but it is absent on 
other trials. This subliminal stimulus is intended to facilitate the subjects' 
response to the target, resulting in priming. Following each trial, the subject 
indicates whether the stimulus was present or not, and how sure they were about 
the response. Two criteria were developed to assess the subjects' awareness
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(Cheesman and Merikle, 1984); the subjective threshold and the objective 
threshold. The subjective threshold is met when the subject believes that they are 
guessing, but still shows above chance performance on discriminating the 
presence of the stimulus. The objective threshold is met when the subject shows 
chance performance on discriminating the absence or presence of the stimulus, 
while they still show priming in response to the target stimulus, indicating that 
the preceding subliminal stimulus still affected their behaviour.
In the context of implicit learning, Dienes and Berry (1997) suggested that the 
knowledge used could be said to be below an objective threshold, if a cued recall 
task reveals chance levels of performance. This assumes that a cued recall task 
directly measures knowledge that a subject must have used to perform at above 
chance on classification. To have knowledge that is below a subjective threshold, 
subjects would have to lack metaknowledge.
Dienes and Berry (1997) proposed that determining a lack of metaknowledge 
could be divided into two further criteria, the guessing criterion and the zero 
correlation criterion. The guessing criterion is met when subjects report that they 
are guessing and are relying on random selection of the test items. The zero 
correlation criterion is met when an analysis of the subject's responses reveals 
that there is no association between their responses and the confidence they have 
in these responses. Dienes and Berry (1997) suggest that these criteria may 
correspond to everyday conceptions of unconscious learning.
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Like the previous efforts of Shanks and St John (1994), Dienes and Berry (1997) 
reviewed the implicit learning literature with reference to the criteria they had 
defined. They claimed that some demonstrations of AGL may reveal the use of 
knowledge that is below a subjective threshold. They claimed the subjects often 
classify grammatical strings substantially above chance although they believe that 
they are guessing. This would appear to meet the guessing criterion described 
above. Dienes and Berry (1997) presented further evidence from AGL which 
suggests that the zero correlation criterion may also have been met. An analysis 
of the confidence judgements of subjects who carried out an AGL task revealed 
that subjects were just as confident about incorrect decisions as correct decisions. 
As a result of these findings, Dienes and Berry (1997) argued that construing 
implicit learning in terms of a subjective threshold criterion may provide 
evidence for unconscious learning effects.
The limitations o f setting criteria for unconscious learning 
The assumption of exhaustivity, suggested by Riengold and Merikle (1988), 
addresses the same problem as the Shanks and St John’s (1994) sensitivity 
criterion. A measure of explicit knowledge is said to be exhaustive if it captures 
all of the relevant knowledge that the subject has. There is a potential problem 
with this assumption that has been neatly described by Neal and Hesketh (1997) -
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“If the measure of explicit knowledge is not exhaustive, it will always be 
possible to claim that any observed dissociation is misleading because 
some unmeasured form of explicit knowledge may be responsible for 
learning.”
Neal and Hesketh (1997) - p 31
This observation leads to the conclusion that the Sensitivity criterion cannot be 
met if an exhaustive measure of explicit knowledge does not exist. In place of 
developing such a test of explicit knowledge, Dienes and Berry (1997) propose 
the subjective threshold criterion, that is described above. This measure of 
unconscious learning produces more positive conclusions on the presence of 
unconscious learning in humans than the sensitivity criterion proposed by Shanks 
and St John (1994). This contradiction highlights a problem with the use of 
criteria for verifying unconscious learning, to quote Neal and Hesketh (1997) - (p 
31)-
“because different measures produce different results, and there is no 
objective criterion for choosing a measure in the first place, this type of 
experimental procedure is empirically indeterminate.”
Even attempts to satisfy such criteria are not free of problems. Shanks and St 
John (1994) suggest that if the context during the training phase and the test 
phase could be made as similar as possible, the sensitivity criterion has a better 
chance of being met. However, this causes a further problem because this new 
measure could be influenced by implicit as well as explicit knowledge. A 
measure of explicit knowledge that is influenced by implicit knowledge fails to
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meet the assumption of exclusivity. So, experimental approaches that attempt to 
meet the sensitivity criterion may be flawed by their lack of exclusivity in the 
same way that verbal report measures are impaired by their deficiency in 
exhaustivity. Neal and Hesketh (1997) suggest that alternative measures should 
be investigated to detect separate unconscious and conscious influences on task 
performance.
Using intention as a route to verifying unconscious learning 
Neal and Hesketh (1997) argue that the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 
1991) could be used to dissociate the effects of implicit and explicit learning. 
Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation procedure can be shown to separate the 
influence of intentional and non intentional processes on task performance. This 
is achieved by examining the effect on task performance when intentional and 
non intentional processes are allowed to act in concert or where these processes 
act in opposition. For example, subjects could be presented with a list of words, 
followed by two tests. In one test, subjects recall as many words as possible from 
the list, this is the inclusion condition. In the other condition, subjects generate as 
many words as they can that were not on the list, this is the exclusion condition. 
Any words from the original list that were nevertheless generated in the exclusion 
condition must be the result of non intentional processes. Although this is a 
simplification of the process dissociation procedure, it elucidates that non 
intentional effects of memory can be indexed experimentally. It may be that 
implicit knowledge may exert a similar non intentional influence on performance 
in a classification task. Neal and Hesketh (1997) argue that a procedure similar to
24
process dissociation could conceivably detect this. They suggest that using 
intention in this way to reveal implicit processes does not rely on the sensitivity 
of the awareness test, and is, therefore, a more appropriate way to verify 
unconscious learning.
Buchner, Steffens and Rothkegel’s (1997) adapted the process dissociation 
procedure to sequence learning in an attempt to separate conscious and 
unconscious influences. They revealed that intention to learn the sequence 
increased performance on an awareness test, but left task performance unaffected. 
This would indicate that intention can have alternative influences on unconscious 
and conscious knowledge bases, as suggested by Neal and Hesketh (1997).
In an AGL task, Higham, Vokey and Pritchard (2000) exposed subjects to letter 
strings produced by two different grammars (GA and GB), and asked subjects to 
rate strings for grammaticality in two conditions. Firstly, in-concert conditions 
where the strings were rated as consistent with either grammar, or opposition 
conditions where the strings were rated as consistent with only one of the 
grammars (in this case GB). Higham et al. (2000) reported evidence of controlled 
processing, as subjects could successfully reject items from GA and non 
grammatical items in the opposition condition. This sensitivity was removed by 
the introduction of a time deadline at test, as in these circumstances subjects 
showed a slight tendency to incorrectly classify GA items as GB items. This 
effect was interpreted by Higham et al. as evidence for automatic influences at 
test, as subjects under time deadline conditions could not prevent the bias to 
select GA items.
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Redington (2000) questioned these findings on the basis that these results can be 
interpreted as the influence of a single controlled process. Redington (2000) 
suggested that the two grammars Higham et al. used were very similar, but the 
non grammatical items were dissimilar from these. Hence, participants may have 
mistakenly identified more grammatical items than non grammatical as being 
from the other grammar as a result of this similarity. Indeed, Dienes et al. (1995) 
carried out a similar experiment to that of Higham et al., except the non 
grammatical items were similar to the two grammars presented to subjects. 
Although this study found controlled influences in grammaticality decisions, no 
automatic influences were demonstrated.
Perruchet, Gallego and Vinter (1997) offer an alternative interpretation of the 
process dissociation procedure. They suggest that subjects recall the items in the 
test, but as a result of impoverished memory, subjects fail to remember the 
spatiotemporal context of encoding. Thus, even when exclusion retrieval 
conditions are used, subjects recall the items from the training set and use them in 
the test.
The process dissociation procedure makes some very strong assumptions, all of 
which have been criticised in the literature. For example, process dissociation 
relies on the assumption that task performance is a mixture of implicit or explicit 
processing components that are assumed to be stochastically independent. 
Joordens and Merikle (1993) suggested that it would be equally plausible to 
assume that there is redundancy between explicit and implicit task components, 
so that situations in which conscious processes operate are a subset of situations
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where unconscious processes operate. This account makes different estimates of 
unconscious influences on task performance in comparison to the assumption of 
independence. There are other models of how conscious and unconscious 
influences may interact in the process dissociation task (e.g Gardiner and Java, 
1993), which make further estimates of unconscious influences.
More generally, Redington (2000) has criticised the use of intention as a route to 
separating conscious and unconscious influences on task performance. He argues 
that this position ignores the data from verbal report studies and other measures 
of conscious awareness. Although these data have been shown to be questionable, 
Redington (2000) suggests that it is still in need of further explanation and any 
theory or account of implicit learning that offers no explanation of the lack of 
verbal reports is unsatisfactory.
Concluding remarks on awareness measures
Redington's (2000) comments about the importance of verbal report data 
highlights the way in which research on implicit learning, prompted by Shanks 
and St John (1994), has increasingly focused on finding the methodological 
solutions to the information and sensitivity criteria. The difficulties in satisfying 
these criteria have resulted in the introduction of the concept of intention. 
However, verbal reports can, in some circumstances, produce useful data for 
understanding implicit learning. For example, Mathews et al. (1989) asked 
subjects in an artificial grammar learning study to produce verbal reports on how 
another subject should perform the classification test. These reports were used by 
naive subjects in a classification test to some effect showing that verbal reports
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can produce useful data. Furthermore, the attempts to use intention as a means of 
isolating conscious and unconscious influences has not yet proved successful 
(e.g. Redington, 2000 commentary on Higham and Vokey, 2000). Many of the 
attempts to demonstrate learning in the complete absence of awareness may be 
unsuccessful because of the nature of the knowledge acquired in implicit learning 
tasks. In their review, Dienes and Berry (1997) indicate that while the knowledge 
acquired in implicit learning tasks is not accessible through verbal reports, some 
knowledge is revealed by more direct tests such as cued report tests. Indeed, 
Seger (1994) states that knowledge in implicit learning tasks is often on
"the fringe of consciousness: a field of relatively unarticulated, vague 
experience, neither fully accessible to consciousness, nor fully separate" 
(p 421).
Hence, if the knowledge used in implicit learning tasks is not held in separate 
forms, using the intentional against unintentional manipulation may not yield 
conclusive results. Moreover, the finding that the knowledge acquired in implicit 
learning tasks is on the fringe of consciousness, rather than totally inaccessible, is 
very important for the development of theories of implicit learning. The various 
theoretical interpretations of implicit learning will be considered in the following 
section.
1.8 Theoretical Accounts of Implicit Learning
In a review of implicit learning, Reber (1989) concluded that implicit learning 
tasks such as artificial grammar learning reveal the operation of an unconscious
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learning system that yields a knowledge base that is "abstract and representative 
of the structure of the environment" (p 219). The main focus of research on 
implicit learning has been directed towards either proving or refuting the 
existence of such an unconscious learning system. Indeed, Mathews (1997) 
described the current state of implicit learning research as “an ongoing debate 
between believers and non believers in the existence of a powerful cognitive 
unconscious” (p 38).
The parallel systems view of implicit learning can be contrasted with two other 
accounts of implicit learning, the episodic processing account (Whittlesea and 
Dorken, 1993) and the subjective unit formation account (Perruchet and Gallego, 
1998). These frameworks have been taken as representing a view that questions 
the validity of implicit learning, that of “non believers”. However, this is not an 
accurate characterisation of these accounts. They do not refute the fact that 
subjects become sensitive to the rule structure of a particular set of stimuli 
without associated verbalised knowledge. They do question, however, the validity 
of the claim that these findings suggest that subjects abstract rules from the 
stimuli they were presented with using a parallel learning system. Instead, they 
suggest subjects acquire some other, non rule based knowledge that incidentally 
allows them to become sensitive to the rules in a test. These alternative positions 
on the basis of implicit learning will be considered below.
In the preceding section, it was reported that much of the experimental evidence 
suggests that the knowledge acquired in implicit learning tasks is "on the fringe 
of consciousness" rather than totally inaccessible. If the idea that parallel learning
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systems are responsible for dissociations between performance measures and 
verbal reports, one might expect complete inaccessibility of knowledge acquired 
by the unconscious learning system. As noted earlier, demonstrating learning in 
the absence of awareness has proved very difficult indeed. For this reason, 
proponents of parallel learning systems cite other evidence which is taken from 
two sources, neuropsychology and dual task studies. This evidence will be 
considered in detail in the next section.
1.8.1 A parallel systems account of implicit learning
The parallel system account can be placed within two main theoretical contexts. 
Firstly, there is the cognitive evolutionary standpoint, taken by Reber (1989) and 
Mathews and Rousell (1989). Secondly, some authors consider implicit learning 
to be similar to the kind of learning that takes place in connectionist models (e.g. 
Cleeremans, Destrebecqz and Boyer, 1998).
Reber (1989) argued that the evolutionary ancestors of humans showed learning 
of covariations between stimuli in the environment. This is a primitive form of 
learning that simply accumulates information about the environment. Reber 
(1989) suggests that there is “no reason to suppose that these presumably 
adaptive mental capacities ought to have been lost” (p 230). In other words, this 
primitive form of learning still exists in humans. According to Reber (1989), 
these processes predate the evolution of consciousness, as consciousness arrived 
late on the evolutionary scene. For this reason, these simple learning processes 
remain impenetrable to conscious inspection. This kind of learning, in Reber’s 
(1989) view, is very similar to the slightly more sophisticated learning that takes
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place in implicit learning studies (e.g. AGL). As stated earlier, Reber (1989) 
claims that this system is involved with the acquisition of rules that are 
represented in a symbolic and abstract form. The evidence for this assumption is 
presented below.
This position purporting the existence of symbolic rules that are unavailable to 
consciousness is not tenable according to Cleeremans (1998). Cleeremans (1998) 
argues that “because these expressions are static and exist independently of the 
processor that interprets them, they are automatically available to outside 
inspection” (p 201). So, unlike Reber (1989), Cleeremans (1998) questions the 
validity of the assumption that implicit learning processes result in the 
representation of the rules that constrain a given stimulus set (e.g. the grammar in 
AGL studies).
Instead, Cleeremans (1998) notes that connectionist models may exhibit rule like 
behaviour, without representing rules themselves, so making these models a 
better starting point for understanding implicit learning. Connectionist networks 
are collections of small units that are joined by links. These links strengthen or 
weaken as each unit becomes active, and this allows the network to process the 
input and output of information. In this view, “implicit learning is a by product of 
processing, and involves changes in the very structures that drive processing (the 
connection weights between units)” (Cleeremans, 1998, p226). Furthermore, 
these models do not represent knowledge explicitly, it is represented in a 
distributed manner across the network.
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A drawback of this account is that it does not specify how explicit cognition may 
be represented. As Neal and Hesketh (1997) note, the logical extreme of these 
arguments is that people never have introspective access to information of any 
form. Cleeremans (1998) argues that symbolic representations are available to 
conscious inspection, so it may be inferred that these systems are responsible for 
explicit learning within this view.
Although the parallel learning system view can be set within a couple of 
theoretical contexts, the same evidence is used to support the concept of separate 
learning systems. Apart from dissociations between verbal report and 
performance measures, which was covered in the previous section, separate 
systems accounts cite neuropsychology and dual task studies. The 
neuropsychological evidence will be considered first.
Evidence from neuropsychology
Knowlton and Squire (1992) compared artificial grammar learning in normal and 
amnesic subjects. Amnesics performed as well as control subjects on 
grammaticality judgements, but were impaired on classification and recognition 
when explicit comparison to prior exemplars was emphasised. These deficiencies 
were attributed to impaired explicit retrieval in the amnesics, with intact 
grammaticality judgements drawing on implicit knowledge of the grammar. In 
further papers, Knowlton and Squire (1994, 1996) demonstrated that Amnesic 
patients were not only impaired on recognition judgements but their knowledge 
of fragments of grammatical training strings was also impaired.
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Subsequently, work by Kinder and Shanks (2000) using a Simple Recurrent 
Network model of AGL performance, has cast doubt on the supposition that only 
separate systems models of learning can account for impaired recognition and 
intact classification in amnesics. The condition was simulated within the SRN by 
reducing the learning rate parameter, making the assumption that the learning rate 
of amnesics is slower than controls. The simulation results resemble the 
experimental data very closely. While classification performance was similar 
when the learning rate was low or high, recognition performance was 
considerably better when the learning rate was high. Hence no new mechanisms 
are required to produce a dissociation between classification and recognition, it 
can be explained equally well by a slowing down of the learning process in 
Amnesia.
As explained earlier (sect 1.5), in the sequence learning task subjects become 
sensitive to sequential movements of a stimulus between locations on a screen, 
without associated verbalised knowledge. There appears to be some evidence for 
the activation of non-overlapping brain regions between different levels of 
awareness in the sequence learning task. In one Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET) study, Grafton, Hazeltine and Ivry (1995) demonstrated that distinct brain 
regions are active when subjects report awareness of a sequence compared to a 
situation where they claim to be unaware. Moreover, as subjects showed greater 
awareness of the sequence, additional brain areas appeared to become active. This 
data relies rather heavily on the assumption that the awareness test was suitably 
detecting the absence of conscious knowledge in the supposed unaware brain
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state. As explained earlier, assumptions of when subjects are unaware should be 
made with great caution.
In the first application of the SRT task, Nissen and Bullemer (1987) showed that 
Korsakoff amnesic patients were able to learn a 10 item repeating sequence. 
Furthermore, the patients did not reveal any information about the sequence at the 
awareness test. Shanks and Johnstone (1998) point out that these studies used 
sequences that did not control for the frequency with which stimulus location was 
used and other similar factors. That is, the patients need not have learned the 
sequence transitions to show learning, they could simply learn that location 1 
occurred more frequently. Data reported by Keele (1997) shows similar intact 
learning of sequence information by patients with hippocampal damage. 
However, there was some evidence that the patients were unable to learn complex 
information, possibly confirming the criticism of the Nissen and Bullemer (1987) 
studies. Another study of sequence learning in amnesics was conducted by Reber 
and Squire (1994). This study appeared to reveal differences between the 
awareness scores of amnesics and normal subjects. However, they have been 
questioned by Shanks and Johnstone (1998) on the grounds of low statistical 
power resulting from small sample sizes.
More recently, Reber and Squire (1998) have demonstrated that patients with 
medial temporal or diencephalic damage showed normal learning on the task, 
despite grossly impaired ability to demonstrate learning of the sequence 
explicitly. Boyd and Winstein (2001) tested patients with unilateral stroke in a 
series of experiments. The patients responded to the sequence with the hand
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ipsilateral to the damage, and demonstrated no learning of the sequence even after 
extended practice. However, when they were given the opportunity to learn the 
sequence explicitly, a reduction in response time was observed. This data and that 
of Reber and Squire (1998) shows an interesting dissociation between implicit 
and explicit learning of sequential information.
In conclusion, although some of the studies reported here are affected by 
methodological problems, there is evidence that neuropsychological patients are 
able to learn sequences implicitly but not explicitly (Reber and Squire, 1998), and 
there is other evidence for the reverse (Boyd and Winstein, 2001). While this data 
can be taken as support for the existence of conscious and unconscious learning 
modes, it should be noted that these studies are subject to the same 
methodological problems of determining when learning is conscious or 
unconscious as studies with normal subjects. For example, the Grafton et al.. 
(1995) study does not demonstrate that the unaware subjects are below an 
objective threshold of awareness, no conclusions can be drawn that implicate 
separate learning systems. Equally, it is difficult to determine if the subjects in the 
Boyd and Winstein (2001) study acquire only explicit knowledge of the 
sequence, it may be that the test is not exclusively sensitive to explicit knowledge 
and implicit knowledge has an influence. In conclusion, data from 
neuropsychological studies cannot be taken to be representative of separate 
learning modes until it is subject to the same methodological constraints that are 
necessary for studies with normal subjects.
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Evidence from dual task studies
The findings of studies with amnesic patients are similar to those where dual task 
conditions are used with normal subjects. Curran and Keele (1993) found that 
when subjects had performed a secondary task during training performance was 
equivalent to situations where single task instructions were used. It was suggested 
that the secondary task had removed any possible conscious influences from task 
performance, and task performance revealed only the sole contribution of 
unconscious learning. However, Neal and Hesketh (1997) note that performance 
on dual task experiments are subject to the same problems of dissociation as 
standard SRT task conditions, and cannot be considered as decisive evidence for 
unconscious processes. Furthermore, Shanks and Johnstone (1998) carried out a 
dual task sequence learning experiment and demonstrated that appropriate tests of 
awareness revealed significant amounts of explicit knowledge of the sequence.
Evidence for rule abstraction in implicit learning
Reber’s dual system account of implicit learning makes the point that implicit 
knowledge tends to be in the form of abstract representations of the rule structure 
that relates stimuli. For example, in the AGL task Redington and Chater (1996) 
suggest that abstract knowledge is best characterised as information that the 
subjects possess that is similar to the grammar that generated the letter strings 
subjects saw during training. Hence, rules go beyond the surface features of the 
stimuli and are grounded on the conceptual relationships between the letters that 
form the strings. This is a central aspect of Reber’s dual system account, as it 
allows the conclusion that the proposed unconscious learning system operates
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using the same symbolic knowledge as does the conscious learning system. As 
Cleeremans (1998) puts it,
“there is an unconscious mind that is just the same as the more familiar
conscious one, only minus consciousness”.
It is important to note that the connectionist account of implicit learning does not 
specify that rules are represented directly. However, one connectionist model of 
AGL performance demonstrated by Dienes et al. (1999) models transfer to 
alternative symbol sets, so findings of transfer are significant for both dual system 
frameworks.
The strongest evidence for the use of abstract knowledge of this kind in AGL is 
drawn from studies demonstrating "transfer" to a novel symbol set. The transfer 
effect in the AGL task occurs in circumstances where elements from which 
training strings are composed are mapped onto a new vocabulary, so that the 
underlying syntax is identical but the surface symbols are changed. Subjects 
perform at above chance levels when judging the grammaticality of the strings in 
the novel alphabet (e.g. Mathews et al., 1989). This finding, it has been assumed 
by proponents of the abstraction view, rules out any account which refers to 
surface features, because in this case, training and test stimuli have different 
surface forms.
Transfer has been demonstrated many times in the literature (e.g. Altmann et al., 
1995; Brooks and Vokey., 1991; Mathews et al., 1989). As stated earlier, this 
effect has been taken as strong evidence that subjects have acquired an abstract
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representation of the grammar and are applying this knowledge in the transfer. 
The original finding has been extended by Altmann, Dienes and Goode (1995), 
who have demonstrated impressive cross modal transfer. For example, 
(Experiment 1) one group of subjects were trained on standard letter strings and a 
second group on a sequence of tones, both sets of stimuli conformed to the same 
rule structure. Each letter string had an equivalent tone sequence. In the 
subsequent test, participants performed classification in the same modality (letters 
to letters or tones to tones) or in opposite modalities (letters to tones or tones to 
letters). The results indicated that prior exposure to the grammar led to increased 
performance relative to control groups who had received either random sequences 
or no training.
While this finding may at face value provide substantial evidence for the use of 
abstract rule knowledge, it is the extension to this preliminary finding that 
provides further interest. Altmann et al. (1995) performed post hoc analysis on 
their data and found that performance was above chance even for sequences 
where no element was repeated. For example, items such as MTXR do not 
contain a repeating element, whereas MTTTVT does contain repeating elements. 
This finding is interesting because it may allow a comparison with another view 
of transfer performance proposed by Brooks and Vokey (1991). In their view, 
subjects store whole strings and then use the similarity of those stored strings to 
new strings presented at test to drive analogical processing. Hence their view is 
known as the "abstract analogy" account of transfer performance. Repeated 
elements are important in this view because they allow analogy between strings
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to be drawn. For example, the string BBGXTR and WWSNPZ are similar on the 
basis of their repetition structure, this information could not be obtained from 
strings with no repetitions because the mapping of surface features is entirely 
arbitrary. Gomez, Gerken and Schvanveldt (2000) make the important point that 
such repetition structure is a route to testing the validity of the abstract analogies 
viewpoint. The prediction they made was that transfer can only occur where the 
items contain repeated elements, with no transfer when strings did not have 
repeated elements
So, returning to the Altmann et al. (1995) finding that transfer still occurs in the 
absence of repetitions, this would now seem to be evidence against the abstract 
analogy viewpoint. However, this finding should not affect the abstract rule 
based interpretation of transfer. If the grammar is abstracted in the training phase, 
this process should not occur any differently for repeated or non repeated 
elements. Hence, the grammar should simply be applied to the new domain.
Gomez, Gerken and Schvanveldt (2000) observed that the ungrammatical strings 
used for the post hoc comparison in the Altmann et al. study began with illegal 
elements. They note that these violations have been shown to be particularly 
salient for learners (see Reber and Allen, 1978; Reber and Lewis, 1977) which 
may account for the Altmann et al. (1995) findings. To address this issue, Gomez 
et al. set out to test whether subjects can demonstrate transfer of an identical 
grammar between two vocabularies where repetition of elements is not allowed 
by the grammar, and with materials without salient initial bigrams. In these 
conditions the participants in Gomez et al's experiment did not select grammatical
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items in the test phase with any greater frequency than non grammatical items. 
Therefore, it appears that transfer performance is more likely to be dependent on 
the kind of analogical processing that Brooks and Vokey (1991) originally 
proposed, rather than a view that emphasises abstraction of rules. Indeed, Gomez 
et al. make the point that people may have a bias to use information such as 
repetition patterns. They claim that this occurs because of the perceptual salience 
of these features.
The acquisition o f complex information in sequence learning 
There has been some debate about what particular information subjects use to 
demonstrate performance benefits in the sequence learning task. This debate is 
similar in some ways to the debate on transfer in the AGL literature, as it centres 
around the complexity of knowledge acquired by subjects. Reed and Johnson 
(1994) noted that the sequential movements that subjects respond to may not be 
balanced in terms of their frequency. For example, the transition from location 1 
to location 2 may be less frequent than the transition from location 2 to location 
3. In these circumstances, subjects may simply learn that the movement from 
location 2 to location 3 occurs more frequently and tend to use this information 
when responding to the targets. No learning of the relationships between the 
locations is required to show sensitivity. Reed and Johnson (1994) noted a 
number of other constraints that the sequence has, such as the absolute frequency 
of each location, for instance the stimulus may simply appear more frequently in 
location 2. In an attempt to control for these factors, Reed and Johnson (1994)
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used a procedure that allowed specific conclusions to be drawn on the 
information that subjects used to perform the task.
Reed and Johnson (1994) devised training and test sequences that differed only in 
second order condition (SOC) information. A SOC sequence is one in which 
every location is completely determined by the previous two locations, whereas 
knowing the previous location alone does not provide enough information to 
predict the current location. The training and test sequences were equated in 
terms of the transition frequency, location frequency and other confounding 
information. The response time at test was significantly slower than the training 
trials, indicating that subjects were able to learn complex SOC information. 
Furthermore, results from direct cued generation and recognition tests indicated 
that the information was implicit. Subsequently, Shanks and Johnstone (1998) 
have suggested that the design used by Reed and Johnson (1994) was flawed. 
When these flaws were corrected, subjects were able to reveal sequence 
knowledge in objective tests, indicating that SOC information cannot be learned 
without awareness.
Summary o f  the parallel systems account
Apart from dissociations between performance measures and verbal reports (see 
sect 1.7), proponents of separate learning systems suggest that the primary 
evidence in favour of separate conscious and unconscious learning systems is 
provided by neuropsychological studies. While data from neuropsychological 
patients provides impressive evidence in favour of separate learning modes, it 
must be subject to the same tight methodological constraints imposed on studies
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with normal subjects. In the majority of studies with amnesic patients these 
controls have not been taken into account. As dual task studies are subject to the 
same methodological considerations, this problem also applies to these studies. 
As a result, the evidence from neuropsychology and dual task studies cannot be 
considered to be conclusive.
The claim that unconscious learning yields abstract knowledge is cast into doubt 
by the finding that transfer in AGL does not occur when strings do not contain 
repeated elements (Gomez et al., 2000). This indicates that subjects have to rely 
on analogical processing of previously seen strings to drive transfer performance. 
As a result, it seems unlikely that the knowledge acquired in the AGL task is 
separate from the surface features of the training stimuli and is represented in an 
abstract form. This conclusion refutes the idea that implicit learning is a process 
that results in abstract knowledge, as suggested by Reber (1989). Furthermore, 
the finding that repetition structure is critical to transfer suggests that other 
knowledge, such as the similarity of training items to those at test may be 
involved in AGL. This issue will be addressed in the light of alternative accounts 
of implicit leaning, which are considered in the following sections. As explained 
earlier, these accounts do not propose the existence of separate learning systems, 
so the finding that performance is sensitive to the surface form of the stimuli may 
indirectly provide additional evidence against the idea of separate conscious and 
unconscious learning systems.
The assumption that the objective structure of the stimulus environment is 
acquired during training implies that learning proceeds in a unsupervised manner.
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The role of the subject is that of a passive learner who has little influence over the 
acquisition of the stimulus domain. This point has been neatly put by Cleeremans 
(1993)-
“a hallmark of implicit learning processes ... is that they proceed in a 
unintentional way ... any structure emerges as a result of [implicit] 
processing must be entirely stimulus driven”
Cleeremans (1993) pl3
cited by Whittlesea and Wright (1997)
This assumption of passivity contrasts strikingly with the other accounts of 
implicit learning. In the following discussion, it will become clear that 
participants in implicit learning experiments are not passive recipients of the 
stimulus structure, they actively process and manipulate the material they are 
presented with. It is this interaction with the stimulus that produces sensitivity to 
the structure. The dual system account fails to take account of the importance of 
this active processing, and this is why the alternative models that are described 
below offer a superior account of implicit learning.
1.8.2 Subjective unit formation account of implicit learning
The subjective unit formation account of implicit learning, proposed by Perruchet 
and Gallego (1998) focuses on how people structure the information that they are 
presented with. For example, in artificial grammar learning the strings can be 
thought of as made up from pairs or triplets of letters that frequently occur 
adjacent to one another. For example, the first two letters in a string may be “TV”
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in a large proportion of training strings. This division of letters could produce a 
knowledge base of permissible pairs that can be later used in the test. This 
account is not limited to AGL, Perruchet and Gallego (1998) argue that this 
process of division or parsing of stimuli is a fundamental process that shapes the 
phenomenal experience of the world.
The original motivation for this account of implicit learning originated from work 
by Dulany, Carlson and Dewey (1984) on the AGL task. In this study, during the 
grammaticality test subjects were asked to underline the part of the item they 
believed made the string grammatical or cross out the part of the string that made 
the string ungrammatical. They performed at above chance on this version of the 
task.
Perruchet and Pacteau's (1990) experiments were designed to focus specifically 
on the role of knowledge of permissible pairs of letters and the availability of this 
knowledge to conscious awareness. Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) demonstrated 
that grammaticality judgements of subjects initially studying letter strings did not 
differ from subjects learning from a list of bigrams that made up the strings. 
Further support for the formation of small chunks of letters is provided by the fact 
that the verbal reports of subjects who were asked to give instructions to a yoked 
partner following the training phase most frequently referred to bigrams or 
trigrams of letters (Mathews et al., 1989).
Data from sequence learning provides further evidence for the idea that subjects 
acquire constrained fragments or units of knowledge. Perruchet and Gallego
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(1998) cite Cleeremans (1993), who reports that even after considerable practice 
subjects are only influenced by trials four steps away from the current context. 
Furthermore, there is some further evidence that suggests that the task becomes 
more difficult as the number of predictive elements increases. Perruchet and 
Gallego (1990) note that in the study by Cohen, Ivry and Keele (1990), trials 
which are uniquely predicted by the preceding element (unique relationships) are 
easier to learn than associations where more elements are required to predict the 
current context (ambiguous relationships). This indicates that the division of 
structure into small elements is preferred to more complex longer elements.
It appears that there is evidence from a number of sources that small knowledge 
units can be used in implicit learning tasks to drive performance. This leaves the 
question of how these knowledge units are formed. According to Perruchet and 
Gallego (1998), this process of division or parsing of the training strings occurs 
by the action of associative processes. The formation of associations occurs as a 
result of the repeated presence of primitive elements in spatial contiguity (in the 
case of AGL) or temporal contiguity (in the case of sequence learning). For 
example, in AGL the letters are the primitive elements which occur in spatial 
contiguity. Repeated pairings of letters results in the formation of an associative 
unit, either two or more letters long. Perruchet and Gallego (1998) claim that the 
limitations of the size of the units may reflect the limited capacity of the 
perceptual attention system.
The break down of strings into fragments may sound rather like an abstraction of 
the original stimulus material. In a sense this is correct, what is important
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however, is that Perruchet and Gallego (1998) argue that these fragments are 
conscious. Therefore, there is no unconscious abstract knowledge base in this 
model. Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) presented all possible bigrams separately 
and asked the subjects to rate on a six point scale which they had seen before. The 
ratings indicated that the subjects had some explicit knowledge of the bigrams 
that the training strings were composed from. In addition, Dienes, Broadbent and 
Berry (1991) presented letter string stems and asked subjects what permissible 
continuations could occur. Again subjects appeared to have some knowledge of 
the bigrams that made up the strings. In sequence learning, Perruchet and 
Amorim (1992) demonstrated a correlation between RTs and chunks of trials that 
subjects had generated in an awareness test.
It may appear that, like Shanks and St John (1994), Perruchet and Gallego (1998) 
are simply claiming that the knowledge used in implicit learning tasks is explicit. 
Their view, however, goes further as it provides a role for implicit learning in 
how these units arrived in explicit memory. It is the process by which information 
is coded into fragments or units. Perruchet and Vinter (1997) define implicit 
learning as that which allows -
“subjects to pass from conscious perceptions and representations to other, 
generally better structured, conscious perceptions and representations, 
through the action of intrinsically unconscious mechanisms”
Perruchet and Vinter (1997) -  p44
The intrinsically unconscious mechanisms that they refer to here are the 
associative processes that group the primitives stimuli are made up from. Thus,
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the subjective experience of a particular stimulus domain changes with greater 
experience of the domain. Within this view, implicit learning is the structuring of 
the world from a phenomenological perspective. Since the structure subjects 
impose on stimuli in implicit learning experiments does not necessarily map onto 
what the experimenter believes the structure to be, verbal report often yields little 
useful information from the experimenter's perspective.
There are some researchers who argue that subjects used more than simply 
fragments of strings in artificial grammar learning. In a recent development, 
Meulemans and Van der Linden (1997) have built elements of the fragment view 
into a more traditional abstraction account. By balancing rule knowledge 
orthogonally to fragment knowledge they were able to demonstrate the use of 
both kinds of information. Half the test strings contained fragments in common 
with strings in the training phase (Associated) and half did not (Not Associated). 
This was coupled with the usual grammatical versus non grammatical items, 
making four conditions. The degree to which training and test strings had 
fragments in common was called associative chunk strength (ACS). Meulemans 
and Van der Linden (1997) also manipulated the amount of training items from a 
large number (125) to a small number (32). They found that when subjects 
received a small training set, they were biased to use fragmentary knowledge. 
However, in the situation where subjects had a much larger set of training stimuli, 
subjects appeared to use rule like knowledge. This work has been taken to be 
strong evidence for the use of rule and fragment knowledge under different 
circumstances in AGL. In response, Johnstone and Shanks (1999) noted that the
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training strings contained information about the locations of legal fragments and 
that this information was not included in the ACS measure used by Meulemans 
and Van der Linden (1997). Using a multiple regression procedure, Johnstone and 
Shanks (1999) were able to demonstrate that repeated chunks in new positions 
was a good predictor of performance, whereas grammaticality did not predict 
performance. These data suggest that the unit formation account is sufficient 
alone to account for the effect of set size.
It was suggested earlier that transfer to a novel symbol set in AGL can be 
achieved through the operation of analogical processes. This account of transfer 
performance is unlike the Perruchet and Gallego (1998) because it refers to the 
encoding of whole strings. There is some evidence, however, that a fragment 
account can also explain the transfer effect. Using toy models designed only to 
provide feasibility proof of performance, Redington and Chater (1996) were able 
to demonstrate that fragmentary knowledge may be used in transfer. The models 
provided a match with patterns of observed data. For example, they demonstrate 
superior performance on the same letter test in comparison with a changed letter 
test. These models, however, remain silent on the issue of repetition structure 
which has been shown to be a critical aspect of transfer performance (Gomez et 
al., 2000).
Concluding remarks on the subjective unit formation account 
The account of implicit learning described above involves a substantial shift in 
understanding what processes are involved in implicit learning tasks in 
comparison to the dual system account. In place of the unconscious abstraction of
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rules, the unit formation account proposes that implicit learning reflects the 
unconscious process of structuring a stimulus domain, and this structuring allows 
subjects to perform at above chance in implicit learning tasks.
There is a substantial amount of data that supports the claim that subjects build 
small units of information from the primitives that they are presented with in 
training. Further evidence suggests that these units are available to consciousness. 
This finding is significant for the debate on measures of awareness. These 
knowledge units were only defined as conscious when a direct measure of 
awareness was used. They are above the objective threshold, as defined by 
Dienes and Berry (1997), because when subjects see the fragments in a 
recognition procedure, they select them at above chance. However, when subjects 
are simply questioned about their metaknowledge, they are unable to report the 
existence of rules indicating that they are below the subjective threshold, as 
defined by Dienes and Berry (1997).
As noted earlier, some authors cast the status of implicit learning research as 
reflecting a debate between those who propose the existence of a system that 
abstracts rules unconsciously, and those who question the existence of such a 
system. It may be that casting implicit learning in this way isolates the findings of 
research in implicit learning. Perruchet, Vinter and Gallego (1997) argue that 
implicit learning should not be an isolated field, instead they argue “implicit 
learning is at the root of our conscious perception and representation of the world, 
and its importance for adaptive behaviour is crucial”. The important point here is 
that moving away from the debate on the existence of a unconscious learning
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system, and instead directing research into attempting to understand what other 
processes may be occurring has produced a powerful model of implicit learning. 
This model can generate a number of other testable predictions which will further 
the understanding of what knowledge is acquired when people encounter 
complex and structured stimulus domains.
1.8.3 Episodic Processing Account of Implicit Learning
From an early stage, the dual system account of implicit learning has been 
contrasted with an alternative account of implicit learning, the instance based 
account proposed by Brooks (1978). This account assumes that all training 
instances are encoded in full, and the decisions at test are based on the test 
instances' similarity to those presented during training. No abstract or average 
form of the training instances is stored in memory.
The episodic processing view is an extension of the instance account, suggesting 
that subjects encode more than just the training instance itself. This view 
distinguishes between instances and experiences o f instances, so that the manner 
with which the training instances were processed forms a integral part of the 
representation. This account is now the main competitor to the concept of parallel 
learning systems, as recent reviews of the field confirm (Dienes and Berry, 1997; 
Neal and Hesketh, 1997). This view borrows a good deal of its theoretical 
underpinnings from the instance account, so a description of progression of the 
instance account is necessary.
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An instance based account o f implicit learning
The instance account provides a very simple description of what knowledge is 
acquired in an implicit learning task, that is subjects only encode each exemplar 
as it is presented. The rule structure of the grammar is not represented in any 
abstract form, sensitivity to the structure of the grammar arises out the 
grammatical test items' greater similarity to those presented during the training 
period. Such use of prior exemplars does not imply that they are explicitly 
recalled or in fact recallable.
Brooks (1978) gave subjects exemplars that had been generated by two separate 
grammars. These were used in a paired associate learning task in which these 
strings were paired with English words. The strings of either grammar could be 
distinguished by its association to the category of the word to which it was paired. 
In this case, one grammar was associated with an Old World city and the other a 
New World city. Subjects subsequently informed of this distinction could 
classify the exemplars, whereas subjects who were not informed could not 
discriminate them. Brooks (1978) suggested that subjects were comparing test 
strings with specific items held in memory, using the specific paired associate as 
a cue. Reber and Allen (1978) proposed that although this suggests that subjects 
use exemplar knowledge and not abstract knowledge, the paired associate training 
conditions stressed close attention to the details of items. However, under 
conditions where subjects merely observed the strings, the particular details of the 
stimuli become less important with the emphasis switching to the abstraction of 
knowledge. Thus, Reber and Allen (1978) propose that the use of abstraction
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processes versus instance based encoding are balanced in such a way that 
conditions which promote one discourage the other. Vokey and Brooks (1992) 
called this view the "dual knowledge" approach. Within this explanation, 
unconscious processes are the default mode, so when the training task does not 
encourage instance encoding, rules will be acquired passively (see earlier on).
This "dual knowledge" analysis of performance was questioned by Vokey and 
Brooks (1992) who suggested that instance based models of memory (e.g Medin 
and Schaffer, 1978) could account for similarity to specific instances and, more 
importantly in this case, judgements of grammaticality. In these models, new 
grammatical items presented at test are likely to resemble a large amount of old 
grammatical items and so a difference between selection of grammatical versus 
non grammatical items can be explained by "retrieval time averaging". This 
process occurs when items' features are, for example, weighted for frequency in 
such a way that they represent the predictive significance of those features when 
determining the item's grammatical status. In addition, within these instance 
based accounts, it is straightforward to account for effects of similarity. Specific 
items within these models can have a disproportional influence by a "closeness to 
old" effect. The "closeness to old" effect occurs when a test item is very similar to 
a training item, so that the particular test item is selected regardless of its 
grammatical status. Thus, the independent effect of similarity and grammaticality 
can be accounted for by using "retrieval time averaging" or "closeness to old" 
processes within instance based accounts, without assumptions of separable 
knowledge bases. It is important to note that while these models do assume that
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some abstraction occurs, this abstraction is in no way represented in the 
knowledge base: it occurs during the retrieval process.
In order to support their claims, Vokey and Brooks (1992) manipulated similarity 
and grammaticality independently. They found that the effects of the two 
variables was in the majority of cases, additive, and each variable influenced both 
judgements of grammaticality and similarity. This lends support to the idea of a 
single knowledge base because knowledge was applied regardless of the task 
instructions. This is not the case for a dual knowledge view, as here knowledge of 
the grammar should be applied in a grammaticality test, with item knowledge 
being used in a similarity judgement. An even more significant finding was the 
effect of increasing item individuation by inducing mnemonic training conditions. 
As noted earlier, Reber and Allen (1978) suggested that increasing item 
differentiation should reduce effects of grammaticality because it reduces the 
opportunity for the default abstraction system to operate. Vokey and Brooks 
(1992) demonstrated that this was not the case, in none of their experiments did 
item individuation result in a decrease in the effect of grammaticality. In addition, 
Vokey and Brooks (1992) showed that increasing item individuation decreased 
the effect of specific similarity, suggesting that items can be too well 
differentiated to support transfer to new similar items, a finding which is hard to 
account for under a dual knowledge account.
The validity of the idea that subjects encode whole strings of letters can be 
questioned on the basis that encoding will not always be maximally efficient. 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) suggested that incomplete encoding of the training
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stimuli could result in an abstract code of the training stimuli. That is, failure to 
divert sufficient attention and effort to the training strings may result in only parts 
of their structure being encoded. Indeed, as Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) have 
demonstrated, fragments of training strings can be used to select grammatical 
items at above chance levels, without the need for the whole strings to be 
experienced. In fact, Vokey and Brooks (1994) have cast the fragment account to 
be partial encoding or fragmentary retrieval of material. Furthermore, Perruchet 
and Pacteau (1991) note that the conditions in which AGL performance is 
maximal, the observation condition of Reber and Allen’s (1978) experiment, are 
also those which are most likely to result in incomplete encoding of particular 
items. However, the results from the transfer of symbol set experiments 
conducted by Brooks and Vokey (1991) and Gomez et al. (2000) add support to 
the position that at some level the representation of whole strings may be 
important. In addition, there is some evidence that subjects use explicit mini rules 
generated from their experience with the stimuli (Dulany, 1984), such as “the first 
letter in the string is T”.
The episodic processing view
In response to these apparently contradictory findings of what information is used 
in the AGL task, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) propose the acquisition of various 
types of knowledge; fragments of strings, whole strings or explicit mini rules 
depending on the circumstances in which the learning occurs. In other words, this 
view emphasises that variability of the encoding conditions can produce different 
sorts of knowledge, and that this knowledge reflects the actual experience the
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subject had with the stimuli. This knowledge is then applied at test according to 
the extent to which the test task elicits similar processing experiences. Therefore, 
in this view the properties that the stimulus itself possesses is not necessarily 
represented or used at test. Different properties of the stimulus will be 
emphasised by different encoding tasks. This processing view of implicit learning 
draws on ideas from the transfer appropriate processing framework of memory 
(Morris, Bransford and Franks, 1977).
The episodic processing account assumes that “memory preserves experiences, 
not stimulus structures” (Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993 - p230). The nature of 
these experiences is an interaction between the stimulus structure and the 
processing performed upon it. Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) suggest that if the 
encoding task encourages subjects to seek features that are common to all training 
exemplars, representations are more likely to portray commonalities in the 
stimuli, as an abstraction account would suggest. If, however, the encoding task 
induces attention to the details of particular items, this would result in 
representations of particular items, as in instance based accounts. It is important 
to note that, in this view, the training task is central to the kind of representations 
formed. There is no default mode for learning, learning only occurs by active 
interaction with the stimulus structure.
The underlying principle has been neatly put by Whittlesea and Wright (1997) - 
p i83 "Until the subject encounters the stimuli and processes them in some way 
for some specific purpose, the effective structure of the set is not real but only 
potential, it has many potential states, some of which are catastrophically
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different". This idea guides the understanding of every aspect of what is 
happening in an implicit learning experiment. The deep structure of the stimulus 
set is never directly observed by the subject. Sensitivity to this deep structure 
arises, almost by accident, out the correlation between the subject’s set of 
experiences and that objective structure, not the objective structure itself. This 
leads to inaccurate reports on the rule structure of the grammar because people do 
not directly observe the structure, they instead report whatever elements helped 
them in satisfying the demands of the task.
Evidence for the use of processing episodes in AGL tasks has been presented by 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993). In their experiments, subjects memorised items 
generated by a grammar, either by pronouncing or spelling the items, then 
classification was conducted by pronouncing half the test examples and spelling 
the other half. Test performance was only reliable when study and test processing 
matched. Thus, the test performance was successful when it cued prior processing 
episodes. Interestingly, an almost identical pattern of data occurred when the 
classification and the recognition versions of the test task were used. Whittlesea 
and Dorken (1993) suggest that this is because subjects use knowledge of 
processing episodes in both type of test, resulting in the same performance. This 
finding is consistent with that of Vokey and Brooks (1992) (see earlier on).
Mathews and Rousell (1993) criticised the Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) studies 
on the basis that subjects' performance was selectively influenced and passive 
abstraction could not occur under these circumstances. In order to address these 
concerns, Whittlesea and Wright (1997) presented subjects with two categories
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that were formally identical but where the items were familiar in one case and 
unfamiliar in another. Subjects' also performed the same induction task on the 
stimuli. Therefore, the only manipulation was the familiarity of the category. 
Subjects' sensitivity to structure was highly influenced by the familiarity of the 
category showing that processing does not occur in a neutral manner or in 
isolation from the subjects' experience of the stimuli. Contrary to Mathews and 
Rousell's (1993) criticism that manipulating task demands artificially produces 
processing specificity, in this case even when the induction task was held 
constant, the stimulus was not processed in a neutral manner. This experiment 
adds further evidence to the view that suggests there is no default mode of 
processing.
Further support for the episodic account is derived from studies using 
biconditional grammars. These strings were eight elements long with a full stop 
separating the first and second halves. The grammar involved three separate rules 
indicating which letters must occur in the first and second halves of the string. 
The correspondence rules were X goes with T, P goes with C and S goes with V. 
According to these rules TPPV.XCCS would be a valid string. Johnstone and 
Shanks (2000) state that this grammar has three advantages over transitional finite 
state grammars. First, each of the rules can occur in any of the eight positions. 
Secondly, because the rule related positions have three intervening letters, it is 
possible to unconfound rule and fragment knowledge. Finally, the grammatical 
status of a particular string is easy to determine as all grammatical strings contain 
three valid rules. This type of grammar is significant because it allows the effect
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of the training task to have separate effects on different types of structural 
relationships, fragmentary aspects of the strings and rule aspects of the strings.
Shanks, Johnstone and Staggs (1997) used two induction tasks with a 
biconditional grammar, one condition which encouraged rule learning {edit task) 
and another which involved more standard orienting conditions {match task). 
Subjects in the match condition were at chance in judging grammaticality but 
they were highly sensitive to the fragment structure of the strings. The data 
collected by Shanks, Johnstone and Staggs (1997) was unambiguous; when the 
fragments were familiar, participants showed a greater preference for 
ungrammatical strings than grammatical. In the edit task, subjects were shown 
flawed examples of strings and were asked to indicate which letters they thought 
occurred wrongly, after which they were given feedback. This encouraged the use 
of an hypothesis testing strategy to increase rule learning. Here subjects 
performed well on judging grammaticality with no effect of whole item 
similarity, suggesting that the knowledge used was the principles of the grammar. 
In a further study, Johnstone and Shanks (2000) have shown that subjects in the 
edit condition are much less sensitive to familiar fragmentary elements. 
Additionally, subjects were shown to have good awareness of the rule structure in 
the edit condition. This not only suggests that subjects were indeed using the rule 
structure rather than the surface features of the strings, but they may have been 
using this knowledge with full conscious awareness. Johnstone and Shanks 
(2000) suggested that their data were consistent with the episodic processing 
since subjects only acquired rules when the orienting task focused on them, and
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where subjects attention was left unconstrained, knowledge of fragments became 
more important.
It is significant that Johnstone and Shanks (2000) demonstrated that rule-like 
knowledge may be formed with detectable levels of awareness when subjects are 
directed towards that aspect of the stimulus structure. This finding is in line with 
four predictions made by Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) on how sensitivity to 
stimulus structure interacts with conscious awareness -
• One is aware of some knowledge if the task draws attention to that 
knowledge.
• The incidental learning conditions that are typical in implicit learning 
experiments tend to mask the fact that knowledge acquired incidentally will 
be relevant later on.
• One needs some kind of theory about how knowledge that one has is actually 
relevant to the task in hand in order to verbalise that knowledge.
• Knowledge learning with awareness may be expressed as an unconscious 
influence rather than an explicit act of remembering. This may be 
complicated in cases where the relevant knowledge is inherently distributed, 
as is often the case when participants are exposed to many exemplars.
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) claim that all four factors are reasons why learning 
can occur without accurate verbal reports. They maintain, however, that these 
predictions arise from the general principles of learning, and not from the 
existence of a separate unconscious learning mode. This implies that the findings 
of implicit learning studies should not be considered in isolation, as some unique
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attribute of cognition which is demonstrated under certain circumstances, but as 
findings that are relevant to the understanding of learning in all circumstances.
The limitations o f the episodic account
The encoding of all processing episodes during training is not taken as a plausible 
knowledge base by all authors. Perruchet, Gallego and Vinter (1997) argue that 
the life time accumulation of episodes is unrealistic as would lead to a linearly 
increasing number of episodes from infancy to old age. This position is echoed by 
Mathews and Rousell (1993), who express concern over the efficiency of a 
system that stores such a vast amount of information. Neal and Hesketh (1997) 
respond by suggesting that such criticism is based on intuitive conceptions of the 
mind, and that there are no empirical data to suggest that storage capacity should 
act as a constraint on accounts of implicit learning.
Seger (1994) points out that implicit learning is demonstrated through several 
different dependent measures. According to Seger (1994), these dependent 
measures reflect different response modalities, conceptual fluency, efficiency and 
prediction and control. Experimental tasks can be classified according to these 
modalities, so for example, artificial grammar learning reflects conceptual 
fluency, while sequence learning reflects efficiency. This classification highlights 
the necessity for theories of implicit learning to take account of data from 
different response modalities. A problem with the episodic account is that the 
experimental evidence which supports this view is drawn solely from 
classification experiments with artificial grammar strings. However, other
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evidence may indirectly provide evidence for the episodic processing account if 
the theoretical foundations of the account are considered in a more broad sense.
The episodic processing account of learning has much in common with the 
procedural view of cognition, proposed by Kolers and Roediger (1984). Within 
this framework, information is not represented as an object in memory, but in 
terms of skill in manipulating symbols. Thus, there is no distinction to be drawn 
between symbols versus processes or descriptions versus actions, all cognition is 
described in terms of skills or procedures. For example, the retrieval of the word 
“bicycle” from memory is no different from the act of riding a bicycle, they both 
reflect skilled interaction with symbols. This emphasis on interaction is the basis 
of the episodic model, as subjects actively process and interact with the training 
stimuli leading to test sensitivity. Thus, the processing view of implicit learning 
predicts that the stimulus domain must be actively engaged by subjects during 
training.
Findings from the sequence learning task support this conclusion that the stimulus 
must be actively responded to during training, Willingham (1999) demonstrated 
that subjects who merely watched .stimuli did not demonstrate learning of the 
stimulus sequence. This indicates that the subjects have to interact or respond to 
the stimulus to learn the sequence itself, it is not sufficient to passively observe 
the stimulus sequence. However, when certain subjects demonstrated a high level 
of explicit knowledge, indexed by a free recall of the sequence, learning of the 
sequence by observation was demonstrated by these subjects. It appears that this 
explicit knowledge is responsible for the learning in this case.
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This explicit knowledge may have arisen through mental practice of the sequence 
movements. Pascual-Leone (1993) demonstrated that mental practice can result in 
sequence learning without an overt response. However, there are other studies 
that have failed to demonstrate learning following mental practice only (e.g. 
Reber and Squire, 1998; Shanks and Cameron, 2000). Shanks and Cameron 
(2000) claim this discrepancy may be the result of the highly salient sequence 
elements used by Pascual-Leone (1993). The elusive effect of mental practice is 
confirmed by the Willingham (1999) study, as only a small number of subjects 
demonstrated significant explicit knowledge.
Shanks and Cameron (2000) suggested that the processing account of learning 
(Kolers and Roediger, 1984) may be able to account for the weak effect of mental 
practice. The processing account proposes that if the operations during training 
are duplicated by similar operations during the test phase, learning will be 
revealed. They claim that mental practice may result in mental imagery skill with 
the sequence, and this mental imagery may not transfer efficiently to the test, 
resulting in weak effects. It may be that when this mental imagery is highly 
salient, it may be useful in guiding performance at test. Indeed, when the target 
stimulus changes colour to make salient certain aspects of the sequence, 
observational learning can occur (Kelly, Burton and Riedel, 1999).
This understanding of how the episodic processing model can account for 
sequence learning is incomplete. The episodic processing model rests on the 
assumption that test performance is driven by reference to previous processing 
experiences. It is difficult to conceive how episodic information can be useful in,
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for example, the SRT task. Thus, although the episodic model is a powerful 
account of performance on classification tasks, it falls short of a complete 
explanation of all experimental data.
1.9 Summary of theoretical considerations
Early interpretations of implicit learning assumed the existence of a learning 
system that unconsciously and passively acquires abstract representations of a 
stimulus environment which are later applied at test (e.g. Reber, 1989). However, 
the finding that performance in the AGL task does not transfer to a changed letter 
set provides evidence against the conclusion that abstract knowledge is acquired 
in this task. Furthermore, the neuropsychological and dual task evidence that has 
been presented in favour of the operation of parallel conscious and unconscious 
learning systems is subject to the same methodological problems as single task 
designs with normal subjects (see sect 1.8.1), rendering this evidence equivocal. 
As a result, alternative accounts of implicit learning have been put forward as 
superior explanations.
Perruchet and Gallego (1998) suggest that small units of information are acquired 
during training in implicit learning tasks. Following training, a large amount of 
these small chunks of information are stored, which can then be used at test to 
perform at above chance levels. This account, therefore, assumes that a preferred 
level of information is acquired. In this sense, the unit formation account is 
similar to the parallel system view, as both set a default level of knowledge.
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In contrast, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) suggest that there is no preferred level 
of information acquired during training. Within the episodic processing account, 
the level information that is acquired is dependent on the processing demands of 
the induction phase. Therefore, distinct forms of knowledge can be acquired from 
the stimuli with the same underlying structure. Induction tasks that focus on parts 
of stimuli may result in the fragmentary kind of knowledge proposed by 
Perruchet and Gallego (1998). Alternatively, a task that focuses on individual 
stimuli may result in the representation of whole exemplars in memory.
This is the critical aspect of the processing view. No level of structure is the 
default for processing; any level can be represented according to the demands of 
the task. Hence, the use of fragmentary information (as proposed by Perruchet 
and Gallego [1998]) is perfectly compatible with the episodic processing account. 
However, the acquisition of abstract information that is held separately from 
episodic information is inconsistent with the episodic processing view. Therefore, 
the greatest theoretical contrast is between the episodic processing and parallel 
systems accounts.
The episodic processing view suggests that the information that subjects use at 
the test is correlated with the abstract structure of the training items, and since 
subjects are not aware of this correlation, they are not able to verbalise anything 
pertinent to the rule structure. If critical aspects of stimuli are stored in this 
indirect way, then it is reasonable to assume that they may be accessible under 
certain circumstances. This type of explanation aligns with some observations of 
what subjects do in fact verbalise following training, given the correct retrieval
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conditions. For example, Dienes and Berry (1997) have reported that cued tests 
can elicit some limited awareness following implicit learning experiments. So it 
appears that the knowledge acquired in implicit learning is on the "fringe" of 
consciousness (as suggested by Seger, 1994), rather than completely inaccessible.
It has been argued that implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge form the 
endpoints of a continuum (e.g. Berry and Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1997). If so, 
knowledge that is on the "fringe" of consciousness may be somewhere in the 
centre of this domain. However, there is no empirical evidence that such a 
continuum exists in the human learning system. For this reason, it is more likely 
that test relevant knowledge is on the edges of consciousness as a result of its 
indirect relationship with information which is directly processed during training. 
While this position should not be cast as refuting the existence of learning 
without awareness as a real experimental phenomenon, it does deny the existence 
of a separate unconscious learning mode to explain it.
A key aspect of the episodic processing account is the constant activity of the 
learner during training. In contrast, the parallel systems account of implicit 
learning assumes that unconscious learning is automatic. For example, Reber 
(1997) states "a system bereft of consciousness is one that operates fully 
automatically" (p49). It is on this issue that the episodic processing view contrasts 
most strikingly, as here the operations that are carried out during training directly 
control performance in the test. The subjective unit formation account remains 
silent on the issue of whether implicit learning is an automatic process or an 
active process, and this reinforces the point that the most significant theoretical
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contrast is between the parallel system and episodic processing views. In the light 
of this, and the earlier suggestion that the use of fragmentary information is 
perfectly consistent with the episodic view, from here on, only the parallel 
system and episodic processing views will be considered.
A concern for the episodic processing account of implicit learning is that the 
evidence cited in its support is universally taken from classification or recognition 
tasks. An increasing proportion of recent literature on implicit learning focuses on 
findings from the sequence learning task, a fact that is problematic for the 
generality of the episodic processing account. However, the episodic processing 
account is theoretically close to the Kolers and Roediger (1984) model of skill 
acquisition. If the episodic account is taken to incorporate predictions made by 
the Kolers and Roediger (1984) model, then this framework can provide an 
explanation of sequence learning performance. This indicates that the findings of 
implicit learning tasks can be integrated into a general account of learning, using 
a single set of principles to understand the learning of different types of 
information in varying experimental contexts.
1.10 Preview of the experimental chapters
Research in the field of implicit learning has largely been concerned with 
attempting to prove or disprove one interpretation of the phenomenon, which 
casts implicit learning as representing the operation of an unconscious learning 
system (e.g. Reber, 1989). This has essentially boiled down to a debate on the 
ability of awareness measures to detect conscious knowledge (Shanks and SUohn, 
1994; Dienes and Berry, 1997; Neal and Hesketh, 1997). Alternative definitions
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of what constitutes unconscious learning are taken by those who support the 
concept of a separate unconscious learning system (e.g. Dienes and Berry, 1997), 
and those who question its existence (Shanks and St John, 1994). Thus, the 
debate on this issue has reached something of an impasse (see sect 1.7). Within 
this thesis, implicit learning is construed as a experimental phenomenon that may 
be explained by one of two competing theoretical interpretations, the parallel 
system account mentioned above, and the episodic processing view (Whittlesea 
and Dorken, 1993).
The principle aim of this thesis is to discriminate between these two accounts, by 
focusing on their main points of departure. The first of these is the role of active 
processing in implicit learning, and the second is the information acquired in 
implicit learning tasks. An additional theme that will be addressed in this thesis is 
a specific prediction peculiar to the episodic account. This prediction suggests 
that the processing demands of the training and test phases must be consistent for 
successful performance at test. These aspects of the accounts do not specifically 
address the issue of conscious awareness, which has proved contentious 
elsewhere.
The main themes recur throughout this body of work, while the general structure 
of this thesis is guided by more specific experimental questions, which will be 
addressed in detail at the outset of each chapter.
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Chapter 2 The Efficacy of Implicit Invariance Learning
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, recent findings using the Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) task 
were discussed. One finding concerned the demonstration of transfer effects in 
the AGL task. That is, training is carried out on one letter set, with the test items 
constructed from a different letter set, and appreciable learning can still be 
revealed on the changed letter set (e.g. Mathews et al., 1989). An understanding 
of this effect is that the grammar from which the items are constructed has been 
acquired by the subject, and can be applied regardless of surface form (e.g. Reber, 
1989). This understanding has been questioned on the grounds that certain salient 
items can be used to perform at above chance levels on the transfer test, without 
the grammar itself being represented in any way (e.g. Brooks and Vokey, 1991). 
Such a suggestion has implications for findings of transfer in other tasks. One 
such task is the McGeorge and Burton (1990) invariant learning task. Experiment 
1 investigates transfer in this task with reference to the contribution of salient 
items, which have proved to be important in this task in other work (Wright and 
Burton, 1995).
A further finding in the AGL literature that may be relevant to the invariant 
learning task, is the contribution of encoding episodic information (e.g. 
Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993). The role of this type of information is investigated 
in further experiments in this chapter. In the course of investigating these 
processes, it will be seen that the invariant learning task reveals very small
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learning effects (Experiment 3). These effects may initially raise methodological 
issues relating to the sensitivity of the test task. However, they represent more 
interesting points relating to the interaction between test task and training task 
demands. These issues are addressed in the final experiment in the chapter 
(Experiment 5), where the role of the training task is investigated.
2.2 Implicit learning of an invariant
In the original McGeorge and Burton (1990) study, participants were asked to 
perform some task (such as arithmetic) on 30 four-digit numbers. Each four digit 
number contained a “3” digit; this fact was not pointed out to the participants. In 
a subsequent recognition task, 10 pairs of four-digit numbers were presented to 
subjects one at a time. In each pair one number contained a “3” (positive) and one 
did not (negative). Subjects were then falsely told they had seen one of the 
numbers in the study phase and they must indicate which of the numbers they had 
seen. A robust effect was observed for participants choosing the positive over the 
negative. This effect was seen to persist over different encoding tasks, and when 
the format of test materials was changed from study to test phase (i.e. learning 
items seen as digits and test items appeared as words). In a post task question 
session, subjects were unable to report anything pertinent to the invariant digit. 
They concluded that performance on this task was driven by semantic knowledge 
of the invariant feature, and that this knowledge was implicit.
Wright and Burton (1995) have questioned this assertion, by suggesting that it is 
not necessary to learn an invariance rule to perform at above chance performance 
on this task. They propose that subjects may have been rejecting salient negatives
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on the basis of information that is more prevalent in these test items. The 
information to which they refer concerns repetitions within the four digit numbers 
(e.g. 4667, 2862 etc), these numbers being more distinctive at test. Constraining 
the positive items to contain “3” reduces the possibility of repetitions within the 
strings. Therefore, fewer positive items than negative items contained repetitions 
in the test stimuli. As stated before, items with repetitions would be rejected at 
test because they are salient. Hence, fewer positive items would be rejected in the 
test. This would allow participants to score at artificially high levels. To 
investigate this possibility, they constrained test pairs in two ways, namely where 
one item contained a repetition and another competing item did not, or where 
neither contained repetitions (neutral).Thus, it is possible to examine the effect of 
repetitions independently from any effect of the invariant. Where one item 
contained a repetition, this could occur in the negative (e.g. 2447), so biasing the 
response to the positive (towards), or the positive (e.g. 1138) in turn biasing the 
response to the negative (against). Performance was better predicted by rejection 
of salient items than selection of positives.
There remained, however, an indication that the invariant still exerted an 
influence over performance, and there were three pieces of evidence to support 
this. Firstly, in the Neutral condition the effect was marginally significant, with 
selection of positives at 59% (as chance was at 50%). Secondly, in the Against 
condition, if rejection of salient items was solely controlling performance it 
would be expected that the salient positive should have biased selection to the 
negative. However, selection was not significantly biased to the less salient
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negative. Thirdly, when the three groups were collapsed together, there was a 
significant trend to select the positive. This would not be expected if rejection of 
salient items was the only process occurring in this task. Performance should be 
symmetrical with respect to chance performance across the three groups, yielding 
chance performance when the three groups are collapsed.
This rejection strategy becomes more important when considering the transfer 
knowledge of the invariant to different formats (McGeorge and Burton, 1990). 
That is, subjects presented with training stimuli as digits (3567 etc) would select 
positives with a greater probability even when test stimuli were words (three five 
six seven). McGeorge and Burton (1990) suggested that since the effect was not 
tied to surface features, subjects had acquired semantic information about the 
invariance. This effect was likened to other transfer effects found in the implicit 
learning literature, where knowledge does not appear to be tied to the surface 
form (e.g. Mathews, 1989). It is represented in an abstract manner, and can be 
applied regardless of surface characteristics.
Importantly, the cross format transfer condition of the McGeorge and Burton 
study (Experiment 2) reveals a smaller effect than where study and test items 
were consistent (Experiment 1). It may be that the lowering occurs because 
subjects are now relying on the rejection strategy alone, with the small effect of 
invariant sensitivity removed by the change in surface form. That is, the transfer 
effect demonstrated by McGeorge and Burton (1990) may be an artefact resulting 
from the use of the rejection strategy, made possible by the presence of salient 
repetition items.
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2.3 Experiment 1
It is the purpose of Experiment 1 to investigate the validity of the cross format 
transfer effect in implicit invariance learning. The cross format effect occurs 
when subjects are presented with strings in one format (e.g. words -  nine three 
six one) at study and at test the format is changed to another format (e.g. digits - 
2431). Earlier on it was suggested that the rejection strategy demonstrated by 
Wright and Burton (1990) might be sufficient to account for performance in the 
cross format conditions. So, it is important to make transparent the contribution 
of both the rejection strategy and any sensitivity to invariance in this task.
To this end, a set of training strings were constructed that corresponded to the 
invariance rule, all containing the digit ‘3’. These strings were written out as 
words (e.g. three nine seven two). Subjects were then presented with the positive 
versus negative forced choice test. Here the strings were presented as number 
strings (e.g. 5671 against 2315), so that the format was different at test in 
comparison to training conditions. As in Wright and Burton (1995), there were 
three conditions at test; Towards, Against and Neutral. The towards test items are 
constrained so that there is a salient repetition in the negative (e.g. 5661) but not 
in the positive (e.g. 3298). In the Against items, the positive item contains a 
salient repetition (e.g. 3224), while the negative does not (e.g. 4651). Finally, 
neither of the neutral items contain repetitions (e.g. 2314 against 7659). This 
design is identical to that of Wright and Burton (1995) except for one aspect, 
there is a change in surface features between the study and test phase.
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In the Wright and Burton (1995) study, when the three conditions were grouped 
together they displayed a significant but weak bias towards selecting the positive, 
and a much more powerful bias towards rejecting distinctive repetition items. If 
the rejection strategy is responsible for the cross format transfer found by 
McGeorge and Burton (1990), then it should be clearly demonstrated by a bias to 
select positives in the Towards condition, reject negatives in the Against 
condition, and no bias in towards selecting positives in the Neutral condition. 
More importantly though, there should be no general bias to select positives over 
the three conditions.
A finding that shows a consistently strong bias to reject salient negative items at 
test, even when the surface features are changed, would add further evidence to 
the position that this process occurs in a different way to that of sensitivity to 
invariance. The data that were reported in the original Wright and Burton (1995) 
study suggested that this rejection strategy occurred explicitly. A minority of 
participants (20%) reported using rejection of unseen “doubles” as a strategy 
when guessing. This was taken as evidence that some subjects were using this 
strategy to aid performance. However, such assertions must be taken with some 
caution for two reasons. Firstly, these verbal reports may not be entirely accurate. 
Secondly, five subjects' responses cannot be taken to represent the whole. 
Therefore, more evidence is required to dissociate the explicit rejection of 
negatives from sensitivity to an invariance rule. If such sensitivity to invariance 
does not transfer across scripts and the explicit rejection of negatives does, these 
effects may be underlain by different mechanisms. Modifying the Wright and
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Burton (1995) study by introducing transfer from study to test could allow this 
distinction to be demonstrated.
Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow took 
part in the experiment. They were naive to the experimental hypothesis and 
procedures.
Materials. Study sets were generated individually for each subject. First, a set 
of 30 positive items was generated. A positive is defined as a four digit number 
that contains one "3" digit, a negative being a four digit number that does not 
contain a "3". There were two other stipulations; none of the numbers included a 
zero digit and there were no digits that repeated among the four. The study set 
items were printed as words, e.g. 3756 would appear as "three seven five six". For 
the test items, four further lists of numbers were generated for each subject: 12 
positives with no repetitions, 6 negatives with repetitions, 12 negatives with no 
repetitions and 6 positives with repetitions. Repetitions within strings did not 
involve any more than two digits repeating (e.g. 3445), and these are referred to 
as Doubles. Test pairs were randomly selected so that each subject received 12 
pairs, 4 from each of the 3 conditions. In the towards condition a Negative 
Double is paired with a Positive Non Double. The neutral condition involves both 
items as Non Doubles and in the against condition the Positive is a Double paired 
with a Negative Non Double. Test items were constrained so that none were 
identical to any in the study set.
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Design and Procedure. This was a within subjects experiment: All subjects were 
exposed to the 30 study items, followed by 4 test pairs from each of the 3 
conditions; towards, neutral and against.
The experiment is divided into three phases: a learning phase, a test phase and a 
test of explicit knowledge. In the learning phase, participants were given 30 
positives on slips of paper printed with the 4 digits as words. The slips of paper 
were removed from the envelope one at a time. The sum of the first two digits 
was compared with that of the second. If the sum of the first two was larger than 
the second, then the participants marked the slip with a tick; if the sum was 
smaller then they marked it with a cross and if the sums were equal they left the 
slip blank. This orienting task is the same as that utilised by Wright and Burton 
(1995).
The participants were then presented with a surprise test. Twelve pairs were 
presented, four from each condition, one at a time, and the participants were 
falsely told that they had seen one item from each test pair before. They were 
asked to circle the item they had seen before.
Following the test phase, subjects were given a test of explicit knowledge, which 
contained three questions. Participants were asked to answer the first of these 
three questions before turning the paper over to reveal the final question. The 
questionnaire read as follows:
Could you please answer the following questions in order? Answer all questions 
even if you feel you are repeating information.
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1. Did you notice anything systematic about the numbers in the first part of the 
experiment?
2. Did any of the numbers appear more frequently than any others?
3. One number appeared more frequently than any other during the first part of 
the experiment. Could you circle the number that you think it was: If you’re not 
sure then please guess.
One two three four five six seven eight nine 
Results
The means for the three conditions are shown below.
Condition Positives selected
Mean No (out of 4) SD Percentage
Against 0.83 (0.95) 21%
Neutral 2.17 (1.02) 54%
Towards 3.27 (0.79) 82%
The mean number of positives selected was 6.3 (out of a maximum 12), SD = 
1.39. A one sample t-test showed that this was not significantly greater than 
chance performance of 6, t (29) = 1.05. The mean number of positives selected in 
each condition is shown above. An Analysis of Variance showed a main effect of 
condition, F (2, 87) = 52.2, p < 0.01. Tukey HSD t-tests indicated that there were
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significant differences between neutral and against, with further differences 
between towards and the other two conditions.
Following this, these scores were tested against chance performance (2.0 for each 
condition). For the Towards condition more positives were selected than would 
be expected by chance, t (29) = 8.84, p < 0.01; for the Neutral condition the 
number of positives selected was not different from chance, t (29) = 0.9. Finally, 
in the Against condition the number of positives selected was significantly below 
chance performance, t (29) = - 6.7, p < 0.01.
From the above table it can be seen that in the Towards condition items 
containing repetitions were rejected on 81.7% of occasions, and in the Against 
condition these items were rejected on 79.2% of occasions. Over the two 
conditions repetitions were classified as unseen on 80.5%. This is far greater than 
the selection of the Positive containing the invariant (performance at 52%).
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 98.5% of the study strings.
Test o f Explicit Knowledge. No participant reported anything related to the 
invariant in response to the question, "Did you notice anything systematic about 
the numbers in the first part of the experiment?". Four participants mentioned the 
invariant at the question "did any of the numbers appear more frequently than any 
others?”. Two participants produced the invariant along with other digits and the 
remaining two produced the invariant on its own. These participants went on to 
circle the "three" in the response to the question which instructed subjects to 
indicate which number was most frequent. The mean for these subjects was 6,
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which was below the mean for the remainder of the group. Two others mentioned 
the invariant with other digits in response to the second question, but failed to 
indicate this in response to the last question that was most specific.
Discussion
The results of this experiment indicate that the participants still demonstrate a 
tendency to reject salient negatives when surface structure is changed. There was 
no longer any influence of the invariant at test. Firstly, the effect of the positive 
selection in the Neutral condition was no longer marginal. In the Against 
condition, participants rejected positive at a level that was greater than expected 
by chance. This is unlike Wright and Burton (1995), where subjects failed to 
reject the distinctive positive to above chance levels. When all three conditions 
are collapsed, the bias to selection of positives demonstrated by Wright and 
Burton (1995) was not found when surface features were changed.
These findings indicate that the effect demonstrated by McGeorge and Burton 
(1990) in experiment 2 and 3 could be attributed to rejection of salient negatives 
alone with no contribution from invariance learning. It would appear that 
invariance learning is sensitive to surface features. This finding indicates that the 
knowledge used in this task is not held at an abstract level separate from the 
physical manifestations of the stimuli. The data reported here does not allow any 
further discussion, although it will be addressed later on in the chapter.
The fact that rejection of salient items is insensitive to surface structure is not 
surprising if the perspective advocated by Wright and Burton (1995) is followed.
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They suggest that negatives are rejected by a metacognitive process, the items’ 
salient repetition structure provides a cue that this particular item is novel and did 
not occur in the study set. A change in surface structure between training and test 
should have no effect on this process. The evidence from this experiment would 
add further weight to this view. The fact that the selection of positives and the 
rejection of repetitions respond differently to surface changes, suggests that they 
are separable processes.
Subsequent to this work, Stadler, Warren and Lesch (2000) have carried out a 
similar experiment on cross form transfer. They demonstrate that the transfer 
observed in McGeorge and Burton (1990) depended on the use of the rejection 
strategy. When repetitions were removed from the training and test materials, no 
transfer was observed. The difference between this study and the current study is 
that here the effect of rejection of salient items and selection of positives was 
compared within the same experiment and were shown to be separable processes.
Stadler et al. refer to the lack of cross format effects as “hyperspecificity” of 
transfer. They suggest that this is similar to the sensitivity to surface feature 
changes demonstrated in the implicit memory literature. To explain these effects, 
they cite the processing view of implicit memory (e.g. Roediger, Weldon and 
Challis, 1999). This view suggests that learning and memory depend upon a 
match between processing performed during study, and that occurring at test. 
They suggest that the sensitivity to surface form demonstrated by their data 
indicates that materials need to be the same between study and test for any effects 
to occur. This suggests that if the materials are different, processing during study
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and test do not match, and the result is that performance drops to chance levels. 
This account would seem to receive further support from the results of 
Experiment 1.
These data replicate the findings of Wright and Burton (1995), by showing the 
power of this rejection strategy. Although rejecting salient negatives may be a 
powerful determinant of performance, it cannot be the only factor at work. 
Stadler, Warren and Lesch (2000) showed that the learning can be demonstrated 
with no salient repetition items included in the study materials. In addition, as 
explained earlier, there was a marginal learning effect evident in the Wright and 
Burton (1995) data. It may be that the invariant can still exert some influence 
over and above the rejection of salient repetitions. Alternatively, it may be that 
the positive versus negative forced choice test could be subject to more artefacts 
than simply the prevalence of repetitions in the test negatives. For example, 
subjects may reject numbers made salient for historical reasons (e.g. 1939, 1812 
or 1066). Alternatively, numbers can be salient for personal reasons, like 
birthdays and bank account PIN numbers. It is important to ensure subjects 
cannot use rejecting negative items as a strategy at any stage. This will allow the 
effect of selecting positives to be taken seriously as the process underlying 
performance in this experiment. This issue is investigated in Experiment 2.
2.4 Experiment 2
To date, all research on the McGeorge and Burton (1990) task has used the 
standard forced choice procedure that places a novel positive against a novel 
negative. This test configuration relies on the assumption that the positive item is
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selected against a neutral negative. The data reported by Wright and Burton 
(1995) would suggest that this reasoning may be flawed and that the negative 
may be, at the least, equally important in driving performance. Their stimuli 
were, however, contrived to reveal the strong effects of rejection of salient 
negative items solely on the basis of their repetition structure.
There is other evidence to suggest that negative instances may not be neutral to 
the task demands. Ward and Churchill (1998) demonstrated that subjects could be 
sensitive to negative items over positives in a forced choice test. In their 
experiment, subjects were presented with a training set consisting entirely of 
negative items, so that none of the strings contained a ‘3’. At test, significantly 
more negative strings than positives were selected. This experiment did not 
control for repetitions in the study or test strings so it must be considered with 
some caution. However, what it does illustrate is that the negative can influence 
judgements towards selection rather than rejection in certain circumstances. It 
appears then, that the negative can destabilise performance in this task, and this 
hinders our understanding of what knowledge, if any, is acquired during the 
training phase.
The next experiment attempts to demonstrate knowledge of invariance indirectly, 
and without the need for a positive versus negative forced choice. It may be that 
an invariant feature could exert a dilution effect on a recognition judgement. This 
could occur by placing a seen positive against a novel positive in one condition, 
with a seen negative and a novel negative in a second condition. Thus, both items 
in the test either contain the invariant “3” (in the positive condition) or neither
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contain the invariant “3” (in the negative condition). The novel positive item 
would have the invariant in common with the training stimuli and the novel 
negative would not. The novel positive may, therefore, influence subjects more 
than the novel negative item, diluting any recognition effect of the old positive in 
comparison to recognition performance of the old negative.
In the following experiment, the test of invariance is modified so that knowledge 
is examined by dilution of a response in a recognition test. The aim of this is to 
rule out the role of rejecting negative items in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) 
task.
Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate Psychology students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for their time. 
They were naive with respect to the experimental hypothesis and procedures.
Materials. A computer program generated the digit strings individually for each 
participant. The study items involved 32 four-digit strings of which 26 followed 
the invariance rule. In this case the invariance rule stipulated the strings must 
conform to the criterion that the four digit number contains one digit “3”. These 
were known as Positives, if the number did not contain “3” it was classified as a 
Negative. None of the four digit strings contained zero digits. The strings were 
constrained so that none of the strings contained repeated digits. A further 6 
Positives and 6 Negatives were produced for the test materials. These were 
constructed to be different from any item in the study set.
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Six Positives and Negatives were randomly selected from the study set to make 
old items. This resulted in 6 test pairs that included one novel positive with one 
old and another 6 test pairs that contained one novel negative with one old.
Design and Procedure. The experiment had a within subjects design. There were 
two conditions; in both the subjects were presented with an old item paired with a 
novel item. In the Positive condition both included the invariant, and in the 
Negative condition the invariant was absent from the alternatives.
The experiment was divided into three phases: a learning phase, a test phase, and 
a test of explicit knowledge. In the study phase the subjects were shown the 26 
positives and 6 negatives on slips of paper. The orienting task was the same 
addition and comparison as in Experiment 1.
Immediately after subjects had completed this task for all 32 items, they were 
given a surprise test. Ten slips of paper were presented one at a time, containing 
one seen item against one novel item. These were divided into two conditions as 
described above. The left-right positioning of the items was randomly determined 
for each pair. Subjects were asked to circle the number they had seen before. If 
they were unsure, subjects were asked to guess. Finally, they were given a test of 
explicit knowledge, which was identical to the type presented in Experiment 1.
Results
The mean number of seen items in each condition is shown in the table below.
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Test Materials Old strings selected (out of 6)
Mean No. SD
Positive 3.9 1.25
Negative 3.8 0.83
The mean number of seen items selected by the 20 subjects was 3.85 (out of a 
maximum 6), SD = 1.05. A one-sample t-test showed that this was significantly 
greater than chance performance o f3 ,r (1 9 )  = 5 .1 1 ,p < 0 .0 1 .A  t-test for paired 
samples showed no effect of condition, t (19) = 0.29, p > 0.1.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 97.3% of the study strings.
Tests o f Awareness: No subject reported any information relevant to the task in 
answer to the first two questions. In response to the third question 2 of the 20 
subjects circled the digit "3”. These subjects selected seen items at typical levels 
in comparison with the remainder of the group.
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to reveal invariant learning in a new form of test 
that avoids problems of negative rejection. Negative and Positive recognition 
performance was not significantly different in this experiment. Subjects show that 
they were no worse at recognising old Positive items than old Negative 
exemplars. Thus, the positives that were paired with the old positives had no
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diluting effect on performance. The novel Positive items did not exert the kind of 
influence on performance that may have been expected if the positive items had 
acquired some special significance to the subject.
This can be taken as evidence that the selection of positives in the standard forced 
choice task, where novel negative and positive items are paired, is less important 
than rejection of salient negatives. Negative items cannot be considered to be 
neutral in the forced choice test.
However, an aspect of the experimental design may have interfered with 
sensitivity to invariance. It was assumed that subjects would perform at a similar 
level with respect to the invariant even though some negative instances were 
included in the study set. This may not be the case. It is possible that implicit 
sensitivity to invariance is highly specific and if even a few negative instances 
could disrupt learning. Thus, the Positive and Negative conditions of this 
experiment failed to demonstrate a difference on account of the disruption of 
invariance acquisition. If this is the case, it may have interesting implications for 
invariance learning. The influence of negative introduction on positive selection 
may provide interesting insights into the kind of knowledge that is acquired in 
this task. To establish the effect of negative inclusion it would be necessary to 
perform an experiment that manipulates the number of negative instances 
included in the study set, and observe any changes to the extent of positive 
selection.
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This possible effect of negative inclusion indicates that the test constraints used in 
the current experiment may not be valid for examining learning in this task. If 
including negatives has an effect on learning which is significant, this implies that 
any sensitivity to invariance would be altered by the stipulation that old negatives 
are placed into the study phase. This suggests that it would not be possible to 
replicate the original conditions of the McGeorge and Burton (1990) study. If so, 
this test configuration would not appear to be a profitable route for future 
research.
2.5 Experiment 3
McGeorge and Burton (1990) argued that performance on the invariant learning 
task could be explained by implicit acquisition of semantic knowledge of 
invariant characteristics of the study set. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the 
robust nature of this knowledge in the face of changing surface features is likely 
to be an artefact of the stimuli used by McGeorge and Burton (1990). The 
acquisition of an invariant rule may in fact be specific to the same surface 
features. Implicit learning of invariance has been questioned on other grounds in 
addition to specificity of transfer. As explained earlier, rejection of salient 
negatives (Wright and Burton, 1995) has been put forward as another 
explanation. While this shows that the rejection of salient negative items is indeed 
an important determinant of performance and can be used in this task, there is still 
some evidence for an effect of invariant learning (e.g Stadler, Warren and Lesch, 
2000). There are two main alternatives which could explain what knowledge 
underlies this effect of learning. The acquisition of rule-like information about
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invariance or the encoding of episodic information. It was suggested earlier that 
these accounts may predict differing patterns of performance as negative items 
are included in the study materials. The predictions of each account will now be 
considered.
McGeorge and Burton (1990) have proposed that subjects acquire some semantic 
knowledge of invariance during this task. In other words, subjects learn a rule that 
each string contains a “3” digit. The acquisition of this type of rule is dependent 
on the fact that the study set has this general characteristic that each string has a 
digit in common. If negative exemplars are presented to subjects along with the 
positives, then the study set could no longer be described in terms of an 
invariance rule. If no such rule exists in these circumstances, McGeorge and 
Burton’s position would predict that no learning should take place. This should be 
the case even with only a small number of negative items.
A highly influential view of implicit learning in the last few years has been the 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) episodic processing account (see sect 1.8.3). 
Within this view, sensitivity to general properties of the training set (or 
invariances) occur because rule following test items induce similar processing 
episodes in comparison with the rule following items from training. This 
similarity of processing episodes results in the selection of rule following items. 
Effects of invariance learning can be explained within this account by suggesting 
that Positives are more prevalent in training, and tend to elicit more similar 
processing episodes. Positive and Negative items are not theoretically separable 
within this view. The Positive has not gained any special properties during
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training; the “3” digit simply makes processing of the positive more similar to 
strings encountered during training. Hence, introducing negatives should steadily 
reduce performance as increasing numbers are included in the study materials.
The importance of encoding episodes has been demonstrated previously in this 
task. Cock, Berry and Gaffan (1994) manipulated the similarity of items at test to 
those in the study set independently from the invariant (producing positive 
similar, negative similar, positive dissimilar and negative dissimilar items). Cock 
et al. demonstrated that similarity between test and study item was a stronger 
determinant of performance than the influence of the invariant. However, 
manipulating test conditions to gain insight into the information used in this task 
is problematic. Since the study items in their experiment contained no repetitions, 
the effect of the invariant would have been similar to the very small marginal 
effect demonstrated in the Neutral condition of the Wright and Burton study. 
Hence, the large 75% manipulation of similarity would obscure the small effect 
of the invariant. That is, the materials encouraged participants to use similarity 
information, perhaps overriding any residual effect of invariance learning. 
Introducing negative items into the study phase is a cleaner method of 
determining the information used in this task as the test task conditions are held 
constant. The acquisition of a rule against encoding of episodes will reveal 
alternative patterns of data across the same test, revealing the information used 
without test bias.
The following experiment attempts to determine how the inclusion of negative 
items in the study period affects performance. The main prediction is that
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introducing negatives should reduce the bias to select positives at test, if 
information from the training period is used at test. More specifically, if 
McGeorge and Burton (1990) are correct, and semantic knowledge underlies 
performance in this task, the bias to positives at test should no longer occur where 
a small number of negatives are included in the training set. However, if the 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) account is followed, the bias to select positives 
should not significantly decrease with a small proportion of negative items 
included in the study set.
Method
Participants. Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow took 
part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for their participation.
Materials. Study sets were generated individually for each subject. First, a set 
of 30 items was produced for the study set. These contained a varying number of 
Negatives and Positives according to the condition. The All Positive condition 
included 30 Positive items, the Two Negative condition included 28 Positive 
strings with 2 Negative strings and the Five Negative condition included 25 
Positive with 5 Negative strings. The test items were the same across the three 
experimental conditions. 10 Positive and 10 Negative strings were produced for 
the test. As in the study set the strings contained no repetitions in the Negative or 
the Positives. The test items were also constrained so none had appeared as study 
set items previously.
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Design and Procedure. Subjects were randomly allocated to the All Positives, 
Two Negatives or Five Negatives conditions. The experiment was again divided 
into a study phase, a test phase and a test of explicit knowledge.
The study set was presented in the same envelopes and on identical slips of paper 
as in the previous two experiments. The orienting task utilised the same addition 
and comparison procedure as earlier. Following the study phase, subjects were 
given the surprise test. This involved the presentation of ten slips of paper which 
had a Negative novel item and a Positive novel item printed horizontally. Again, 
subjects were falsely told that they had seen one of the items in the test pair 
before. The left - right positioning was randomly determined for each pair. 
Participants were asked to circle the item they had seen in the study set.
Finally, participants were given a test of explicit knowledge that was identical to 
the format presented in Experiment 1 and 2.
Results
The means for the three conditions are presented in the table below.
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Training Materials Positives selected (out of 10)
Mean No. SD
All Positives 5.5 (1.40)
Two Negatives 5.8 (1.77)
Five Negatives 4.6 (1.64)
An Analysis of Variance revealed that the main effect of Training set narrowly 
missed significance, F (2, 57) = 3.02, p < 0.1. Individual one sample t-tests on 
each of the conditions revealed no significant effects. The maximum t - value 
being t (29) = 2.03 for Two Negatives (significant on a one tailed test p < 0.05), 
All Positives was t = 1.60 and Five Negatives being t = - 1.09.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 94.5% of the study strings in the 
All Positives group. This proportion was 96.7% in the Two Negatives group and 
95.2% in the Five Negatives group.
Tests o f Awareness: No participant reported anything related to the invariant in 
response to the first question on the explicit knowledge questionnaire. Eight 
subjects responded, when probed, that the “3” was the most frequent digit. These 
subjects selected positives at test at the same level as the mean, and could not
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have been influencing the data at higher levels than subjects who did not report 
the “3”.
Discussion
The data from this experiment were inconclusive. The analysis revealed no 
significant differences between the different levels of negative inclusion in the 
study set. What is more important, however, is the fact that although a greater 
sample size was used in comparison to the Wright and Burton (1995) study, the 
selection of positives was only significantly different from chance in one 
experimental condition, Two Positives (the effect was marginal). This suggests 
that learning in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) invariant learning task is far 
from reliable. Indeed, such effects may not be theoretically important or 
interesting if they cannot be easily elicited. However, the fact that these digit 
string stimuli show such weak effects does not mean that the effect of training 
negatives cannot be investigated in the invariant learning task. Invariance 
learning has been demonstrated using stimuli other than the digit strings used by 
McGeorge and Burton (1990). In experiment 4, clock face stimuli developed by 
Bright and Burton (1993) are used in a otherwise identical design to that of the 
current experiment. The reason for this is that learning with clock face stimuli has 
been shown to reveal a larger learning effect.
2.6 Experiment 4
Bright and Burton (1993) demonstrated implicit invariance learning using the 
aforementioned clock face stimuli. The invariance rule was a time range that was 
consistent over all of the training items so that all of the training items clock
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times fell between 6 and 12 o’clock, as in digit invariance these times were 
referred to as positives. At test, novel positives were set against negatives (clock 
times between 12 and 6 o’clock) in a two alternative forced choice. Bright and 
Burton (1993) demonstrated a preference for positives at test. What is more 
significant here, though, is that subjects selected 7.8 positives out of 10 test pairs. 
This is a higher proportion of positives selected than in digit invariance 
experiments. In the light of this larger effect of learning produced by these 
stimuli, it may be possible to investigate the effect of negative training items 
using clock face stimuli.
In experiment 3, the number of negatives that were introduced into the study set 
was relatively small. This was done because a finding of sensitivity to a small 
number of negatives would have been evidence against the importance of 
encoding whole strings in determining performance in this task. This reasoning 
was undermined, however, by the lack of power in the digit invariance task when 
repetitions are removed from training and test items. So in the following 
experiment, larger numbers of negative exemplars are introduced, and the gaps 
between the numbers of negatives in each of the three groups are enlarged. So in 
place of the All Positives, Two Negatives and Five Negatives groups; All 
Positives, Five Negatives and Ten Negatives groups are used.
The predictions made here are similar to those of Experiment 3. If negative items 
do not influence performance, any effects must be the result of processing 
conducted during the test period. If negative items during training do affect 
performance, they may do so in two ways, each of which supports an alternative
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theoretical interpretation. If rule-like knowledge of invariance determines 
performance, the selection of positives should be significantly reduced by the 
inclusion of a small number of negative items during training. On the other hand, 
if the Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) episodic account is supported, a small 
number of negative items should not influence performance.
Method
Participants. Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow took 
part in the experiment.
Materials. The experimental stimuli were a series of clock faces. Four 
different shapes of clock face were used circular, square, octagonal, and diamond 
(see Figure 1 for examples). Four designs of legends were used: Arabic numerals, 
Roman Numerals, straight lines at the 12, 3, 6 and 9 positions; and no legend at 
all. The clock hands were straight lines drawn onto the clock faces in black pen.
The times displayed on the clock faces were generated by a computer program. 
These times conformed to one of two rules, either the times were between 6 and 
12 o'clock, these clocks will be referred to as positives, or between 12 and 6 o ' 
clock, these times will be referred to as negatives. Examples of the positive or 
negative clock faces used are shown below.
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Clock times were generated for the three experimental groups separately. In the 
All Positives group the materials were composed of thirty positive clock faces for 
the training items, with ten negatives and ten positives for the two alternative 
forced choice test. In the Five and Ten Negatives groups, subjects were presented 
with same test materials as in All Positives. Here though, the training materials 
were altered by introducing negatives into the set. This was arranged so that the 
Five Negatives group had five negatives and twenty five positives in the training 
set, and the Ten Negatives group had ten negatives and twenty positives. There 
were four sets of stimuli generated for each experimental group.
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As seen above, all stimuli in this experiment were presented as analogue times, 
and the surface features for each face were assigned randomly. The clock times 
were drawn onto the faces by hand. The training materials and test materials for 
each set of stimuli were then arranged into two separate booklets.
Design and Procedure. Subjects were randomly allocated to the All Positives, 
Five Negatives or Ten Negatives conditions. The experiment was again divided 
into a study phase, a test phase and a test of explicit knowledge.
As described earlier, the materials for each experimental group were divided into 
four sets. Subjects were given one of the four sets of materials at random. The 
training clocks booklet were then presented to subjects. They were asked to write 
down the time displayed on each clock face in a space underneath it. Subjects 
were free to write out the time in any format they chose. This distractor task is the 
same as that used by Bright and Burton (1993).
Following the training phase, the first booklet was taken from subjects and they 
were given the second booklet containing the two alternative forced choice. This 
consisted of a positive clock time paired with a negative clock time on each page 
of the booklet. There were ten such pairs made from the ten negatives and ten 
positives generated earlier. The left/right positioning of the negative and positive 
clock times was randomly varied. On presentation with the test clocks, subjects 
were falsely told that they had seen one of the clock times in each of the pairs in 
the earlier part of the experiment, and that they must indicate with a mark which 
of the clock times they had seen. If they were unsure they were asked to guess.
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Following the test phase, the test materials booklet was taken from subjects and 
they were presented with a short questionnaire. They were asked to fill out the 
questions in order, and turn the page over to reveal the last question. The 
questions subjects were asked were in a graduated format becoming more specific 
as they progressed:
Did you notice anything peculiar about the clocks I showed you earlier?
Did you notice anything that the clocks had in common?
The clock times displayed on the clocks all had something in common, what do 
you think it was? If you don’t know just guess.
Results
The mean number of positive clock time selected at test for each group is 
presented in the table below.
Training Materials Positives selected (out of 10)
Mean No. SD
All Positives 7.1 (1.7)
Five Negatives 6.5 (1.9)
Ten Negatives 5.2 (2.5)
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An Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of Training Set, F (2, 
57) = 4.32, p < 0.05. One sample t - tests showed that All Positives and Five 
Negatives were both significantly different from chance performance, the lowest t 
- value was for Five Negatives, t (19) = 3.4, p < 0.05. Planned comparisons 
showed that All Positives is significantly different from Ten Negatives, F (1, 57) 
= 8.37, p < 0.05; that All Positives and Five Negatives were not significantly 
different, F (1, 57) = 0.98, and that Five Negatives and Ten Negatives are 
marginally significant, F (1, 57) = 3.62, p < 0.1.
Tests o f Awareness: Three subjects in the Five Negatives group reported that 
they noticed the majority of clock times appeared to be between 6 and 12 
o’clock. These subjects did not deviate substantially from the mean and were not 
removed from the analysis.
Discussion
The clock face stimuli demonstrated a clear bias to select the Positive item at test. 
This effect was more convincing than the digit stimuli, which failed to show 
significant effects. It is now possible to examine the main thrust of this 
experiment, the effect of negative inclusion on performance.
The effect of Negative inclusion was clear; introducing five negatives clock 
stimuli did not significantly reduce the bias to select positives. This indicates that 
introducing a small number of negative exemplars does not break down the bias 
to select positives. It was suggested earlier that if a invariance rule is acquired, a 
small number of negative items in the training phase may disrupt learning.
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However, this was not the case, as significant sensitivity was demonstrated by the 
group who received five negatives in the training materials. It appears then, that 
the alternative possibility, emphasising episodic processing, is a better 
explanation of the data. These accounts suggest that the fact that the invariant 
occurs in every string does not result in any abstract representation of invariance. 
Subjects are biased to select the positive simply because the invariant feature 
appears more often, or that more positive items are retrieved.
It is somewhat unsatisfactory that this effect could only be revealed by 
substantially altering the stimuli from digit strings to clock faces. The alteration 
of stimuli was undertaken because the digit stimuli revealed very small effects of 
learning, and the effect of negative inclusion could not be investigated. Since this 
effect has been demonstrated using clock face stimuli, digit stimuli can now be 
considered once again. It was suggested earlier that if learning of invariant 
features of digit stimuli cannot be easily demonstrated, these stimuli may not be 
theoretically helpful. However, the learning effects of these stimuli are not 
consistent across versions of the task, and these effects may reflect the lower end 
of this variation. Furthermore, determining the source of the variation may lead to 
a better understanding of invariance learning, and hence implicit learning in 
general.
A good example of this is the role of the training task. There is some evidence 
that learning on this task is not neutral to what processes the subject carries out 
during training. In their first experiment, McGeorge and Burton (1990) asked 
subjects to perform arithmetic on the stimuli, and this served as the orienting task.
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In a following experiment, they asked subjects to perform a slightly different 
task. Subjects counted the number of horizontal lines in the stimuli, so for 
example, “7” would have one horizontal line. This modification significantly 
reduced performance on this task. It appears then, that it may be possible to vary 
the sensitivity shown to invariant properties by manipulating the demands of the 
training period.
Any variation induced by changing the training task is not theoretically neutral. 
As suggested earlier, the overlap between the training task conditions and test 
conditions is central to the episodic processing view of implicit learning proposed 
by Whittlesea and Dorken (1993). Within this view, altering the relationship 
between the processing demands of the training and test periods varies the 
overlap between them, resulting in different patterns of performance. Where 
overlap is high, performance is good, with low overlap resulting in poor 
performance.
An effect of varying training conditions is not taken into account within a view of 
implicit learning that assumes that knowledge in these tasks is acquired by an 
unconscious learning system (e,g. Reber, 1989). This account assumes that 
information is passively acquired because learning occurs in a stimulus driven 
manner. The structure (or invariances) of stimuli will be encoded regardless of 
what task is carried out on the stimuli. Experiment 5 is concerned with clarifying 
the effect of training task manipulations.
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2.7 Experiment 5
Processing accounts of implicit learning emphasise that performance at test is 
more successful when there is a large degree of overlap between training and test 
processes. By this understanding, marginally significant learning effects must 
indicate a small amount of processing overlap between study and test periods. 
The results of Experiment 3 reveal such marginal effects, so it may be that this is 
the reason for the small effect of learning revealed. This claim cannot be made 
without defining the conditions for both high and low degrees of overlap. It is the 
purpose of the current experiment to investigate conditions where the overlap 
between study and test is maximal in the invariant learning task. In addition, the 
conditions where overlap is as little as possible will be demonstrated to provide 
the purest comparison case.
Wright and Whittlesea (1998) refine the notion of overlapping processing in 
implicit learning tasks with an account they call “learning without knowing the 
consequences”. They propose that the sensitivity to the general properties of a 
domain arises from the correlation between these structural properties and the 
information that subjects acquired explicitly in satisfying the demands of the 
induction task. Importantly, subjects are not aware of this correlation and are 
unable to verbalise anything about the structure of the stimulus domain. For 
example, during the test in the invariant learning task subjects may attempt to 
remember some of the arithmetic computations they carried out during training. 
Since an increased number of these calculations contained the digit ‘3’, the 
positive would be more likely to be selected on the basis of the ‘3’ digit in
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common with the remembered computations. Since the awareness test probes the 
subjects as to the occurrence of a regular digit in all strings, the subjects are 
unlikely to use their knowledge of computations to respond to this question.
One of the strengths of this account is that it can provide some explanation of 
performance where the induction task is directly related to the structure of the 
domain, and, conversely, where the induction task is totally unrelated to the 
stimulus structure. The information that the subject computes in an attempt to 
satisfy the demands of the induction task can be same as the structure of the 
stimuli. In this case, the relationship is unambiguous and performance is high. In 
contrast, the information computed explicitly may have nothing whatsoever to do 
with the structure or invariances of the stimuli. In which case, this explicitly 
computed information would not increase performance, and chance performance 
would be observed.
To test this reasoning, Wright and Whittlesea (1998) carried out an experiment 
that used an invariant that was designed to relate directly to the arithmetic 
induction task used by McGeorge and Burton (1990), where the sum of the first 
two digits was compared with the second two. The digit strings were constructed 
so that the sum of the first two digits was always the same as the sum of the 
second two. Since the induction task required subjects to compare the sum of 
these pairs of digits, the invariant would be made highly salient by the overlap of 
task and invariance. In the test, subjects performed at ceiling by selecting 98.3% 
of strings that retained the invariant at test. This level of performance implies that 
the relationship between task and invariance became transparent.
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Wright and Whittlesea (1998) carried out a further experiment which, they 
claimed, represented the opposite case, where task and invariance were unrelated. 
The invariant characteristic dictated that the last two digits should always differ 
by one (e.g. 54, 32, 98 etc). Wright and Whittlesea (1998) claimed that this 
invariant did not relate to the induction task in any way, and this reasoning was 
reflected in the data as the subjects performed at chance. This finding is 
problematic for a number of reasons. Wright and Whittlesea (1998) used only 
twelve training items, and it is unlikely that learning could occur following 
exposure to such a small training set. This problem was heightened by the fact 
that Wright and Whittlesea (1998) did not demonstrate a case where learning of 
this particular invariant did occur. Furthermore, even if learning could have been 
successfully demonstrated, it is not clear that this invariant is unrelated to the 
arithmetic task. Since the last two digits always differ by one, their sum would be 
odd in each case. This invariance surely correlates with the orienting task, leading 
to the conclusion that this task does not represent a case where task and 
invariance are unrelated.
Aside from these methodological concerns, it is important to note that the Wright 
and Whittlesea (1998) study used novel arithmetic invariant characteristics. It is 
necessary, therefore, to carry out an experiment using the same invariant 
characteristics used in previous studies. In addition, the relationship of invariance 
to induction task will be investigated using cleaner experimental manipulations.
To this end, a set of training stimuli was created that conformed to an invariance 
rule of the same type that was used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The difference is
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that in Experiment 5 the invariant was low, the digit “2”, or high, the digit “8”. 
The induction task in Experiment 5A was to search for the lowest digit in the 
string and make a key press response. Hence, the invariant was either matched the 
demands of the orienting task (i.e. 2 -  low number ) or it did not ( i.e. 8 -  high 
number ). Experiment 5B was a reversal of Experiment 5A, here subjects were 
asked to search for the highest digit in the string. This resulted in the opposite 
relationship of task demands to invariance and served to check that any 
sensitivity was not the effect of specific stimuli or induction task used in 
Experiment 5A.
The main prediction made here is that sensitivity to the invariant digit is 
dependent on the relationship between the induction task demands and the 
invariant characteristic. That is, when the low numbers are the focus of the 
orienting task, a low invariant will result in sensitivity, but where the invariant is 
high, chance performance will be observed. The opposite result is expected where 
the task is to search for high numbers.
As in previous experiments, a post task questionnaire was presented to subjects. 
The prediction is that subjects who process the invariant that is related to the 
induction task demands will consequently report the presence of the invariant in 
the majority of cases. No clear prediction can be made regarding the report of 
subjects who process invariant that is unrelated to the induction task demands.
104
Method - Experiment 5A
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow 
took part in the experiment.
Materials. The stimuli were constructed in a similar manner to Experiments 
1, 2 and 3, although there were some exceptions and for clarity some repetition 
follows of details reported earlier. Two sets of study and test stimuli were 
generated, one for each experimental group, Invariant ‘2’ (using an invariant ‘2’) 
and Invariant ‘8’ (using an invariant ‘8’). Strings that contain the invariant 
continue to be referred to as positive items, and negatives are still items without 
the invariant, the difference here is that the invariant digit can be a ‘8’ or a ‘2’ 
dependent on the group. The Invariant ‘2’ stimuli for both the study and test 
phase were created first. These training stimuli consisted of 30 four-digit strings, 
all of which contained a ‘2’ digit. As in earlier studies, the strings were 
constrained so that no strings contained a repeating digit. The test stimuli were 
then generated and consisted of 10 negative items and 10 positive items. No 
string from the test phase was identical to any string in the study phase. The 
Invariant ‘8’ stimuli were then generated by replacing all ‘2’ digits in the strings 
with ‘8’ digits and vice versa, for both the training and test stimuli. The Invariant 
‘8’ stimuli were therefore identical to the Invariant ‘2’ group in two important 
ways. First, they had an invariant digit, in this case ‘8’ in place of ‘2’. Secondly, 
the number of ‘2’ digits was the same as the number of ‘8’ digits in the Invariant 
Low group.
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Design and Procedure. Subjects were randomly allocated to the Invariant ‘8’ or 
Invariant ‘2’ conditions. The experiment was again divided into a study phase, a 
test phase and a test of explicit knowledge.
The study strings were presented to subjects on a computer screen. Subjects were 
told that a fixation cross would appear in the centre of the screen and after a short 
period a four-digit number would replace it. The fixation cross appeared for 
300ms. The subjects' task was to indicate using keys 1 - 6  which was the lowest 
digit of the four. They were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. After they had made a selection, the fixation cross appeared, followed 
by the next four digit number and so on. The 30 training strings were randomly 
presented to each subject.
When they had finished the training phase, some instructions on the test phase 
were presented. Subjects were told that they would see two four-digit strings on 
the left and right hand side of then screen. The ten positive and negative test 
strings were then put together to make ten test pairs. The left right positioning 
was randomly determined as was the presentation of the pairs. They were told 
(falsely) that they had seen one of these strings before and to indicate which of 
the two it was. If it was the right-hand string the instructions were to press the ‘a’ 
key, and if it was the left-hand string press the ‘1’ key.
Following the test phase, the test of awareness was presented. This involved the 
same three-question sheet of paper as in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
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Results
The means for the two conditions are presented in the table below.
Training Group Positive strings selected (out of 10)
Mean No. SD
Invariant ‘8’ 5.2 1.0
Invariant ‘2’ 6.8 1.6
Subjects in the Invariant ‘2’ group selected Positive string in the forced choice 
test at above chance level (5 out of 10), t (9) = 3.3, p < 0.05. This was not the 
case in the Invariant ‘8’ group, t (9) = 0.58. The means of the two groups were 
significantly different from each other, t (19) = 2.6, p < 0.05.
Tests o f Awareness: Subjects provided very little information in response to the
first question, and this was not relevant to invariance. Their responses to 
questions two and three tended to be consistent and are considered together. In 
the Invariant ‘2’ condition, nine subjects reported that the most frequent digit was 
‘2’. The remaining subject reported that the digit was ‘7’. In the Invariant ‘8’ 
group, seven subjects reported that the digit ‘1’ was the most frequent, with two 
others reporting ‘6’ as the most frequent and the remaining subject noting ‘2’ as 
most frequent.
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Method - Experiment 5B
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow 
took part in the experiment.
Materials and Procedure. The materials, design and procedure were all 
identical to Experiment 5 A, except in place of searching for the lowest number in 
the training stimuli during the training phase, subjects were asked to indicate 
using keys 4 -  9 the highest digit of the four.
Results
The means for the two conditions are presented in the table below.
Training Group Positive strings selected (out of 10)
Mean No. SD
Invariant ‘8’ 8.3 1.8
Invariant ‘2’ 3.9 2.2
Subjects in the Invariant ‘8’ group selected Positive string in the forced choice 
test at above chance level (5 out of 10), t (9) = 5.4, p < 0.05. This was not the 
case in the Invariant ‘2’ group, t (9) = - 1.5. The means of the two groups were 
significantly different from each other, t(19) = 4 .8 ,p<  0.05.
Tests o f Awareness: Subjects provided very little information in response to the
first question, and this was not relevant to invariance. Their responses to
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questions two and three tended to be consistent and are considered together. In 
Invariant ‘8’ group, nine subjects reported that the most frequent digit was ‘8’, 
with one subject responding that the most frequent digit was ‘9’. In the Invariant 
‘2’ group, seven subjects claimed that the most frequent digit was ‘9’ and the 
remaining three subjects all reported that the most frequent digit was ‘8’.
Discussion
This data from experiment 5 shows very clearly that the relationship of the 
orienting task to the invariant property can determine performance on the forced 
choice test. Where the invariant digit was low, and the orienting task induced 
subjects to search for low numbers, a significantly increased number of positive 
items were chosen in the forced choice test (Experiment 5A). Similarly, where 
the orienting task constrained subjects to process high digits, and the invariant 
was high, performance was significantly above chance (Experiment 5B). 
However, the opposite was found in the remaining two conditions where the 
orienting task did not match the invariant characteristic. That is, where the 
orienting task was either to search for high numbers with a low invariant, or 
conversely to search for low numbers with a high invariant. Performance was not 
significantly different from chance in both cases.
These effects were demonstrated by holding the orienting task constant and 
varying the stimulus in relation to it. Importantly, Experiment 5A and 5B differed 
in that they demonstrated a reversal of task demands, with a consequent reversal 
of learning effects. These effects were symmetrical, showing that there are no
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specific effects of stimuli or task demands. It is the interaction of the orienting 
task with the invariance that determines the success of learning.
Wright and Whittlesea (1998) have suggested that “what subjects learn is dictated 
by an interaction between their intentions and the structure of the particular 
instances they encounter” (p. 415). The data reported from Experiment 5 support 
this view of what underlies performance in implicit learning tasks. The 
conception that knowledge is acquired by a unconscious learning mechanism 
(e.g. Reber, 1989) appears to be refuted by the above data. When the task 
demands did not relate to the stimulus structure, no learning was observed. This 
suggests that the task demands have some relationship to the stimuli for learning 
to take place.
The processing account of implicit learning is able to make some predictions 
about the degree of learning by referring to the extent of overlapping training and 
test task demands. The separate systems view of implicit learning can make no 
prediction about the degree of learning. It would seem that the processing view, 
such as the Wright and Whittlesea (1998), provides a better account of the data. 
According to this account, the weak effects of Experiment 3 are the result of a 
small amount of overlap between the study and test phase.
Wright and Whittlesea (1998) do not specify clearly what is likely to be contained 
in verbal report data. In Experiment 5, subjects reported that the digits they 
believed occurred most frequently were those that corresponded to the orienting 
task they had performed. So, in Experiment 5A low numbers tended to be
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reported, and in Experiment 5B, high numbers tended to be reported. The verbal 
reports seem to match the training task demands which goes along with the 
processing account. However, a more complete explanation of this can be 
obtained by referring to the particular strategy used by subjects in the awareness 
test.
In the awareness test, subjects were asked if they noticed anything systematic 
about the stimuli in the training phase, and whether any of the digits occurred 
more often than others. Since they were unlikely to have considered anything 
about these issues during the training phase, they are likely to use available 
information or an availability heuristic to generate an answer. The availability 
heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) is a strategy for evaluating the 
frequency of an entity based on the ease with which instances of this entity come 
to mind. For example, the risk of a train crash would appear greater if one has 
seen the report of such an incident on the news. In the current context, subjects 
had processed exclusively, the high digits of the strings (Experiment 5B) or the 
lower digits (Experiment 5A). Hence, these aspects of the stimuli are the most 
accessible information, and are therefore more likely to be reported.
The use of an availability heuristic can specify how another aspect of the verbal 
report data comes about. When the orienting task did not match the invariant, 
subjects tended to report the “9” or the “1”, according to the training task 
demands. However, this was not the case where the orienting task demands 
matched the invariant. Here, the majority of subjects accurately reported the 
invariance from their particular training set, either “8” or “2”. This demonstrates
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that subjects had noticed the invariant when it related directly to their task. The 
“8” or “2” occurred continuously during training, and therefore served as the 
most available information.
In summary, the main finding of Experiment 5 was that the interaction of the 
invariance (or structure) of the stimuli with the training task exerts powerful 
control over performance, even when using the same invariant characteristics as 
in previous studies. These effects were shown to be symmetrical when the task 
demands were reversed, indicating that it was not any special effect of the stimuli 
used. These data support the processing view of Implicit Learning proposed by 
Wright and Whittlesea (1998). Furthermore, no learning was demonstrated when 
the stimuli did not relate the orienting task, suggesting that learning does not 
proceed in a stimulus driven manner as some perspectives propose (e.g. Reber, 
1989). The intentions of the subject appear paramount to the success of learning. 
This framework provides some explanation for the small amount of learning 
demonstrated when the orienting task is not directly related to the invariant 
characteristic, as in Experiment 3. The training task, therefore, not only has 
theoretical implications; it also has methodological connotations.
2.8 General Discussion
A consistent theme of this chapter has been the efficacy of the learning effects in 
the McGeorge and Burton (1990) task. The learning effects have been shown to 
be sensitive to surface features (Experiment 1), insensitive to a small number of 
negative items in the training period (Experiment 4) and modulated by the 
training task demands (Experiment 5). Throughout, the effects of each of these
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factors have been understood in the light of processing accounts of Implicit 
Learning and Memory (Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993. Wright and Whittlesea, 
1998. Roediger, Weldon and Challis, 1989). The findings of each experiment will 
now be related to the others, with reference to processing accounts.
Sensitivity to invariant characteristics was shown to be eliminated when the 
surface form of the stimuli changed from the training phase to the test phase 
(Experiment 1). This finding is in line with subsequent data reported by Stadler, 
Warren and Lesch (2000), and therefore it is unlikely that the information 
acquired in this task is held at an abstract or conceptual level as McGeorge and 
Burton (1990) suggested. It is more likely that performance is driven by a match 
between processing events that occurred during the test phase, and processing 
events that occurred during training.
In an attempt to place these findings in a theoretical context, Stadler, Warren and 
Lesch (2000) compare specificity of surface form in the McGeorge and Burton 
(1990) task to similar effects in the implicit memory literature. At this point it 
should be noted that implicit learning and implicit memory have been defined as 
distinct phenomena (Buchner and Wippich, 1998). While implicit learning refers 
to the acquisition of relationships between stimuli, implicit memory reflects the 
facilitation of a response following single exposures of familiar stimuli (e.g. 
Jacoby, 1983). Implicit learning can be revealed in test conditions where the 
surface features are altered (e.g. Mathews et al., 1989) and implicit memory 
effects do appear to be sensitive to surface form (Jacoby and Hayman, 1987). As 
performance in the invariant learning task is specific to surface features, Stadler
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et al. suggest that it reflects processing similar to that occurring in implicit 
memory tasks rather than implicit learning tasks. Classifying invariance learning 
in this manner implies that its theoretical interpretation may be distinct from other 
forms of implicit learning.
This classification may not be required if there is a single theoretical 
interpretation of both implicit learning and implicit memory. Wright and 
Whittlesea (1998) have compared the findings of implicit learning tasks with 
those in the implicit memory literature, in this case using the processing account 
as a point of convergence. They cite the seminal paper by Jacoby (1983) to 
illustrate that the processing account of implicit memory is akin to the processing 
account of implicit learning, and describe how this account can explain both sets 
of findings. Jacoby (1983) demonstrated that subjects asked to generate the 
antonym of hot encode the meaning of the word cold, but not its visual properties, 
whereas reading cold selectively triggers visual properties but not conceptual 
aspects of the word. Aspects that are not required to satisfy the demands of the 
task remain unprocessed. This encoding variability reveals different patterns of 
performance on different tests. There is no need to assume that performance on 
one test is underlain by a different type of knowledge in comparison to another 
test. In an implicit learning task, the training phase requires certain mental 
operations to be carried out on stimuli. These may be related to the test task 
demands, or unrelated to the test task. Performance is dependent on the test task 
bearing some relationship to the training task demands.
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This account is supported by the findings of Experiment 5. Where the invariant 
digit was low, and the orienting task induced subjects to search for low numbers, 
a significantly increased number of positive items were chosen in the forced 
choice test (Experiment 5A). This was replicated where the orienting task 
involved searching for high numbers. Here the training task induced processing 
of information that would later become important in the test task. According to 
Wright and Whittlesea (1998), during the training stage the invariant property had 
no special status, it is only when this property later correlates with the test task 
demands that it can assist in satisfying those demands. Conversely, where the 
orienting task was to search for high numbers with a low invariant, and vice 
versa, performance was at chance. This occurs because the information that is 
encoded during the test phase cannot be used at test to satisfy the demands of the 
test task. The same kind of processing occurs when, as in Jacoby (1983), a subject 
has experienced the visual properties of hot, and the semantic properties are 
required at test, performance is likely to fail because the encoded information is 
of no use to the test demands. If the test requires the visual properties of hot, the 
subject would be able to draw on the previous visual processing of the word hot, 
resulting in improved performance. Hence, the data reported in implicit memory 
and implicit learning tasks can be understood within a single set of principles.
Returning to the findings of Experiment 1, the test task demands require subjects 
to indicate which of two digit strings are most familiar to them. According to the 
processing account (Roediger, Weldron and Challis, 1989), once an item has been 
encountered, this results in later presentations of the item being processed with
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greater ease (i.e. more fluently), biasing it towards selection at test. When the 
surface features change, this fluency mechanism can no longer operate, giving the 
positive item no advantage over the negative. Hence, specificity of surface form 
is a consequence of this view of performance. This account assumes that the 
application of similarity based mechanisms in tandem with fluency. That is, at 
test subjects compare the items in the forced choice test to previously seen 
exemplars in training, so selecting the item which is most similar to an exemplar 
from training.
Experiment 4 suggests that the use of similarity or a episodic mechanism is a 
reasonable assumption to make concerning performance in this task. Following 
on from work by Cock, Berry and Gaff an (1994), who revealed the use of 
similarity at test, Experiment 4 demonstrated that when the training set no longer 
followed an invariance rule, it merely had a majority feature, performance did not 
deteriorate significantly. This indicates that the above chance selection of positive 
items does not have to occur when there is an invariant, it can also occur in 
conditions when the positive item is more prevalent in the study set. This occurs 
because, at test, the positive item will be similar to a larger number of episodes of 
stimuli than the negative, as a result of the presence of the invariant feature. It 
would not make any difference if the feature occurred in every of the strings, this 
invariance has no special status.
Along with the acknowledgement of specificity of surface features, these findings 
are a problem for an account of invariance learning that purports the abstraction 
of an invariance rule from the training materials, such as McGeorge and Burton’s
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(1990) original understanding of performance. Furthermore, in Experiment 5, 
chance performance is observed when the orienting task does not relate to the 
invariant property, demonstrating that the sensitivity to invariance is not an 
automatic consequence of interacting with the stimuli. This causes further 
problems for any account suggesting that subjects acquire knowledge of 
invariance that is a special quality acquired from the stimuli, regardless of surface 
form or processing conditions, held separately from the stimuli themselves.
The experiments reported in this chapter have been primarily concerned with 
manipulations of the training task conditions. In experiment 3, it was observed 
that certain training tasks used on stimuli can produce relatively small learning 
effects at test. This was interpreted as demonstrating a small degree of low 
overlap of study and test processes. Nevertheless, it may be that these training 
conditions can reveal more significant learning effects on a test task that is more 
appropriate to the processes carried out during the test. It is the purpose of the 
following chapter to explore the role of test task demands in the invariant 
learning task.
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Chapter 3 The Effect of Alternative Test Task Demands
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the information acquired in the 
invariant learning task is tied to the surface features of the training stimuli. It was 
argued that this finding shows that subjects select items at test according to their 
fluency or ease of processing. Such fluency, however, is only one mechanism for 
making decisions about stimuli. Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) suggest that people 
can use another heuristic in remembering and classification tasks, the generation 
heuristic. According to Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) the generation heuristic is 
"based on the production of information about a prior experience with a stimulus, 
information that is not available in the current stimulus display" (p85). False 
memory effects provide some evidence for the use of this heuristic. For example, 
when given a word "sleep" following a set of items that are in a particular context 
(e.g. dream, bed, night, snore), subjects falsely claim to have seen a target word 
in that context (Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Hence, subjects are generating 
information about the training period that the test stimulus does not itself possess, 
and are using this information to aid responding.
Studies on invariance learning, and indeed implicit learning in general, have 
tended to rely on classification of novel stimuli revealing knowledge about a 
given stimulus domain. It may be that these tests of knowledge rely mainly on the 
fluency with which the test items are processed to guide decisions about stimuli. 
This leads to the question of whether the fluency of processing of test stimuli is
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critical for any test task to reveal learning effects. It may be that sensitivity to 
invariance, for example, can be revealed in other ways. As noted above, subjects 
have been shown to generate aspects of the training stimuli which are not present 
in the test stimuli to make judgements. It may be possible to devise a test task that 
focuses on this generation aspect of test processing rather than the fluency of 
processing test items alone. If learning effects cannot be revealed by the 
generation of information, it is likely that knowledge of invariance can only be 
revealed by an increased fluency of processing novel test strings.
3.2 Generation of an Invariant Feature
In the following experiments, a test task is introduced that encourages subjects to 
generate features of stimuli at test that they have encountered in the study phase. 
To this end, we apply a modification of the fragment completion task (e.g. 
Tulving, Schacter and Stark, 1983) to induce generation of an invariant feature. In 
the Tulving et al. study participants are presented with incomplete words (e.g. 
_0_0_G A _) and asked to fill in the blanks to make up a word. In this task, half 
the solutions were words from a target list, but the subjects were not informed of 
this. Fragment completion therefore served as a test of implicit memory. Tulving 
et al. found that subjects were more likely to complete fragments correctly when 
the solution corresponded to a target word. They found that correctly recognised 
words were not completed any better than words that subjects failed to recognise. 
Therefore, fragment completion could serve as a valid implicit memory test.
This test of memory can easily be applied to the invariance learning task. The 
first phase of the experiment would be carried out in an identical manner as in
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previous invariant learning studies. The test materials presented to participants 
would consist of three digits and space (e.g. 7_26, 928_ etc). The space can be 
placed in any of the four positions. These numbers could be constrained to 
include the invariant or it could be absent from the string (e.g. invariant present = 
43_1 or invariant absent = 291_ ). The subject's task is to complete the fragment 
with a digit to make up a four digit number they saw in the study phase.
Altering the demands of the test task may result in a shift in the processing 
resources used at test in comparison to forced choice materials. Therefore, in 
addition to investigating generation of knowledge (experiments 6 and 7), the 
following experiments examine the role of processing in this task. The fragment 
completion task induces subjects to generate potential candidates to complete the 
string. In a forced choice task subjects are asked to choose which of two numbers 
they have seen before. These tasks differ in that the former involves articulation 
of digits whereas the latter does not. Experiment 8 examines the effect of 
suppressing articulation during the study phase. A reduction in performance 
would indicate that the overlap in processing resources between study and test 
must be an important determinant of performance. This finding would be 
consistent with processing theories of implicit learning (see Neal & Hesketh, 
1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). Stadler, Warren and Lesch (2000) 
demonstrated that invariance learning is sensitive to surface form using forced 
choice materials. If the test task demands are changed so that subjects generate 
information about the stimuli, it is likely that surface feature changes will no 
longer influence performance. Experiment 9 investigates this possibility.
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To date, studies of invariance learning have increasingly supported a processing 
basis of successful performance, rather than the application of abstract 
knowledge. Cock, Berry, & Gaffan (1994) demonstrated that similarity to 
instances in the study phase was a more important factor than apparent 
knowledge of invariance. Thus, reference to specific episodes during study can 
determine performance. More recently, Stadler, Warren and Lesch (2000) showed 
that a change in surface features can reduce performance to chance levels. This 
finding is again consistent with the processing view of implicit learning.
In summary, the following experiments are primarily intended to demonstrate that 
knowledge of invariant features can be demonstrated in a generation task rather 
than a forced choice test. The secondary aim of these experiments is to 
investigate the effect of changing processing demands on fragment completion 
performance.
3.3 Experiment 6
The purpose of this experiment is to determine whether it is possible to 
demonstrate learning of invariant features in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) 
task using a fragment completion task. To this end, the test task materials were 
contrived in two ways. Absent strings were created by removing the invariant 
from a invariant string (e.g. 3451 would become _451). Present strings were 
created by removing one of the three other digits from a invariant string (e.g. 
3451 could become 3_51). Present strings were included to prevent response bias. 
If participants produced an invariant in literally every test string then this may 
induce them to inhibit production of invariant strings in later trials.
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Certain predictions can be made about performance on this test. If the study set 
encountered contains an invariant digit in every string then it would be expected 
that subjects may produce more invariant digits than other digits in the test. That 
is, participants will produce more invariant digits in the Absent condition when 
they have received an invariant digit in the study set materials (Invariant Group), 
than where they have received four naturally occurring numbers (Random Group) 
study set materials.
A weaker prediction can be made about performance in the Present condition, if 
subjects have implicitly acquired information about a single invariant digit then 
they may inhibit production of invariant digits if one is already present in the 
string. Hence, this test may provide a more comprehensive assessment of 
knowledge acquired during the study phase by potentially examining production 
and inhibition of an invariant digit.
However, this prediction is made with some caution because the strings are 
constrained to contain no repetitions which have been shown to be highly salient 
(Wright and Burton, 1995). Consequently, subjects may not produce repeated 
digits in the strings because these doubles did not occur in the study phase. This 
hypothesis can be tested by examining the production of repetitions of all digits 
and comparing this score to the production of invariant digits in the test phase.
Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow 
took part in this experiment. They were paid a small fee for their participation.
122
Materials. Study sets were generated individually for each subject. The sets 
were generated separately for the Invariant and Random study set materials 
groups. In the Invariant group a set of 30 items was produced for the study set. 
These were constrained so the strings contained an invariant "3" digit. In the 
Random group a set of 30 four digit numbers were generated so all numbers 1-9 
would appear naturally. The strings in both groups were constrained in order to 
contain no repetitions. A further 10 Positive and 10 Negative items were 
generated for each subject in both groups as the test items. As in the study phase, 
none of these items contained repetitions. The test items were constrained so none 
had appeared as study items previously. These test items were then altered to 
form fragments in two forms for the Present and Absent condition. In the Present 
condition, the 10 Positives for each subject were selected and one digit removed 
at random which was not the invariant and replaced with a For example, 
4369 would become one of “_369, 43_9 or 436_”. In the Absent condition, each 
of the 10 Negatives for each subject was selected and again one digit was 
removed and replaced with a Since no invariant is present in the Negatives 
one of the four digits was selected. For example, 2815 could become one of “ 
_815, 2_15, 28_5 or 281_”. The study and test items were presented with each 
string appearing on a page of a small booklets.
Design and Procedure. As in experiment 1 -  5, the experiment was divided into 
three phases: a study phase, a test phase and a test of explicit knowledge.
Subjects were randomly allocated to receive Invariant or Random study materials 
which are explained above. Apart from the constraints imposed on the four digit
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strings the experimental procedure was identical for both groups. The four digit 
study strings were presented on individual pages of the small booklet. Subjects 
were asked to perform the same arithmetic task as in experiment 1 -3 .
They were then presented with the surprise test phase consisting of 10 string 
fragments from each of the 2 conditions; Present or Absent. The items were 
presented on individual pages of the small booklets. These items were 
randomised, so that no systematic order of presentation occurred. Participants 
were falsely told that the fragment represents three quarters of a whole number 
they had seen in the study phase. They were asked to fill in the gap with a digit so 
that the fragment would make a whole number that they had seen in the study 
phase. Like the study phase, they were told to complete each page of the booklet 
without referring back or forward to other test strings. Following the test phase 
subjects were given the awareness questionnaire.
Results
The means for the two factors are presented in the table below.
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Study set Invariant produced in test string (out of 10)
Present Absent
Mean No. SE Mean No. SE
Invariant 0.2 0.13 2.30 0.30
Random 0.3 0.21 1.1 0.38
An Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of study materials, F 
(1, 18) = 4.76, p < 0.05. It also demonstrates a main effect of test materials, F (1, 
18) = 24.82, p < 0.01. The Study set x Test materials interaction was also 
significant, F (1, 18) = 4.99, p < 0.05.
In the Absent condition participants in the Invariant group produced significantly 
more invariant digits than in the Random group, F (1, 36) = 6.17, p < 0.05. This 
difference was not replicated in the Present condition, F (1, 36) = 0.16.
In the Invariant group, the mean number of invariant digits produced in the 
Absent condition was significantly higher than in the Present condition, F (1, 18) 
= 26.03, p < 0.01. The difference was not found in the Random group, although 
the effect was marginal, F (1, 18) = 3.78.
Analysis of repetition production - The means for digit repetitions were divided 
into two types, repetition of invariants (43_2 completed as 4332) or repetition of 
other digits (43_2 completed as 4322). Using these means it is possible to
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determine i f " 3 " is produced in present strings with a lower frequency than other 
digits that are repeated.
Subjects produced repetitions of digits other than "3" in 2.5% of Present test 
strings. In comparison, the mean number of "3" digits produced in the Present 
condition was 2%. A paired samples t-test revealed that the production of 
invariant digits and repetitions of other digits are not significantly different, t (19) 
= 1.0.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 95% of the study strings in the 
random group and 95.3% of strings in the invariant group.
Test o f Awareness: No participant reported anything related to the invariant in
response to the first question on the explicit knowledge questionnaire. One 
participant circled "three" in response to the final question but did not mention it 
in response to the first two. No subject reported anything pertinent to repetitions 
in response to the first question.
Discussion
Constraining the materials received by subjects in the Invariant group to contain 
an invariant digit resulted in the predicted difference in relation to the Random 
group. Participants produced a significantly larger number of invariant digits 
when they had received an Invariant study set than when the study set they 
received contained random naturally occurring numbers. This main finding 
confirms the prediction made that subjects would produce the invariant with 
higher frequency under the conditions described above.
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It was suggested in the introduction that when the invariant was already present in 
the test string, implicitly acquired information may prevent subjects completing 
the string with a repeated invariant digit. Every string subjects encountered 
contained an invariant digit but never more than one, therefore it is possible 
subjects may have acquired this information. The analysis of invariant production 
seemed to imply that subjects were indeed selectively inhibiting invariant digits 
in the Present condition. Analysis of the group that received invariant material 
revealed that production of invariant digits was significantly lower in the Present 
than the Absent condition, whereas this difference was not replicated in the group 
that received random materials. In addition, the difference between the Invariant 
group and the Random group also did not significantly differ in the Present 
condition. Therefore, it is possible that the invariant is inhibited when it is present 
in the string. But, as aforementioned, the study set materials were constrained so 
that they did not contain repetitions. Analysis revealed the production of 
repetitions in general was not significantly different from the production of 
invariant digits in the Present condition. This suggests that the inhibition of "3" in 
the Present condition may reflect a floor effect which is a result of subjects 
inhibiting production of repeated digits as a matter of course.
Inhibition of repetitions may occur because subjects did not see any repetitions in 
the study set and therefore did not complete strings in the test phase with 
repetitions. Strings with repeated numbers tend to be salient (as in experiment 1 
and Wright and Burton, 1995) and would therefore be remembered by subjects.
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Some subjects could have noticed the repetition constraints of the study set and 
used it as a strategy to aid their memory.
3.4 Experiment 7
In experiment 6 it was shown that the fragment completion test can reveal 
varying effects when subjects have been exposed to training strings that all 
contained an invariant digit compared to where all the digits appeared naturally in 
the training strings. This sensitivity was primarily revealed by the increased 
production of ‘3’ digits in the absent test materials (e.g. those that did not contain 
‘3’ -  72_1). A potentially significant secondary finding was that subjects 
appeared to inhibit production of the invariant ‘3’ in the present test materials 
(e.g. those that did contain the ‘3’ -  13_5). It may be that this effect is the result 
of implicitly acquired information that each training contained a single ‘3’ digit. 
This possibility was undermined by the fact that subjects appear to produce 
repetitions of all other digits apart from ‘3’ at the same level that they produced 
the invariant ‘3’ in the present strings. This indicates that the test materials may 
bias subjects against generating any digits that are already present in the 
particular test string (e.g. subjects biased against completing 42_1 as 4221 etc). 
This effect would generalise to the invariant, resulting in an apparent bias to 
inhibit the ‘3’ in the present strings.
It was suggested above that this bias to inhibit the production of repetitions in the 
test strings may be the result of the absence of items containing repetitions 
occurring during the training phase. Since subjects did not see any training items 
with repetitions, they did not complete the test strings with repeated digits.
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Alternatively, this effect may be the result of strategic processing during the test 
phase, with no reference to the training items. Test items, like training items, 
appear salient when completed with a repeated digit. Hence, subjects may be 
biased against generating digits that produce salient items regardless of what 
items they saw during training.
The most accessible way to differentiate between these possibilities is to include 
items with repetitions in the training phase. If the floor effect of producing 
repetitions results from the fact that subjects did not see training items containing 
repetitions, subjects will now have seen a number of items with repeating digits 
and may complete test strings with repetitions. On the other hand, if subjects fail 
to generate repetitions as a result of a test bias against generating digits that result 
in salient strings, the repetition items presented during training should have no 
effect.
In addition, the strings will be constrained by preventing the ‘3’ digit from 
repeating in the training strings, so that only one ‘3’ could occur in the training 
items. Hence, if subjects show a tendency to repeat digits other than ‘3’ in the test 
materials, while inhibiting production of the ‘3’ digit in the present strings, it may 
be that they have become sensitive to the singular occurrence of the ‘3’ digit in 
the training strings. However, if the ‘3’ is repeated in the present test strings (e.g. 
23_1 is completed 2331) at the same level as other repeats (e.g. 2_59 is 
completed as 2559), subjects do not become sensitive to the fact that the ‘3’ digit 
occurs only once in each string.
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Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow 
took part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for their participation.
Materials. In the Invariant group a set of 30 items was generated for the study 
set. These were all Positive items with certain constraints regarding repetitions. 
All digits apart from “3” appeared naturally, that is they were not prevented from 
repeating. In the Random group a set of 30 four digit numbers were generated so 
all digits 1-9 would appear naturally. There were no constraints on repetitions 
within the strings. A subset of ten of the thirty training strings could be -
3254,3621,7437, 3622, 1138, 1326, 9349, 9312, 3682, 1653
The test items were generated in exactly the way as Experiment 6.
Design and Procedure. The experiment followed the same three phase 
procedure using an identical orienting task on study items as in Experiment 6. To 
clarify; the only alteration was the constraints on repetitions in the study set.
Results
The means for the two factors are presented in the table below.
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Study set Invariant produced in test string (out of lOj
Present Absent
Mean No. SD Mean No. SD
Invariant 0.8 1.14 2.0 1.25
Random 0.7 0.67 1.0 0.94
An Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of Invariant, F (1, 18) 
= 6.39, p < 0.05. There was no significant interaction or main effect of Group, the 
largest value for F = 2.49.
In the Absent condition, participants did not produce significantly more invariants 
in the Invariant group than in the Random, although the effect was marginal, F (1, 
18) = 4.09, p < 0.1. Again in the Present condition there was no significant 
effect, F = 0.06.
In the Invariant group, participants produced more ‘3’ digits in the Absent 
condition than in the present, F = 8.18, p < 0.01. This difference was not found in 
the Random group, F = 0.5.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 99.6% of the study strings in the 
random group and 98.3% of strings in the invariant group.
Analysis of Repetitions. This analysis was carried out in the same way as in 
Experiment 4. Repetitions of digits present in the test strings were produced in
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both the absent and present conditions in 8.6% of test strings. This was 
significantly larger than zero, t (19) = 6.4, p < 0.05. A paired samples t-test 
reveals that the difference between production of repetitions in general and 
production of invariants in the present condition are not significantly different, t 
(19) = 0.23.
Test o f Awareness. No participant reported the invariant in response to the first 
question on the explicit knowledge questionnaire. Two participants circled 
"three" in response to the final question. They had mentioned the invariant in 
answer to the second question, but among other digits and were therefore not 
removed. No subject mentioned the repetition of numbers in any sense.
Discussion
The indication of this experiment is that repeated digits are produced in fragment 
test strings when the training strings contained repeated digits. Subjects placed 
repetitions of digits already present in the test strings significantly above zero in 
this experiment. When comparing this finding to that of experiment 6, the 
conclusion must be that the presence of repetitions during training is critical for 
the production of repetitions during the test. Consequently, this rules out the 
possibility that subjects are biased against producing repeated digits regardless of 
what items they are exposed to during the training phase. The floor effect in the 
present condition of experiment 6 was conceivably due to the lack of repetition 
items in the training set. Subjects did not see any repetition items in the training 
phase, and therefore did not complete any strings with a repeated digit. This
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inhibition of repeating digits could have occurred by explicit or implicit recourse 
to the training strings, and this issue will be investigated in experiment 8.
In the Invariant group, the ‘3’ digit was constrained so that it would occur in 
every string and it would occur only once in every string. This constraint did not 
result in a selective inhibition of the ‘3’ digit in the Present condition. The ‘3’ 
digit was produced as often in the present condition as repeated digits were 
produced in general. Furthermore, there was no difference in the production of 
‘3’ digits in the Present condition by subjects in the Invariant or Random groups. 
Therefore, the presence of an invariant ‘3’ had no effect on the production of ‘3’ 
digits in the Present condition when repetitions were introduced into the training 
phase. The apparent inhibition effect that was found in the Present condition in 
experiment 6 clearly due to the lack of items with repetitions in the training 
phase, leading to a general bias against the production of repetitions at test.
It would seem then, that the effect of the invariant ‘3’ during training is only 
detected in the Absent test condition. The Present condition does not show any 
sensitivity to the invariant ‘3’, even when the training materials are constrained so 
that it does not repeat. Hence, the sensitivity is demonstrated only where the digit 
is produced at greater levels than usual. Although this finding has refined the 
locus of sensitivity of the fragment completion test, it does not provide an 
explanation of the processes that are involved in this increased production of 
digits. The processes that give rise to this effect are investigated in experiment 8.
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3.5 Experiment 8
In experiment 6 it was shown that the fragment completion task can show 
differential effects when subjects have performed an orienting task on strings that 
all contain an invariant digit and where the strings are random. The next 
experiment aims to define the mechanism which underlies performance on the 
fragment completion task.
The increased production of the invariant ‘3’ may occur because subjects have 
acquired some conceptual knowledge of the invariant as suggested by McGeorge 
and Burton (1990). Fragment test strings may be completed by the application of 
this abstract conceptual knowledge. Accounts of implicit learning that emphasise 
abstraction assume that acquisition and application of knowledge occurs 
passively. Therefore, processing conditions during the study phase should have 
little influence on the passive acquisition of stimulus structure. This provides a 
means of testing the applicability of this account to performance on this task.
In the previous chapter, the episodic processing account of implicit learning has 
been put forward as a more comprehensive account of performance in this task. 
The importance of overlapping processing constraints may provide an alternative 
interpretation of performance in this task. In the completion task, subjects must 
articulate potential candidates for completion of the strings. According to the 
episodic view, this pool of candidates must be triggered by a previous learning 
episode which involves similar processing to that occurring in the test phase. The 
phonological process during test may then rely on the phonological articulation of 
digits during the orienting task. If this articulation is prevented, then the useful
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overlapping information used to generate digits may be removed resulting in a 
reduction in performance to levels comparable with the control group.
In addition to the influence of verbalisation during orienting, an aspect of 
Experiment 6 that requires further scrutiny is the floor effect that was 
demonstrated in the Present condition of both groups. Analysis revealed that 
subjects were inhibiting production of all repeated digits at test and not just 
invariant digits. It was suggested that, since the study set did not contain 
repetitions, subjects would avoid producing digits that were already in the 
fragment. Experiment 7 demonstrated that if the training strings do contain 
repetitions, then subjects complete some test strings with repeated digits. It is 
surmised that this process is under subjects' conscious control or it may even be 
an implicit effect.
A questionnaire was presented to participants with the intention to examine 
knowledge of repeated digits. Firstly, subjects were asked if they used strategies 
during the test phase; they then commented on strategies that involved avoiding 
the numbers present in the test string and, finally, they were given examples of 
numbers containing repetitions and were instructed to indicate how they were 
different from those in the study set.
An additional aspect of this experiment investigated the generation of numbers in 
neutral conditions. That is, what do people produce without the cue of the digits 
in the test string? Subjects were asked to generate random numbers between 1 -9  
and place them in the gap between three other addition signs " e.g. + + _ + or +
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_ + + By removing the digits from the test string no context is available for 
subjects to use. Symbols were used to make this section as close as possible to the 
standard test. This was self paced and followed the fragment completion test.
Method
Participants. Forty three undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in this experiment. They were paid a small fee for their 
participation.
Materials. Study set and test materials were generated in an identical fashion 
to that of Experiment 1. In place of the invariant ”3" an invariant "5" was used in 
this experiment.
Design and Procedure. The experiment was divided into four phases: a study 
phase, a test phase, a neutral generation phase and a test of explicit knowledge.
The experiment was a mixed design with two between subjects factors: 
Suppression vs No Suppression during the study phase, and Invariant vs Random 
study materials. Suppression conditions were performed by the repetition of a 
phase "alpha beta gamma" out loud by participants. Before commencing, subjects 
were trained in the correct manner of articulation. They were encouraged to keep 
articulation as continuous as possible, and endeavour not to leave gaps between 
the words. Participants were asked to practise this phrase to the above 
specifications, when they had become proficient the experiment began.
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Subjects performed the same test as in Experiment 7 except that the strings were 
contrived to have a "5" digit present or absent. Again, the subjects were asked to 
complete the string with a digit that they believed made up a four digit number 
observed in the first part of the experiment.
Following this, the subjects were presented with a booklet containing 10 random 
generation materials. These consisted of three plus signs with a underscore 
randomly among them (e.g. + + _+).  Subjects were asked to place a digit 1 - 9  
randomly in the gap. The generation was self paced.
In addition to the standard post task questionnaire, a second sheet of additional 
questions were presented, which followed a graduated format. The final question 
which presented subjects with numbers with repetitions was not visible until the 
paper was turned over. The question are presented below.
4. Were most of your responses guesses?
5. Did you use any strategies when filling in the spaces?
6. Did you have a strategy for avoiding numbers depending on the other digits in 
the test string? If so, how?
7. How are the numbers listed below different from those you did the addition 
and comparison with earlier?
4423
7355 and so on.
137
Results
The means and standard error for the three factors are presented in the table 
below. Three subjects in the invariant group showed good awareness of the 
invariant digit, and these subjects were removed from the analysis.
Invariant produced in test string (out of 10)
Suppression Training set Present Absent
Mean SE Mean SE
No Supp Invariant 0.1 0.10 3.0 0.37
Random 0.2 0.13 1.0 0.30
Supp Invariant 0.2 0.13 1.7 0.37
Random 0.2 0.13 1.6 0.31
An Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of study materials 
group F (1, 36) = 5, p < 0.05 and test materials F (1, 36) = 99.5, p < 0.05. The 
three-way interaction of articulation, study materials and test materials was 
significant, F (1, 36) = 5, p < 0.05.
In the Absent condition, subjects in the No Suppression group who were 
presented with invariant materials produced significantly more invariant digits 
than subjects in the No Suppression group who received random materials, F (1,
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36) = 27.2, p < 0.05. This difference was not replicated in the Suppression group, 
F (1, 36) < 1. Examination of the effect of Suppression in the Absent condition 
reveals that when subjects received invariant study materials they produced more 
invariant digits under No Suppression conditions than under Suppression 
conditions, F (1, 36) = 11.4, p < 0.05. This difference did not occur when 
subjects received random materials, F (1, 36) = 2.4.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 94% of the study strings in the 
Suppression group and 97.6% of strings in the No Suppression group.
Production o f digits in neutral strings. The means for invariant production in 
each condition are shown below.
Study set Invariant digits produced in the neutral test strings
Suppression No Suppression
Mean No. SE Mean No. SE
Invariant 1.2 0.20 1.1 0.23
Random 0.7 0.26 1.0 0.21
An Analysis of Variance revealed no significant effects of any of the factors. The 
difference in invariant production between subjects who received random 
materials and those who received invariant materials failed to reach significance 
F (1,36)= 1.7.
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Test o f Explicit Knowledge. Three participants were removed from the analysis 
because they verbally reported knowledge of the invariant digit in question 2 of 
the explicitness test and reinforced this by indicating the invariant digit as the 
most frequent in question 3.
In response to question 4, all subjects admitted to guessing most of the time 
during the completion test. In question 5, 12 subjects reported using memory for 
the results of arithmetic done in the orienting task as a cue to generate digits for 
the test. In answer to question 6, 43% of participants said they had avoided the 
digits that were already present in the string as a strategy. The remaining 
participants did not mention anything pertinent to repetitions in response to this 
question. However, 83% of participants noted that the numbers presented to them 
in question 6 were different from those in the study set because they contained 
repetitions.
Discussion
Participants who did not perform a phonological suppression task produced 
similar performance in the test phase in comparison to participants in Experiment
6. That is, constraining the study strings to contain an invariant digit in the 
Invariant group produced the predicted difference in relation to the Random 
group. This difference was not replicated, however, when participants had 
performed a phonological suppression task during encoding. This main finding 
suggests that phonological encoding is required for subjects to demonstrate 
increased invariant production following exposure to invariant strings. Therefore,
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it is clear that invariant properties are not encoded passively but phonological 
articulation during study is necessary for completion of test strings.
The floor effect that was demonstrated in the Present condition of both 
Experiment 6 and 8 appears to be the result of an explicit bias to avoid production 
of a digit that is already present in the test string. In the questionnaire, 43% of 
subjects reported that they used the strategy of avoiding digits which already 
occurred in the test string. When presented with strings containing repetitions, 
83% of the sample were able to verbalise the point that these test strings 
contained repetitions while the items in the study set did not. On the more 
specific question, subjects were more easily able to compare these items with 
instances they saw in the study set and the difference became apparent to a 
greater extent.
Regarding the neutral test conditions, participants showed no bias to production 
of invariant digits when the test items did not provide any cue to the strings in 
the study set. Therefore, this process is not simply a passive production of digits 
based on some very crude frequency priming of digits that were processed in the 
study phase.
3.6 Experiment 9
From the data presented in Experiment 8, the mechanism underlying performance 
on the completion task appears sensitive to phonological interference during the 
study phase. Thus, the overlap between the processing that occurs at study and
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test is an important determinant of performance in the invariance learning task. 
This finding is consistent with episodic processing views of implicit learning.
One limitation of this explanation is that it assumes that a different process 
underlies performance on the completion test in comparison to the standard 
forced choice procedure. This assumption cannot be made solely on the basis of 
the data from Experiment 8. A dissociation between performance on this 
completion task and existing forced choice data needs to be demonstrated in order 
to clarify that distinct processing occurs in these test tasks. A potential candidate 
for this is the transfer of the effect across different surface features. If the 
phonological information determines string completion performance then a 
change in surface features should not interfere with the effect. In the case of the 
forced choice test, performance was reduced to chance levels when surface 
features were changed (Stadler, Warren and Lesch, 2000). Thus, in Experiment 9, 
subjects were presented with study materials in which the four digit numbers 
were written out as words (e.g. four three nine one). The test materials were the 
same as those presented in Experiment 6 and 7.
Method
Participants. Twenty seven undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in this experiment and they were paid a small fee for their 
participation.
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Materials. Study and test materials were generated in an identical fashion to 
that of Experiment 6 with the exception that the study set strings were written out 
as words rather than as digits (e.g. three nine two one).
Design and Procedure. The experiment was carried out in the same way as 
Experiment 6 with the exception that the same extended questionnaire was 
presented to participants as in Experiment 8. This constituted the third phase of 
the experiment.
Results
The means and standard error for the two factors are presented in the table below. 
Three subjects in the invariant group were shown to have good awareness of the 
invariant digit and were removed from the analysis.
Study set Invariant produced in test string (out of 10)
Present Absent
Mean No. SE Mean No. SE
Invariant 0.4 0.2 2.2 0.3
Random 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.3
An Analysis of Variance revealed a significant main effect of test materials F(l, 
22) = 37.5, p < 0.05. The main effect of study materials and interaction of test and 
study materials failed to reach significance. However, in the absent condition the
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production of "3" was significantly higher in participants who had received an 
invariant study set as opposed to those participants who had received random 
study materials, F (1, 44) = 4.15, p < 0.05.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 97% of the study strings in the 
random group and 96.7% of strings in the invariant group.
Test o f Awareness. Three participants were removed from the analysis because
they reported knowledge of the invariant in response to question 2 of the 
awareness test and reinforced this by indicating "3" as the most frequent in 
response to question 3.
In response to question 4, all subjects admitted to guessing most of the time 
during the completion test. In question 5, arithmetic was cited by 50% of 
participants as the main strategy they used. In answer to question 6, 33% of 
participants reported that they had avoided placing repetitions of numbers already 
present in the test string. In response to question 7, 75% of participants noted that 
the numbers in the example were different to those in the study set because they 
contained repetitions.
Discussion
Participants who had received study materials in which every string contained a 
"three" produced significantly more "3" digits when completing the Absent 
strings than participants who received four naturally occurring numbers. This 
replicates the findings of Experiments 6, 7 and 8. It also demonstrates that 
changing surface features does not substantially affect performance on the
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completion task. It is suggested above that the completion task involves a 
different type of processing in comparison to the forced choice procedure that has 
been used in other studies on invariance learning. This position is supported by 
the data as changes in surface features do not substantially affect performance, 
unlike the findings of Stadler et al. (2000) where sensitivity was apparent.
Experiment 8 demonstrated that repetition structure is an aspect of stimulus 
structure that subjects may use as an explicit strategy; this finding is replicated in 
experiment 9. In the questionnaire, 33% of subjects reported the use of a strategy 
for avoiding digits that already occur in the test string. This is slightly less than 
the level in Experiment 8. Despite this, when presented with strings of digits 
containing repetitions, 75% of participants noticed and reported the difference 
between the numbers presented and those in the study set.
3.7 General Discussion
The data reported here demonstrate that it is possible to elicit knowledge of 
invariant properties of digit stimuli using a fragment completion task. In 
experiment 6, subjects who processed strings containing an invariant digit 
completed test strings with an invariant digit significantly more often with this 
invariant than people who processed strings with naturally occurring numbers. 
This effect was revealed only by an increased production of invariant digits in the 
absent test fragments. Invariant production in the present test fragments was 
somewhat obscured in experiment 6 by a bias against producing repeating digits. 
When this bias was accounted for in experiment 7, there was no tendency for 
subjects to show sensitivity to the singular occurrence of the training invariant in
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each string. This suggests the representation of the invariance is not very 
specific. Instead, the information may be more general; referring to the frequency 
of occurrence of the digits in the training strings or about specific strings 
themselves. However, claims on the information used in this task cannot be made 
on the basis of experiment 6 and 7.
The effect was replicated consistently across the four experiments reported in this 
chapter. Studies of invariant learning that use forced choice test materials have 
exhibited inconsistent patterns of performance (see experiment 3). It could be that 
these forced choice tasks require different processing resources than are used in 
completing strings with an invariant digit. Indeed, considering the nature of what 
the two test tasks require people to do may aid the understanding of the difference 
in their characteristics of performance. This focus on processing demands is 
consistent with episodic processing accounts of implicit learning (Whittlesea and 
Dorken, 1993). The overlap in processing resources engaged during study and 
test is the mechanism by which episodic processing theories of implicit learning 
operate. This account is supported by the data presented here. The completion test 
task requires people to articulate potential candidates to fill the fragments that are 
presented at test. When articulation is prevented in the study phase, articulation at 
test has no similar processing episode from the study phase to map onto. From the 
episodic framework, it follows that performance in the test is inhibited, this was 
demonstrated in the data from Experiment 8.
The difference in processing used by fragment completion in comparison to 
forced choice test materials was evident in Experiment 9, where performance was
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consistent over changing surface features. This finding is unlike Stadler et al. 
(2000), who demonstrated no sensitivity across surface form with forced choice 
test materials.
The apparent transfer revealed in Experiment 9 can also be explained within the 
processing account. Data from Experiment 8 indicates that articulation of digits is 
the resource required for performance in the completion task. The change of 
surface features should not interfere with articulation, hence performance in the 
completion task is not affected. Paradoxically, it is the consistency of processing 
resources that results in apparent transfer in the completion task. The same 
argument can be applied with regard to the lack of transfer shown in studies using 
forced choice test materials. The forced choice task requires participants to 
compare whole strings and make a decision on which string was present in the 
study set. Thus, the processing that this task draws on is more likely to be visual 
representations of strings seen in the study phase. If surface features change then 
consistency of processing resources will not occur and performance drops to 
chance.
This explanation for the pattern of data reported here is consistent with the recent 
processing account of Implicit Learning put forward by Whittlesea and Wright 
(1997). They call this account of Implicit Learning, "Learning without knowing 
the consequences". This view of implicit learning emphasises that subjects are 
unaware th a t" processing a particular item this way rather than that way... they 
are in fact exercising an option to prepare for the future in a specific way" (Pg 
196). Considering the fact that subjects will process many aspects of the stimuli
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in many ways, it seems that they are prepared to perform in a number of different 
ways to a number of test tasks. In fact Wright and Whittlesea (1998) have made a 
similar point: "At test knowledge is better understood as a set of resources to be 
drawn on for many different purposes in interacting with the world" (p415). 
After encountering the study materials in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) task, 
subjects appear to use knowledge of the study materials differently according to 
the demands of the test materials. They adapt to test circumstances, rather than 
apply knowledge passively.
The experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate that knowledge of 
invariance can be generated given the correct test circumstances. This reinforces 
the point that subjects are actively involved in satisfying the demands of the test. 
When presented with the test stimuli, this triggers the generation of potentially 
useful experiences of the training phase which subjects apply during the test. In 
the experiments reported in this chapter, the fragment completion test captures 
this process of generation. Furthermore, this use of generation indicates that the 
fluency of processing test stimuli is not the only route to revealing knowledge of 
invariance. Indeed, subjects can apply different heuristics or strategies during the 
test phase according to the demands of the test task. These heuristics focus on 
different experiences of the training stimuli, resulting in differing sensitivity to 
training task manipulations.
On the issue of awareness, Wright and Whittlesea (1998) note that information 
can become explicit in implicit learning tasks when the task carried out during 
encoding maps onto the same information as the task carried out at test. They
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comment that in carrying out the demands of the training task, information may 
be encoded that is only indirectly related to the training task and this knowledge 
may be used to aid performance at test. Since this knowledge is not the focus of 
the training task, it is not processed in conscious awareness. Taking the task 
presented here as an example, one of the questions in the awareness test probed 
knowledge of strategies used during the test phase. In responding to this the 
majority of subjects reported using strategies involving arithmetic as an aide to 
memory. This is not surprising because subjects were induced to perform 
arithmetic as the orienting task. The key point is that none of these strategies 
would help them perform in the completion test or come up with useful 
information in the awareness test. Similar to a suggestion by Whittlesea & 
Dorken (1997) concerning tests of awareness, subjects were operating under the 
wrong theory of what knowledge is relevant and hence they fail on the awareness 
test. However, they can use some of the indirectly encoded information to 
perform at above chance levels in the completion task. This knowledge is not 
available to consciousness because it was not the focus of the training task. Such 
indirectly encoded information may be compatible with certain operations that 
are carried out in the test phase, in which case, it is revealed in the test phase. For 
example, in the completion task, digits were encoded phonologically in the study 
phase and this aided performance in a test phase that required such phonological 
information.
This analysis of the information used in the generation test does not precisely 
specify which aspects of the stimulus are used to perform at above chance levels.
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The next chapter will attempt to address the question of what information is used 
during the test.
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Chapter 4 The Information Acquired in the Invariant 
Learning Task
4.1 Introduction
Reber (1989) suggested that the information acquired in implicit learning tasks is 
in the form of abstract rules. For example, in artificial grammar learning (see sect 
1.5), Reber (1989) proposes that subjects acquire knowledge of the rule structure 
that determines the structure of the training items. However, this understanding of 
the knowledge acquired in artificial grammar learning has proved contentious. 
One view is that it is more likely that subjects classify test strings by making 
analogies between individual training and test strings (e.g. Brooks, 1978). This 
analogical processing may be successful because of greater similarity of 
grammatical training and test strings (e.g. Vokey and Brooks, 1992). There are 
further perspectives considered in detail elsewhere (see sect 1.8.2 and 1.8.3). This 
disagreement on the basis of artificial grammar learning has led to the use of the 
simpler forms of implicit learning, such as the learning of invariant features, in 
order to study this type of learning.
The main focus of study in the preceding chapters has been the effect of 
manipulating processing conditions in the invariant learning task. In other 
research, there is an ongoing effort to determine the information used in the 
invariant learning task (e.g. Cock, Berry and Gaffan, 1994. Churchill and 
Gilmore, 1998. Ward and Churchill, 1998); therefore, the information acquired 
in the invariant learning task will be the main focus of this current chapter.
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The training stimuli in the digit version of the invariant learning task are 
constrained, so that each string contains a digit in common. This constraint allows 
the possibility that subjects may become sensitive to the higher frequency of this 
invariant feature, rather than acquiring abstract knowledge of the invariance, as 
suggested by McGeorge and Burton (1990). There is some evidence that the 
acquisition of frequency information can be acquired automatically and without 
awareness (e.g. Hasher and Zacks, 1979), so it is possible that similar frequency 
acquisition may explain implicit invariant learning effects.
In response to this, Bright and Burton (1993) presented subjects with less rigidly 
defined invariant feature that did not give rise to increased occurrences of a 
specific feature. As described earlier (sect 2.6), Bright and Burton (1993) 
demonstrated implicit invariance learning using clock face stimuli. The 
invariance rule was a time range that was consistent over all of the training items 
so that all of the training items clock times fell between 6 and 12 o’clock. At test, 
subjects showed a preference for clock faces that displayed times within this 
range. This preference indicates that subjects can become sensitive to an invariant 
characteristic that is not simply a highly frequent invariant feature. Thus, the 
operation of a crude frequency counting mechanism is not an essential 
mechanism for invariance learning. However, these data do not rule out the 
operation of frequency counting in acquisition of an invariant feature of digit 
strings.
In Chapter 3, it was explained that if subjects produced more invariant digits in 
the present condition of the test strings (i.e. those fragments that contain the
152
invariant), it may indicate that they are simply primed to produce more digits 
from the study set, regardless of test context. This kind of increase in production 
of digits that occurred very frequently in training during the test is akin to a 
frequency counting process. The production of invariant digits in the present 
strings could not be observed as a result of the bias to inhibit the production of 
repeated digits. In experiment 8, the production of digits in neutral strings was 
investigated, which allows the production of digits without test context to be 
examined. Using these conditions, there was no increased production of invariant 
digits from training. It would appear that there needs to be some context from 
training for any increase in invariant production to be revealed. This finding 
indicates that it is unlikely a crude frequency priming mechanism is operating.
The neutral test strings offer a different form of test in comparison to the standard 
conditions as subjects do not recollect any aspects of the training stimuli. 
Therefore, these data from digit production in neutral strings are not sufficient to 
conclude that digit frequency plays no role in digit invariant learning. More 
convincing evidence against the use of frequency information could be provided 
if the frequency of all digits (i.e. not just the invariant) in the training phase can 
be shown to have no relationship with the production of digits during the test 
phase.
4.2 Further analysis of the completion data from experiment 6
In experiment 6, the analysis focused on the production of the invariant ‘3’ digit 
only. The production of the other digits was not included in the analysis. In this 
section, the level of production of the digits other than the invariant (i.e. 1, 2, 4 -
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9) in the test fragments will be considered in relation to the frequency that these 
digits occur in the training set.
As each subject was presented with a different set of study materials, the 
frequency of each digit within the study sets varied considerably. It is 
meaningless, therefore, to examine the production of particular digits averaged 
across participants. Instead, a ranking system was developed so that the digit that 
occurred most frequently in particular training materials was ranked ‘8’, the digit 
that occurred least frequently was ranked ‘1’ and the other digits in between 
occupied the other rankings. For each subject, therefore, different digits 
corresponded to each of the ranking positions. Hence, the level of digit 
production for each rank was averaged across subjects, rather than the level of 
production of specific digits. This resulted in a production score for each rank. 
This score pooled the values of present and absent test fragments to produce a 
single production score.
The training stimuli were characterised according to a further measure, the 
frequency score. Each subject had different frequencies of digits that resulted in 
each rank. For example, subject 1 had fifteen ‘8’ digits that were ranked as the 
most frequent. However, subject 2 had sixteen ‘4’ digits ranked as the most 
frequent. The average of these frequencies for all subjects produced the frequency 
score for each rank.
The association between training set frequency and test production can be 
examined by plotting the production score against frequency score of each rank
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(see fig 1) There are two sets of rankings plotted below which were derived from 
the invariant and random groups separately. It was considered that these groups 
should yield separate ranks because the presence of an invariant alters the 
frequency of the other digits in the training strings.
□ Inv
production score
Figure 1
A Pearson correlation analysis of these scores reveals a value of r (16) = 0.077, 
which is not significant. This indicates that there is no association between the 
frequency of occurrence of digits in the training phase and their production in the 
test fragments. Therefore, the increased production of the invariant ‘3’ digit in 
experiment 6 is not simply a result of its higher frequency within the training 
materials. One point of concern is the degree of influence that small variations in 
the training frequency could have on digit production at test. The frequency of 
even the highest rank digits in the training set is an average of eighteen 
occurrences, far less frequent than the thirty occurrences of the invariant. It is
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possible that the small variation in frequency during the training would not have a 
discernible effect on the production of digits during training. In comparison, the 
invariant is clearly far more frequent than the other digits, and this may result in a 
sufficient increase to be detectable. However, the analysis reported above is 
unambiguous; there is no association between training frequency and subsequent 
digit production. A weak effect of frequency may be expected to reveal a hint of 
association, but this is not the case.
These data suggest that a frequency counting mechanism does not control the 
production of digits in the completion test. An alternative possibility is that 
subjects are responding on the basis of abstract knowledge of the invariance. 
When considering the suppression data reported in chapter 3, it is unlikely that 
such abstract knowledge does control performance. It was argued in chapter 3 
that the dependence of performance on articulation indicates that episodic 
knowledge of the training phase is used in this task. That is, during the test 
subjects’ decisions are based on memory for specific items encountered during the 
training phase.
The importance of memory for instances in invariance learning has been 
investigated by Cock, Berry and Gaff an (1994). They developed four indices to 
measure the similarity between the training and test strings. For example, one 
measure was the sum of digits that each test string shared with each of the thirty 
training strings. Interestingly, selected negative strings scored higher than 
rejected negatives on the matrices, although they did not discriminate between 
selected and rejected positive strings. Hence, there are some difficulties with the
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way similarity was scored. As a result, Cock et al. manipulated the similarity of 
items in the forced choice test to those in the study set independently of the 
invariant. The data revealed that if the test item was similar to a training item, this 
similarity would bias the response to a greater extent than if the test item was 
positive or negative. Thus, there is good evidence that subjects use the familiarity 
of the test items to guide decisions.
In Chapter 3, subjects completed fragments of novel strings at test with a single 
digit to make up a string they believed to occur in the test phase. It is quite 
conceivable that subjects bring to mind instances or experiences of strings from 
the training phase when completing the test strings. It is the aim of experiment 10 
to investigate the role of memory for instances in determining performance on the 
invariant learning task when the fragment completion test is used.
43  Experiment 10
As explained earlier, Cock et al. demonstrated that memory for whole training 
strings can exert an influence over performance in the forced choice test. It is the 
aim of the current experiment to determine the role of memory for particular 
items when the completion test is used.
If performance on the completion test is underlain by memory for whole 
instances, the invariant digit has no special status. That is, completing fragments 
with any digit, including the invariant, accesses the same knowledge base -  
memory for particular strings. The aim of the test of knowledge should be to 
access the knowledge of the invariant aspect of the training, and the knowledge of
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other aspects of the strings. If performance is no different for these two aspects of 
the strings, it would be reasonable to assume that the invariant digit has no special 
status, and is generated at test in the same way as other aspects of the strings. To 
investigate this possibility, a set of test stimuli was constructed which separately 
accessed knowledge of both the invariant digit and other aspects of the strings.
In the training phase subjects encountered thirty positive test items as before. 
However, during the completion test subjects were presented with twenty 
fragments of strings that were derived from items that occurred in the training set. 
Furthermore, these fragments were made by removing the invariant digit, in this 
case invariant ‘5’, from the invariant training items (e.g. so that 2541 could 
become 2_41) or by removing another digit (e.g. 2541 could become 254_ ). 
Since all test items were derived from positive items, the conditions were 
comparable. These test conditions represent the same structure as the present and 
absent conditions used in the experiments in chapter 3. However, in place of 
measuring the degree of production of the invariant digit, the accuracy of 
completing the fragment correctly was measured.
The main prediction is that if subjects use memory for whole exemplars during 
the test, fragment completion performance will not differ in the absent and 
present strings. However, if some knowledge of invariance is acquired, fragment 
completion performance will be higher in the absent than the present fragments, 
as a result of an increased number of invariant digits produced. In order to be sure 
that any increase in the absent condition is not an artefact of the test materials, a 
second experimental group was included, the negatives group. In the negatives
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group, subjects were presented with twenty positive test items and ten negatives 
during training. Therefore, no knowledge of invariance could be acquired. If 
subjects in the absent condition were to perform higher than those in the present, 
it would prove that any effect in the invariant group is an artefact of the test 
materials. In addition, the same awareness test was administered to participants in 
order to replicate the findings of experiment 8 and 9 on the awareness of 
repetitions.
Method
Participants. Twenty one undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in this experiment. They were paid a small fee for their 
participation.
Materials. Study sets were generated individually for each subject. The sets 
were generated separately for the Invariant and Negatives groups. In the Invariant 
group a set of 30 items was produced for the study set. These were all Positive 
items and contained no repetitions within the strings (as before). In the Negatives 
group a set of 30 four digit numbers was generated so that 20 of the strings were 
positives (contained an invariant 5) and 10 were negatives (did not contain an 
invariant 5).
The test materials fragments were generated by taking the 20 positive items from 
the study set and removing a digit. In the Present condition a digit other than "5" 
was removed (e.g. a string 4531 would become 45_1). In the absent conditions a 
5 digit was always removed (e.g. a string 7591 would become 7_91).
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Design and Procedure. The experimental procedure was carried out in an 
identical manner to that of experiments 6 and 7.
Results
Means and standard error for the two factors are presented in the table below. 
One subject was removed from the analysis for having awareness of the invariant.
Study set Number of strings completed correctly (out of 10)
Present Absent
Mean No. SE Mean No. SE
Invariant 2.1 0.31 2.4 0.43
Negatives 2.2 0.41 2.7 0.40
An Analysis of Variance revealed that neither of the main effects nor interaction 
reached significance. It would be unwise to compare the means here with a 
purported level of chance. This is because it is unclear what that level of chance 
would be. Experiments 6, 7 and 8 have demonstrated that the invariant influences 
subjects' responses to a large extent. Therefore, it would not be possible to 
determine a fair level across the two groups.
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 96.3% of the study strings in the 
Invariant group and 97.2% of strings in the Negatives group.
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Tests o f Explicit Knowledge. One subject reported knowledge of the invariant
digit in the awareness test. Again, all subjects said they felt they were guessing 
most of the time. In response to question 5 subjects reported using similar 
arithmetic as in Experiment 6. In answer to question 6, 40 % of subjects reported 
the use of avoiding repetitions as a strategy. When they were given strings 
containing repetitions in question 7, 90% noted that these items were different 
from those in the study set because they contained repetitions.
Discussion
In the invariant group, completion performance was equivalent in the absent and 
present test strings. There was no difference if the subject was completing the 
string with an invariant digit or another digit. In addition, the verbal reports of 
subjects in the awareness test mirrored those of the subjects in experiments 8 and 
9. That is, the majority of subjects, when prompted, noticed that the strings in the 
training phase did not contain repetitions and a large minority of subjects reported 
using this as a strategy to aid performance.
This finding implies that the invariant ‘5’ digit had not acquired any special status 
as a result of occurring in every training string; it was treated as any other digit 
during the test phase. Moreover, this suggests that subjects use memory for 
individual items when completing the absent test strings and not semantic 
knowledge of the invariance itself. This claim may be premature, however, if the 
required responses made in the test are considered. In the absent condition, there 
were ten test strings in which the required response was the invariant ‘5’; yet the 
responses in the present condition could be any of the eight other digits. Subjects
161
in the absent condition may have been discouraged from entering the same 
response in the absent strings more than a couple of times, especially if they 
failed to notice that every training string contained a ‘5’ digit. It is necessary, 
therefore, to conduct a further experiment that takes this potential bias into 
account.
4.4 Experiment 11
In the previous experiment, it was demonstrated that completion performance is 
equivalent in conditions either where the fragment is completed with a digit that 
was invariant in the training materials, or if the fragment is completed with any 
other digit. Hence, it appears that the invariant does not acquire any special 
quality during training. However, the test materials may have been subject to a 
response bias that stems from the fact that the correct response to the absent 
strings was always the same, a ‘5’ digit, while responses to the present strings 
were varied across the other eight digits.
It may be possible to counteract this bias using the subjects' tendency to inhibit 
the production of repeated digits. In the current experiment, a number of novel 
present fragments were placed into the test set, in order that the proportion of 
present fragments at test was much higher than absent fragments. The natural bias 
against repeating the ‘5’ digit in the present test fragments would mean that the 
number of ‘5’ digits produced in the present fragments would be close to zero. 
Since the present fragments are in the majority, this would reduce the number of 
instances when the invariant ‘5’ would be a potential response. This limits the 
possibility that subjects may consider their responses to be unrepresentative of the
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training digit frequencies, as the number of occasions ‘5’ is a potential response is 
reduced. Apart from the introduction of novel present strings, the experimental 
procedure was identical to experiment 10.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in this experiment. They were paid a small fee for their 
participation.
Materials. Study sets were generated in an identical fashion to Experiment 7 
with the alteration in the Negatives group that 16 positive items occurred and 14 
negatives,
The test materials fragments were generated by taking the 16 positive items from 
the study set and removing a digit. In the Present condition a digit other than "5" 
was removed, and in the absent condition, a "5" digit was removed. A further 14 
novel positive items were generated and the invariant removed, as in the present 
condition. None of these items were the same as those in the study phase.
Design and Procedure. The experimental procedure was carried out in an 
identical manner to that of experiments 10.
Results
Means and standard error for the two factors are presented in the table below.
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Study set Number of strings completed correctly (out of 8)
Present Absent
Mean No. SE Mean No. SE
Invariant 1.1 0.28 1.7 0.48
Negatives 1.8 0.41 1.8 0.35
An Analysis of Variance revealed that neither of the factors main effects nor 
interaction reached significance. Since the level of chance is undefined, the 
experiment does not allow a comparison with chance (see above).
The arithmetic task was carried out correctly on 93.9% of the study strings in the 
Invariant group and 94.3% of strings in the Negatives group.
Tests o f Explicit Knowledge. No subjects reported any knowledge of the 
invariant digit in the awareness test. Four subjects mentioned the invariant among 
other digits in response to the second question. None of these subjects went on to 
circle the invariant in the third question.
Discussion
The results of experiment 11 mirrored those of experiment 10; completion 
performance was equivalent in the present and absent test fragments. In both the 
experimental groups, there was no difference in performance if the string was 
completed with the invariant ‘5’ or any of the other digits. It was suggested that
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the findings of experiment 10 may be influenced by the fact that the correct 
response in the absent condition is always the same. If subjects were to complete 
fragments correctly, then a number of ‘5’ digits would have been produced; this 
may appear odd to subjects, especially if they failed to notice that all training 
strings contained a ‘5’ digit, so resulting in inhibition of further ‘5’ digits. In the 
current experiment, the test materials were controlled, in order that fewer ‘5’ 
digits would be produced, and this did not appear to affect performance. It seems 
then, that the number of correct responses in the absent condition is the same as 
that in the present condition because the same process underlies completion in 
both conditions. It is likely that subjects refer to memory for previously 
encountered strings when completing the test fragments. This memory based 
account makes no distinction between digits that occur in every string and those 
which occur less frequently, as the knowledge base is only the stored exemplars 
seen in training.
4.5 General Discussion
Following exposure to a set of training items that conformed to an invariance 
rule, Cock, Berry and Gaffan (1994) demonstrated that subjects at test tend to 
select an item that is similar to one seen in training in a forced choice test over 
one that is dissimilar, even if it violates the invariance rule. Cock et al. suggested 
that this finding shows that subjects rely on a sense of familiarity with the test 
items to guide judgements during the test. The use of memory based processing 
has been revealed as a powerful determinant of performance in the artificial 
grammar learning task (e.g. Vokey and Brooks, 1994). It appears that memory for
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previous training instances has good explanatory power across different 
experimental tasks that are claimed to demonstrate implicit learning.
In chapter 3, an alternative route to accessing sensitivity to an invariant feature 
was introduced; the completion test. In the completion test, subjects are asked to 
complete a fragment of a four digit string with a digit to make a number that they 
think occurred earlier in the training set. In the experiments reported in the 
current chapter, subjects were presented with fragments of old training strings 
and were given the same test instructions. Under these circumstances, subjects 
showed no difference in their ability to complete these strings with a digit that 
was invariant in the training materials, or, for that matter, any other digit. This 
implies that the invariant did not acquire any special quality during training. 
Instead, responding in this task is dependent on memory based processing of 
particular training strings rather than abstract information about invariant 
characteristics.
Memory for particular instances, in this explanation, refers to memory for 
specific individual training strings that occurred during training. It assumes that 
subjects have remembered at least some of the training strings in full. In the 
experiments reported in chapter 3, the test fragments were derived from strings 
which did not occur in the training set. In this case, it must be assumed that 
subjects rely on the same memory based processing, except here, fragments are 
completed in order to be as close as possible to remembered strings. Since 
subjects feel they are guessing the majority of the time, it is quite conceivable for 
such a process to operate. It is important to note that this mechanism is equivalent
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to the notion of specific similarity to training strings that was proposed by Cock, 
Berry and Gaffan (1994).
Cock et al. expand on this notion of specific similarity of test strings to particular 
training strings with the idea of general similarity. They claim general similarity 
is the “summed similarity between a test string and all members of the learning 
set” (pl031). Cock et al. comment that it is difficult to apply such a conception of 
general similarity to the invariant learning task. Indeed, if the training items are 
described only by a simple invariance rule, such summed similarity of the test 
string to all training strings is akin to a frequency based account. The analysis that 
was performed on experiment 6 did not support this notion of a frequency 
counting account. For this reason, the memory for specific strings is put forward 
as a superior account of performance.
It is straightforward to explain a mechanism behind the use of similarity 
processing in the forced choice test of invariance learning. Subjects select strings 
that share a number of features with a particular item they believe they saw 
before. In the completion test, subjects must be cued by the test fragment to recall 
some item from training. They would then complete the test string with a digit 
which is consistent with the remembered item. The suppression data from 
experiment 8, in tandem with the transfer data from experiment 9, would seem to 
suggest that subjects are using memory for articulation of strings during training, 
rather than a visual representation of the strings.
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The problem with this account is that the verbal reports of subjects in experiments 
11 and 12 failed to provide any evidence that subjects were using a strategy of 
recalling particular items. As in chapter 3, the main verbal reports of strategies 
that subjects used concerned memory for arithmetic computations. This may not 
be a problem, however, if it is considered that the correct responses to the later 
fragment completion task are correlated with these computations. By 
remembering the processing operations carried out on the training strings, 
subjects are able to perform at above chance levels on the test, and yet remain 
unable to verbalise any of the individual training strings.
Throughout the work on this thesis, there has been continuous reference to the 
role of active processing in task performance; at test subjects use information that 
was generated during the active processing of the training stimuli. This is 
consistent with the episodic processing account of implicit learning (Whittlesea 
and Dorken, 1993). However, there are some findings on the sequence learning 
task that are inconsistent with the idea that subjects have to actively attend to the 
training materials, and these will be considered in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5 Response Relevance in the SRT task
5.1 Introduction
Subjects in implicit learning experiments have been described as passive learners 
who have little influence over the acquisition of the structure of a stimulus 
domain (Lewicki and Hill, 1989). This means that implicit learning is directed 
entirely by the structure of the stimulus domain, and any variability in learning is 
the result of variations in the stimulus itself and not the task demands. In contrast, 
there exists a large amount of data that suggest subjects do not process the 
stimulus structure in a passive manner. For example, Whittlesea and Wright 
(1997) demonstrated that familiarity of the stimulus domain can have a powerful 
impact on the acquisition of sensitivity to its structure. In experiment 5 (sect 2.7), 
it was shown that sensitivity to the invariant property was not demonstrated if the 
task demands did not direct the subject to process the invariant characteristic of 
the stimuli. This indicates that the structure of stimuli is not acquired 
automatically.
However, this suggestion is not supported by other studies on the sequence 
learning task. Sequence learning is typically demonstrated when subjects are 
asked to react to items presented in different locations on a screen in a choice 
reaction time task. Unbeknown to the subject, the successive locations follow a 
sequence which repeats several times. Subjects are shown to demonstrate a 
speedup in their response times, without being able to describe the cause of this 
reduction (e.g. Nissen and Bullemer, 1987). In a development of this single
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sequence task, Mayr (1996) demonstrated that subjects were able to learn two 
sequences simultaneously. Importantly, subjects did not make an overt response 
to both sequences, and yet showed appreciable learning on the sequence to which 
they did not respond. This finding is significant because it implies that some 
automatic learning of sequence information can occur.
5.2 Simultaneous Learning of Two Independent Sequences
Mayr (1996) demonstrated learning of two independent sequences, one of which 
represented a sequence of location changes, and the other a sequence of object 
changes. The stimulus object varied across four locations positioned in the 
comers of the screen. Unlike Nissen and Bullemer (1987), four different object 
types were presented, a black square, a black circle, a white square or a white 
circle. Subjects were instructed to respond to these object changes. Importantly, 
this meant that the location changes did not require a response and thus spatial 
locations were not significant for the selection of a goal related motor response. 
Mayr (1996) demonstrated learning of both the spatial and object changes, and, in 
a second experiment, displayed how joint learning of object and spatial sequences 
was as efficient as the learning of single sequences.
Mayr (1996) interpreted these data as reflecting the operation of separate 
sequence learning systems, and suggested that the spatial sequence is learned by a 
system that acquires the sequence of spatial orientations to the successive 
locations of the stimulus object. This system operates independently from the 
system that acquires the sequence of object changes or the non spatial sequence. 
According to Mayr, the non spatial sequence is acquired by a system that is
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involved with the selection of a motor response. This system will acquire any 
information relevant to responses, so that location, colour, size and so on may be 
learned as long as they relate to the response demands. From this point of view, 
non-spatial regularities cannot be acquired when they are not relevant for the goal 
related response. This possibility was not tested, however, by the original Mayr 
(1996) study because subjects were instructed to respond to the object changes or 
the non-spatial dimension. A clearer picture of dual sequence learning using the 
Mayr (1996) design could be obtained by using the same spatial and non-spatial 
sequence dimensions, with responses made to the spatial dimension rather than 
the non-spatial. Using this design, it would be possible to ascertain if non-spatial 
sequences can be acquired without a direct response being made to them, and this 
possibility will be tested in experiment 12.
5.3 Experiment 12
In experiment 12, a replication of the Mayr (1996) study will be undertaken 
except that instead of responding to the object changes, subjects will be instructed 
to respond to the location changes of the object. The aim of this is to demonstrate 
that sensitivity to non spatial sequence material is not acquired when subjects do 
not respond directly to it.
As in Mayr (1996), participants were presented with four different objects that 
appeared at four different locations, and the succession of the location and object 
changes followed regular, but uncorrelated sequences. The same eight and nine 
item sequences were used as in Mayr (1996), and these were repeated nine and 
eight times respectively to make a 72 trial block, and to ensure that each element
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was paired with each other once. A finding of no learning of the object changes 
would indicate that non spatial sequences need to be related to task demands in 
order to be learned.
Method
Participants. Thirty two undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow 
took part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for their participation.
Stimuli. Stimuli were presented on a 15in monitor and occurred at four
different locations. These stimuli occurred in four boxes of side length 3.5cm 
which were horizontally positioned across the screen, each separated by 1.2cm. 
Four objects could occur in each of the locations; a black square, a white square, 
a black circle and a white circle. Object width and height was 2.2cm. During the 
practice trials an asterix, also of side length 2.2cm, was used. The response to 
stimulus interval (RSI) was zero.
Procedure. Before the main training trials began, subjects performed a 72 trial
practice block where the stimulus object was an asterix. These 72 trials were 
organised so that they followed a random pattern through the whole block so 
there was no systematic sequence. No element occurred in the same location on 
successive trials. Throughout the experiment, subjects were instructed to respond 
to the location of the object. If the object occurred in the leftmost box, subjects 
pressed the "d" key on the keyboard, the "f" key for the left middle box, the "j" 
key for the right middle box and the "k" key for the rightmost box. The 
instructions emphasised both speed and accuracy.
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Following this, subjects were instructed that the object to which they were to 
respond would alternate between black circle or square, and a white circle or 
square. They were told to ignore these changes and to continue responding to 
location, as in the practice block. Two sequences were used that corresponded to 
the sequences used by Mayr (1996). Subjects were not informed that the 
appearances of the objects would follow a regular pattern. Sequence A had eight 
elements: DBDABCAC and sequence B had nine: CDADBCABA. Here the 
letters corresponded either to the objects (A = black square, B = white square, C 
= black circle and D = white circle) or the locations (A for leftmost moving 
across the screen to D for rightmost). For each subject, one sequence was applied 
to locations and the other to objects and this assignment was counterbalanced. 
The training blocks consisted of 16 blocks of 72 trials each. This resulted in eight 
repetitions of the nine element sequence and nine repetitions of the eight element 
sequence. Thus, each element in either sequence was paired only once with each 
element of the other. In blocks 9, 12 and 15, the location or object sequence could 
be random, or both sequences could be random. For half the subjects, the location 
sequence was random in block 9 and the object sequence random in block 12, and 
for the other subjects the reverse assignment was used. All subjects saw random 
object and location sequences in block 15.
Following block 16, subjects were questioned about their metaknowledge of the 
sequential structure of the objects and location changes. Like the Mayr (1996) 
study, subjects were falsely led to believe they had been randomly assigned to 
one of four different conditions. Subjects were told there were four conditions,
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Condition 1, where the object and location changes followed a specific pattern, 
Condition 2 where the location changes were regular and object changes random, 
Condition 3 where the object changes were regular, and the location random, or 
Condition 4, where both object and location changes were random. Subjects were 
asked which of these four conditions they felt they had been assigned to.
When they had indicated which condition they thought that they had been 
assigned to, they were told that both the sequences were regular and a short test 
would follow which would probe their knowledge of the sequences. This test 
involved generation of items of the sequence based on three cue items. In this 
respect, the test differed from the Mayr (1996) study because three, rather than 
two, elements were used as a cue. In the Mayr (1996) study, the generation test 
was made as short as possible. The reason for this is that testing of both 
sequences could easily induce contamination from one to the other. It is possible 
that increasing the number of cue items from two to three may improve the 
sensitivity of the test, without substantially enlarging the generation test. Subjects 
saw three cue items and at presentation of the third item, they were asked to 
predict the next item in the sequence. This was repeated until the prediction of 
each sequence item had been attempted. Like the Mayr (1996) study, the order of 
presentation of the object and location generation test was counterbalanced.
Results
Overall Learning Effects: Median RTs were computed per subject and block, 
and are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Reaction times as a function o f training, separately for participants who were
exposed to random spatial sequence in block 9 and a random  object (non-spatial) sequence in 
block 12 (white circles), and for the participants for whom the reverse order was used (black 
circles). All subjects responded to the location changes of the stimulus object.
There is no practice effect, that is, the RTs do not appear to decrease as the 
Blocks progress. This does not, however, indicate that no learning took place 
because in the blocks where location sequence was replaced by random 
movement or where both location and object changes became random, an 
increase in RTs occurred. This increase in RTs is determined by comparing the 
RTs on random blocks with those on adjacent sequenced blocks. This yielded
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learning scores for the location sequence alone, object sequence alone or where 
both sequences were tested together. The means and standard deviations of these 
scores are presented in the table below.
Sequence Test Learning Score
Mean SD
Location 80 39
Object 6 26
Both 86 40
For the location sequence, the learning score was significantly greater than zero, 
t (31) = 11.4, p < 0.05, as was the learning score for both sequences together, t 
(31) = 12, p < 0.05. However, the object sequence learning score failed to reach 
significance, t (31) = 1.2. From these data, it is clear that subjects show learning 
of the location sequence but because there is no corresponding increase in RTs 
when the object sequence ceases, this indicates no learning of the object 
sequence. Comparing the difference scores between the object and location 
reveals that they are significantly different, t (31) = 8.6, p < 0.05.
Comparing learning o f the Eight and Nine element sequences: The data reported 
above represents learning effects of the eight and nine element sequences
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collapsed together. When the learning of these sequences is considered 
separately, the pattern of performance is no different. A two factor Sequence 
Type X Sequence Length Analysis of Variance reveals, importantly, a main effect 
of Sequence Type, F (1, 30) = 84.9, p < 0.05, but no main effect of Sequence 
Length, F (1, 30) = 2.71, p > 0.1. Furthermore, these factors did not interact, F (1, 
30) «  1. From this, we can assume that when a location response is used, the 8 
and 9 item sequence are comparable.
Subjects' Awareness o f the Sequences: The post task question prompted subjects 
to declare whether they noticed any structure in either 1) object and location 
changes, 2) location changes alone, 3) object changes alone or 4) whether no 
sequence was present in either. The number of subjects who endorsed each of the 
responses is shown in the table below, collapsed across subjects who responded 
to the eight or the nine item sequence.
Allocation Response Number of Responses
1. Location and Object 7
2. Location 16
3. Object 5
4. Neither 4
A Chi-Square test reveals that there is a difference in the numbers of responses in 
each category, X2 (3) = 11.3, p < 0.05. A location (2) versus others (1, 3 and 4)
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Chi-Square test indicates that significantly more subjects responded "location" 
than any other response, X2 (1) = 10.5, p < 0.05.
These data suggest that subjects noticed the location sequences more than they 
noticed object sequences. The next question is, do they have greater awareness of 
the location sequence than the object sequence? The generate test of object and 
location sequence was intended to probe subjects' conscious knowledge of the 
sequences. The means for the object and location generation scores are given in 
the table below.
Sequence Generation Score (out of 8.5) Percentage
Mean No. SD
Object 2.5 1.0 30
Location 3.5 1.7 41
The generation score represents the number of correct predictions subjects made 
as the changes cycled through the sequence. The Generation Score for Location 
changes was significantly larger than that for Object changes, t (31) = 2.57, p < 
0.05.
Discussion
The results of this experiment indicate, as predicted, that a non spatial sequence 
does not exert any influence on performance when it is not relevant for the
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response. That is, when an aspect of the stimulus is not critical for the response, it 
does not influence performance. In this task, the only factor that influenced 
performance was the location sequence, to which the subject responded. The 
object sequence was not responded to, and the test revealed no increase in RTs, 
suggesting that this aspect of the stimulus remained unprocessed. The reaction 
time data was mirrored by the verbal reports and generation scores. More subjects 
reported that the location changes followed a sequence than any of the other 
categories. In addition, the generation score of the location sequence was also 
significantly higher than the object sequence. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that subjects tended to have greater awareness of the location sequence 
than the object sequence.
These data suggest that an alteration of the task demands from responding to 
object changes to responding to location changes can have a substantial impact on 
performance and awareness. Mayr (1996) demonstrated learning of both 
sequences when the response was to the object changes, whereas in the current 
experiment, only the sequence that required a response showed any learning. The 
dual system account proposed by Mayr (1996) may explain this difference. Mayr 
(1996) suggested that spatial sequences are learned by a spatial attention system 
which directs orienting to the succession of location changes. Non spatial or 
object changes are not processed by this system, instead they are processed by the 
system that selects a response. This view suggests that non spatial sequences 
require a response in order to influence performance at test, and the data appear to 
support this position.
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There seems to be a contrast between this response based non-spatial sequence 
learning, and Mayr’s (1996) demonstration of non-response based spatial 
sequence learning. Mayr (1996) suggests that this indicates that learning of a 
spatial sequence can occur without an overt response, while a non spatial 
sequence does require a response. This question of whether sequence learning can 
occur without an associated response is explored in further detail in Experiment 
13.
5.4 Experiment 13
In the Mayr (1996) study, the spatial sequence was not relevant for the response, 
but appreciable learning was still demonstrated. In experiment 12, the non spatial 
sequence was not relevant for the response demand, and here, no sensitivity to 
this sequence was acquired. This implies that spatial and non spatial sequences 
are processed by alternative mechanisms. Perhaps more important, however, is 
the finding of spatial sequence learning which is not directly related to the 
response demands of the task. This finding suggests that an overt response is not 
required for learning of a spatial sequence to occur. Evidence for pure perceptual 
learning of a sequence has been provided using a single sequence task by 
Howard, Mutter and Howard (1992) prior to Mayr’s work. Howard et al. 
presented a group of subjects with the standard sequence learning task, except no 
response was required during the first three blocks of trials. On the fourth block, 
subjects responded as normal to the stimuli, and on the fifth block the random 
pattern was introduced. Subjects showed the standard increase in response time 
when the random block was introduced, even though they had only observed the
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sequence for the majority of the training phase. Howard et al. concluded that 
subjects had learned the sequence in a purely perceptual manner. More recently, 
Willingham (1999) questioned these findings on the basis of the use of explicit 
knowledge in the Howard et al. study. When the explicit effects were removed, 
no effect of learning by observation was present.
There is a further methodological problem with studies that attempt to 
demonstrate perceptual learning of sequential learning by pure observation. 
Although subjects are watching the screen, it is impossible to be sure they are, in 
fact, attending to the stimulus changes. This is the advantage of the dual sequence 
task; subjects are actively following the object changes of the stimulus, and to see 
the next object change they must pay attention to the location of the object. This 
methodology may have an advantage over the standard Nissen and Bullemer 
(1987) task, in that it is possible to investigate learning of sequential material that 
is attended to but does not require an overt response, such as the spatial sequence 
used in Mayr (1996). This type of sequence learning would be better described as 
non response relevant rather than observed, since both stimulus dimensions are 
clearly observed, but only one is response relevant.
A problem for the Mayr (1996) dual sequence task is that the spatial and non- 
spatial sequence dimensions require different responses. This brings the further 
question of spatial versus non-spatial sequence learning into the experimental 
interpretation, thus clouding the issue of non response relevant sequence learning. 
Furthermore, since this finding of non response relevant spatial sequence learning 
is demonstrated using different response demands (i.e. object response) in
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comparison to the standard demonstration of spatial sequence learning (which use 
location response), it may be that these findings are not comparable. A superior 
test of non response relevant spatial sequence learning is possible by using the 
dual dimension task with two spatial dimensions. Hence, the response demands 
would be the same as the single spatial sequence learning task, with the 
advantage of greater certainty that the non response relevant dimension is 
processed.
A dual sequence task could be constructed in the spatial domain by varying 
stimulus movements along two spatial dimensions. The stimulus object could 
move between the squares of a grid, rather than four locations in a row. 
Movements between the columns of the grid could follow one sequence, while 
movements between the rows of the grid could follow a second sequence. Hence, 
the stimulus would be moving independently along two separate dimensions, 
according to two independent sequences.
Importantly, this design allows a simple mapping to be formed between either the 
vertical or the horizontal movements, and the key press response. As in the Mayr 
(1996) study, it is possible to have one response relevant dimension and one 
dimension that is not relevant to the response. The alteration here is that both 
dimensions occur in the same spatial domain. Although Mayr (1996) has 
demonstrated learning of a spatial sequence that is not directly response relevant, 
learning of a spatial sequence that is not response relevant has never been 
demonstrated where the response is made to another spatial dimension.
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Rather than using a dual sequence design, only a single sequence was presented 
to subjects, with movements along the second dimension following a random 
pattern. Since this was the first test of this experimental set up, a single sequence 
was used to simplify the experimental design as much as possible. As a result, 
subjects would be exposed to a single sequence, and hence knowledge of only 
one sequence is tested.
To summarise the experimental design, subjects were presented with a four by 
four grid, and the stimulus object, a black square, could move between any of the 
sixteen grid positions. One group of subjects responded to the movements of the 
square between the columns of the grid, and another group responded to the 
movements of the square between the rows. The movements between the grid 
positions were simultaneously determined by two independent patterns; a 
repeating sequence and a random sequence. If the repeating sequence determined 
the square’s movements between the rows of the grid, the random sequence 
determined movements between the columns, and vice versa. The subjects 
responded to the dimension of the grid that followed the random pattern so that 
the other dimension followed a repeating sequence. For the Vertical sequence 
group, the repeating sequence determined movements between the rows of the 
grid, while the subjects responded to the column in which the stimulus appeared, 
and this followed a random pattern. The opposite relationship was used in the 
Horizontal sequence group.
From here on, the vertical and horizontal groups will be considered together in 
terms of two dimensions. In both cases, the dimension of the grid to which the
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subject responds will be referred to as the response relevant dimension (or RR) 
and the dimension of the grid that the subject does not respond to will be referred 
to as the non response relevant or (non-RR). Hence, the repeating sequence 
occurs on the non-RR dimension in both groups, while the subjects respond to the 
RR dimension of the grid.
Following five blocks of training, the non-RR dimension changed from a 
repeating sequence to a random sequence, so that both dimensions of the grid 
now followed a random pattern. Any sensitivity to the sequence that had been 
acquired on the non-RR dimension should now be revealed as a increase in 
response time. Hence, this served as the first test of knowledge.
The next phase of the experiment is referred to as the Switch phase, as here, 
subjects switch their responses from one dimension to the other. Hence, if the 
movements of the square between the rows of the grid had been the RR 
dimension, the movements of the square between the columns now becomes the 
RR dimension and vice versa. After two blocks of completely random trials, the 
third block returns to the same sequence constraints as in the training blocks. 
Since the RR dimension has switched from horizontal to vertical or vice versa, 
this allows the subject to directly respond to the sequence for the first time, thus 
allowing a further test of sequence knowledge. Any facilitation in comparison to 
the adjacent random blocks would reveal sensitivity to the repeating sequence.
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Method
Participants. Twenty two undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for 
participation.
Stimuli. Stimuli were presented on 15in monitor and occurred at sixteen 
different locations within a square grid formation, so that each side was four 
boxes long. The grid was arranged so that the whole area of the screen was 
covered by the grid. The stimuli that appeared in the boxes were black squares of 
side length 2cm. The response to stimulus interval (RSI) was 300 ms.
Design and Procedure. The position of the stimuli within the grid will be 
described by its horizontal and vertical location in the grid. These horizontal and 
vertical locations are each labelled A, B, C and D, so that A on the horizontal 
dimension was the right column of squares, moving across to D on the left. On 
the vertical dimension, A was the top row of squares, moving down to D at the 
bottom. So, for example, BD would be the inside left location on the bottom row.
The experiment was divided into two phases, first the Training phase, followed 
by the Switch phase. In the Training phase, the movement of the square along 
each of the dimensions could either be determined by the eight element sequence 
from Experiment 12 - DBDABCAC, or it could be a random pattern. As in 
Experiment 12, this sequence was repeated nine times within one block of trials 
to make a total of 72 trials. This sequence determined movements on one 
dimension and location changes would be random on the other. Following from
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this, subjects were randomly allocated into two groups, the Horizontal Sequence 
group and the Vertical Sequence group. In the Horizontal Sequence group, the 
sequence determined movements on the horizontal dimension, and the vertical 
movements were random. In the Vertical Sequence group, the sequence 
determined movements on the vertical dimension, with location changes on the 
horizontal dimension following a random pattern. No element in the grid was 
repeated on successive trials. This arrangement was used for the first five blocks 
of trials. In the sixth block, the movements of the square along both dimensions 
were determined by a random pattern, again for 72 trials, and this served as the 
first test of any knowledge acquired in the training phase.
Throughout the experiment, subjects responded to the stimuli using their index 
finger. Subjects assigned to the Horizontal Sequence group responded to the row 
the stimulus appeared in during the training phase (by pressing "9", "6", "3" and 
on the numeric keypad). Those assigned the Vertical Sequence group 
responded to the column in which the square appeared during training (by 
pressing "4", "5", "6" and "+" on the numeric keypad). Hence, the stimulus 
object moved randomly between locations on the RR dimension, with the non-RR 
dimension varied according to the eight item sequence.
The Switch phase consisted of four blocks of trials. During the first two blocks of 
trials, the movements of the square along both dimensions varied according to a 
random pattern. In the third block of the Switch phase, location changes reverted 
back to the same sequences used during the Training phase. In the final block of
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the Switch phase, the location changes of both dimensions would again follow a 
random pattern.
In the Switch phase, the responses were switched to the opposite dimension to 
that used in the training phase, so that subjects who responded to the column in 
which the square appeared during the training phase, now responded to the row in 
which square appeared, and vice versa. This meant that subjects now responded 
to the dimension of the stimulus movements that followed the sequence (i.e. the 
responses followed the sequence presented during the training phase) in the third 
block of the transfer phase. This served as an opportunity for the subjects to 
respond to the sequenced material for the first time, and constituted the second 
test of the sequence.
Throughout the experiment, when a incorrect response was made, a tone of 
duration 200ms was presented immediately following the response. The square 
moved to the next location in the sequence to which the subject made a response, 
and so on.
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Column Res - “4”
Row Res - “9”
Row Res - “3”
Column Res - “5
This diagram represents the responses on the keypad made on two successive trials by subjects 
responding to the row in which the square appears, or the subjects responding to the column in 
which it appears.
Results
Learning Effects: Median RTs were computed per subject and block, and are 
shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Reaction times to the response relevant dim ension as a function of training, collapsed 
across the Horizontal and Vertical sequence groups. The Non RR and RR are marked for each block 
according to the sequence type that occurred on each block, so that if a random sequence was used 
the block is marked ”R" and the repeating sequence is marked "S". The test blocks, blocks 6 and 9, 
are in the boxes.
The crucial RT data are those obtained in blocks 5, 6, 9 and 10, where the 
learning scores are determined. There are two learning scores; the non RR score 
which represents the change in RTs when the non RR dimension changes from a 
repeating sequence (block 5) to a random sequence (block 6). Following block 6, 
the response task switched from responding to the column in which the square 
appeared, to responding to the row in which the square appeared, and vice versa.
In block 9, the subjects responded directly to the repeating sequence, as the
189
repeating sequence and random sequence constrained the square's movements in 
the same way as blocks 1 - 5. Hence, the learning score derived from these trials 
is called the Direct learning score. The Direct learning score represents the 
change in RTs when the RR dimension changes from a repeating sequence (block 
9) to a random sequence (block 10). The non RR, Direct learning scores and 
standard deviations are presented in the table below.
non RR Direct
Learning Score (ms)
Mean SD 
12.8 52.5
Mean SD 
9.5 46.4
Neither the non RR learning score [t (21) = 1.1] nor the Direct learning score [t 
(21) = 0.9] were significantly larger than zero.
Discussion
As no increase in response time occurred at the test blocks in comparison to the 
previous transfer blocks, this indicates that sensitivity to the sequence was not 
revealed in either the non RR or Direct learning scores.
The aim of the current study was to demonstrate, in the simplest possible 
conditions, that a sequence of spatial locations can be learned when the response 
is made to a second spatial dimension. The data suggest that subjects did not 
acquire any sensitivity to the spatial sequence that was present on the non-RR
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dimension. In the Mayr (1996) task, there was clear learning of a spatial sequence 
that was unrelated to response selection. It may be that the discrepancy between 
these findings is related to the response task that each study asked subjects to 
perform. That is, spatial sequence learning of stimulus movements on a non-RR 
dimension does not occur when it is in the same domain as the RR dimension. 
However, there are some methodological concerns that need to be addressed 
before considering this point further.
Willingham, Nissen and Bullemer (1989) carried out an experiment where the 
stimuli were a series of colour patches that occurred at four locations on the 
screen. The location changes followed a specific sequence, while the colour 
patches varied according to a random pattern. The responses were made to the 
colour patches, in order that the location changes were not response relevant. No 
learning of the location changes was demonstrated by Willingham et al. (1989). 
Mayr (1996) supposes that this finding can be explained in that the separation 
between the locations was not very large, and it may be that the small separation 
of the locations would show only a small performance advantage. In the current 
study, the locations were spread out to cover the whole screen area in an attempt 
to maximise separation. However, as in the Willingham (1989) study, this 
separation may not have been sufficient to show any advantage.
The response in the current study required subjects to press the keys using their 
index finger. Unlike the standard situation where each location is given a specific 
finger press, inducing a mapping between the index finger response and the 
spatial location is not a trivial task. Furthermore, even when the mapping has
191
been induced, there are four possible locations for the response to be made, which 
makes responses difficult with the single index finger. Following each response, 
the subject is faced with locating the position of the next response from four 
possible locations. This is not necessary when each finger is allocated with a 
single response location.
In summary, it appears that a non response relevant spatial sequence is not 
acquired when the response dimension is a further spatial sequence. This 
contrasts with findings reported by Mayr (1996) who demonstrated that a spatial 
sequence can be acquired without a direct response. There are two possible 
reasons for the failure to demonstrate learning in the current study. Firstly, the 
separation of the locations between which the object moves may not have been 
sufficiently large to reveal a significant performance benefit. Secondly, the 
response mapping between the index finger and the four response locations may 
not have allowed a simple response mapping to be obtained. In Experiment 14, 
these issues are addressed by simplifying the design of the experiment in an 
attempt to reveal an effect of learning a spatial sequence without a specific 
response.
5.5 Experiment 14
Experiment 13 demonstrated that sensitivity to a spatial sequence does not occur 
when the non-RR and RR dimensions are both spatial. It was suggested that this 
failure to demonstrate learning may be the result of methodological problems. 
The first of these was the small separation of the stimulus locations in the grid, 
which may have made any performance benefit difficult to detect. The second
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problem arose from the singular use of an index finger to respond to four 
locations. This response set up is not as intuitive as the standard SRT task where 
a separate finger is assigned to each stimulus location.
It may be possible to address both these points with a single change in the 
experimental design. Reducing the number of stimulus locations on each 
dimension from four to three would increase the separation of each stimulus 
location, if the screen area is maintained. It would simplify the response if three 
response locations, rather than four, were used. This would make the movement 
between responses faster and more efficient.
There is some precedent for using the index finger with three response locations. 
Cohen, Ivry and Keele (1990) used such a configuration when investigating the 
degree of effector independence in the SRT task. In addition, they used very 
simple five item sequences in their studies. These sequences were shown to 
reveal strong learning effects across training.
In the following experiment, the basic design of Experiment 13 is retained with 
the major modification that three stimulus locations are used on each dimension 
in place of the four used previously. In addition, the same simple five item and 
three element sequences that were used by Cohen et al. were employed here, as 
they have been shown to reveal clear learning effects. Moreover, as they are 
shorter than the eight element sequences used in Experiment 13 they should be 
acquired more easily.
193
Method
Participants. Twenty four undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow took part in the experiment. They were paid a small fee for 
participation.
Stimuli. The stimuli were presented within a grid formation as in Experiment 
13. Here though, the grid contained nine locations. The side length of the grid 
was 22 cm, making the side length of each quadrant 7.5cm. As in Experiment 13, 
the stimuli occurring within the boxes were small squares, with the exception that 
the side length of the square was 1.5cm. The response to stimulus interval (RSI) 
was 200ms.
Design and Procedure. The design of this experiment was identical to that 
used in experiment 13. There were three major differences in the procedure; the 
first of these was the use of shorter five item sequences (see below for a 
description). Secondly, the number of training blocks was increased from five to 
seven, so that there were twelve experimental blocks. Finally, here there were less 
grid locations to which the square could move (from sixteen locations in 
Experiment 13 to nine locations in the current experiment). This lowered number 
of total locations reduces the number of elements that any sequence could use, so, 
in place of each dimension having four elements: A to D, here, three elements are 
used: A to C. The organisation of these elements remains the same, with A 
referring to the left column through to C on the right. The rows are labelled in 
order that A represents the top row of locations moving down to C as the bottom 
row of locations. For example, AB is the leftmost middle location of the nine.
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The response keys used were "4", "5" and "6" on the numeric keypad for the 
horizontal dimension, and "8", "5" and "2" on the numeric keypad for the vertical 
dimension.
The five element sequences were presented in six different orderings. The six 
structured sequences were ABCBC, ACBCB, BACAC, BCACA, CABAB and 
CBABA. Cohen et al. (1990) has suggested that these sequences represent all 
possible structures of five item sequences with three elements. For each block of 
100 trials, the sequence was repeated 20 times. No feedback was given on the 
reaction time task because the three element sequence was a simple mapping to 
three response locations.
Results
Learning Effects: Median RTs were computed per subject and block, and the
average for each block across subjects is displayed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Reaction times to the response relevant dim ension as a function of training,
collapsed across the Horizontal and Vertical Sequence groups. As in figure 2, the non RR and 
RR dimensions are marked according to the sequence type that was used in a particular block. 
The test blocks, blocks 8 and 11, are in the boxes.
The learning scores were determined from the RTs in blocks 7, 8, 11 and 12, in 
the same way as the previous experiment. Again, this yielded non RR and Direct 
learning scores, displayed in the table below.
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non RR Direct
Mean SD Mean SD
Learning Score (ms) 2.6 33.8 29.4 55.8
The non RR learning score is not significantly different from zero [t (23) = 0.4]. 
In contrast, the Direct learning score was significantly different from zero [t (23) 
= 2.53, p <  0.05].
Discussion
The results of Experiment 14 are similar to those of Experiment 13. However, 
unlike Experiment 13, there is some evidence of sensitivity in the Direct test, as 
the Direct learning score is significantly different from chance. In contrast, the 
non-RR learning score did not reveal any learning effects.
This difference between these two tests may indicate that the apparent significant 
learning score is a artefact of learning within the Direct test block. In the second 
test block (block 9), subjects are no longer simply observing the sequence, they 
are responding to the sequence itself, and sequence learning by response should 
now function. The block is one hundred trials long and the sequence only five 
items, which results in twenty cycles of the sequence within the test block. 
Considering that the many sequence learning studies show an appreciable effect 
after twenty four cycles of a longer sequence, twenty cycles should be sufficient
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for a significant degree of learning to occur. Therefore, an effect of learning 
within the block is likely to be responsible for any effect of learning.
5.6 General Discussion
The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of active responding in 
determining sequence learning performance. The question was addressed using 
non spatial (experiment 12) and spatial (experiment 13 and 14) sequences. The 
main finding is that sequence learning appears to be dependent on subjects having 
an opportunity to respond to the sequence itself. This effect was consistent in non 
spatial and, in contrast to other experimental findings, spatial sequences. These 
effects will now be considered in further detail.
It is not greatly surprising that sensitivity to a non spatial sequence can only be 
acquired if the sequence was directly responded to during training. In experiment 
12, subjects performed a location detection task, and the object changes could not 
have aided performance in any way. For this reason, it is likely that they 
remained unprocessed during the location detection task. Mayr (1996) proposes 
that non spatial or object sequences may be acquired through a response based 
sequence learning system that picks up any stimulus dimension which is 
correlated with responses, regardless of whether it is a shape or colour variable. 
The object sequence in experiment 12 did not correlate with the response in any 
way and therefore could not be acquired by such a mechanism.
Mayr’s (1996) finding of spatial sequence learning in the absence of an overt 
response would seem to indicate that a response based interpretation is
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incomplete. However, the response demands of this study are different from those 
in previous spatial sequence learning studies. Subjects responded to the changes 
in the shape of the stimulus object, with the spatial dimension non response 
relevant. In experiment 13 and 14, the response was made to the spatial location 
of the object, with the sequence occurring on a non response relevant spatial 
dimension. In this case, no effect of the non response relevant dimension was 
detected. This position is in line with other research which supports the critical 
role of responses in sequence learning (e.g. Willingham, 1999), with the added 
certainty that the non response relevant or observed sequence has been processed. 
So, it appears that the Mayr (1996) study may be a special case of non response 
relevant sequence learning, resulting from the spatial/non spatial dual dimension 
task.
The degree of awareness of the subjects in the Mayr (1996) study may explain 
why these data present a special case. If the explicit measures reported by Mayr 
(1996) are examined, fifty five of the sixty participants in the study performed at 
above chance levels on the prediction test of awareness of the spatial sequence. 
This indicates that subjects had good explicit awareness of the spatial sequence, 
and this may account for the effect of learning of the non response relevant 
dimension. It could be argued that prediction tests of the type used in experiment 
12 and Mayr (1996) can be influenced by implicit knowledge of the sequence, 
that is, they are not process pure (Willingham, Greeley and Bardone, 1993). 
While this may be the case, a large number of subjects reported detecting some 
sequence in the stimulus movements or the object changes (forty five out of
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sixty), indicating that these significant prediction scores are accompanied by a 
feeling of metaknowledge, implicating the use of explicit knowledge. Taken 
together, these explicit effects are not merely minor consideration when 
interpreting this data.
In section 1.8.3, it was noted that the procedural view of learning (Kolers and 
Roediger, 1984) can be a useful framework for understanding the sequence 
learning task. Within this framework, learning is construed as the accumulation of 
procedures for interacting with symbols. These procedures are associated with 
specific tasks, so, in the case of sequence learning the stored procedure would 
involve responding to the location of a stimulus. Hence, within this account, 
information about non response or task irrelevant sequences should not be 
acquired. This prediction is supported by the data presented in this chapter, as 
sensitivity was only shown to response relevant sequences. This suggests that 
subjects are not passive receivers of structure in the training stimuli; instead, it 
appears the critical aspects of the structure must be processed during the training 
phase for learning to occur. The importance of the active processing of the 
stimulus material is akin to findings of other implicit learning tasks reported 
within this thesis and elsewhere. In the next chapter, a summary of the main 
findings of all the experiments reported in this thesis will be presented.
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C hapter 6 General Discussion
The first part of this chapter provides a brief summary of the main findings 
reported in each of the experimental chapters of this thesis. Following this, these 
findings will be drawn together to assess their significance with respect to the 
theoretical issues set out in chapter 1.
Chapter 2 - The efficacy o f invariant learning
The experiments reported in chapter 2 investigated several manipulations of the 
invariant learning task (McGeorge and Burton, 1990). In this task, subjects are 
exposed to training stimuli which consist of 30 four digit numbers containing an 
invariant "3". In subsequent forced choice test subjects tend to select novel 
numbers containing this invariant over numbers without it. In experiment 1, 
sensitivity was eliminated when the surface form of the stimuli changed from the 
training phase to the test phase. It appears that decisions at the forced choice test 
in the invariant learning task are made on the basis of processing fluency. When 
surface features change, this fluency cannot be used, giving no advantage to the 
items that preserve the invariant.
The use of fluency of processing at test implies that subjects are relying on the 
familiarity of the items presented at test to make decisions (as suggested by Cock, 
Berry and Gaffan, 1994), and experiment 4 provided further evidence supporting 
this position. When the training set was defined by a majority feature, rather than 
an invariance rule, performance did not significantly deteriorate. This indicates
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that the invariant does not acquire some special quality that sets it apart from the 
other digits in the training strings.
Sensitivity to an invariant characteristic is not only influenced by the surface 
features, the demands of the training task are also critical for successful test 
performance. In experiment 5, sensitivity to the invariant property was shown 
only when the training task demands matched the invariant property (e.g. search 
for low numbers with a invariant "2"), while performance was at chance when the 
training task was unrelated to the invariant (e.g. search for low numbers with an 
invariant "8"). This demonstrates that if the training task does not relate in any 
way to the structure of the stimuli, performance at test will be at chance levels. 
Conversely, when the training task maps directly onto the structure of the training 
strings, performance is maximal.
Chapter 3 - The effect o f alternative test task demands
Investigating the generation of information in the invariant learning task was the 
major aim of chapter 3. In experiment 6, a digit string fragment completion test 
was used to demonstrate increased generation of an invariant digit following 
exposure to training exemplars that all contained this invariant. This finding 
indicates that in addition to increased fluency of processing test items, sensitivity 
to invariance can be revealed by generation of invariant information.
It was predicted in chapter 3 that since the completion task requires the 
articulation of digits, this process may lead to the use of phonological information 
preserved from the training period. This possibility was tested in experiment 8
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where subjects performed phonological suppression during training. Performance 
on the completion task dropped to chance levels in the suppression group, 
suggesting that articulation of previously experienced strings is a key aspect of 
generation performance. Generation performance was seen to be insensitive to the 
surface features of the training period, as successful performance was 
demonstrated regardless of the surface form of the training stimuli.
Chapter 4 - The information acquired in the invariant learning task 
In the completion test reported in chapter 3, subjects are given a fragment of a 
four digit number and are asked to complete the fragment to make a number they 
saw during training. In experiments 10 and 11 of this chapter, subjects were given 
fragments of items which had appeared in the training set. These fragments were 
constructed so that there were two alternative correct responses, either where the 
invariant completed the string correctly or another digit was required. Under 
these circumstances, subjects showed no difference in their ability to complete 
these strings with a digit that was invariant in the training strings, or any of the 
other digits. This finding suggests that the invariant did not acquire any special 
quality during training. Instead, subjects refer to particular items that they can 
remember from the training period.
Chapter 5 - Response relevance in the SRT task
This chapter investigated the role of active responding in sequence learning 
performance. In the sequence learning task, subjects are asked to react to a 
stimulus object presented in different locations on a screen in a choice reaction 
time task. The succession of locations follow a sequence which repeats ten times
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or so within a block of trials. A speedup of reaction time is demonstrated across 
training trials, although subjects cannot describe the cause of this speedup. In a 
development of this task, Mayr (1996) presented two sequences on two separate 
stimulus dimensions, a spatial dimension and a non spatial dimension (the shape 
of the stimulus object). Simultaneous learning of both sequences was 
demonstrated, although subjects did not respond directly to the spatial sequence. 
This suggests that the spatial sequence was learned automatically, contrasting 
with the processing view which emphasises constant activity of the learner.
The experiments reported in chapter 5 contradict the findings of Mayr (1996). In 
place of the dual sequence task, a dual dimension task was used where the 
stimulus object moved along two spatial dimensions (experiments 13 and 14). A 
repeating sequence occurred on only one of the dimensions for simplicity. In this 
case, learning of the spatial sequence was not demonstrated when the repeating 
sequence was presented on the dimension that was not response relevant. 
Furthermore, in experiment 12, no sensitivity to a non spatial sequence was 
evident when the response was made to a spatial dimension. This finding suggests 
that learning can only occur when a response is made to the training stimuli, it 
does not occur automatically. In addition, subjects were shown to be aware of the 
stimulus dimension they responded to, the location sequence, and not the object 
sequence. This indicates that task demands during training can determine the 
extent of conscious awareness of a sequence.
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Discussion
Two main accounts of implicit learning were described in chapter 1, the parallel 
system and the episodic processing views. The parallel system account (e.g. 
Reber, 1989) holds that the sensitivity to structure of stimuli that occurs in a 
typical implicit learning experiment is the result of the operation of an implicit 
learning system. This system abstracts the structure of a given stimulus domain 
without awareness, and this occurs in a passive manner. In contrast, within the 
episodic account, particular experiences of stimuli are preserved from the training 
phase, and the similarity of these experiences to the test experiences determines 
test performance.
It was suggested that the episodic processing account provides a superior 
explanation of implicit learning. The episodic processing account may provide a 
superior explanation of experimental data as it places more emphasis on active 
processing, and this position is in tandem with a large amount of experimental 
data that was described in chapter 1. These data suggest that subjects actively 
process the training stimulus they encounter according to the demands of the 
training task, and this processing is reflected in later test performance.
Several experiments reported in this thesis are pertinent to the issue of active 
processing in implicit learning. This question was addressed indirectly in 
experiment 8. When subjects performed phonological suppression during 
training, no effective learning of the invariance was demonstrated, indicating that 
learning is not an automatic consequence of interacting with the stimulus. 
Similarly, in experiment 5, sensitivity to the invariance did not occur as an
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automatic consequence of perceiving the stimuli. When the induction task 
focused on aspects of the stimulus structure that were not related to the invariant 
information, no sensitivity was shown to the invariance. In contrast, when the 
training task directed subjects to the invariant property, maximal sensitivity was 
revealed. This experiment demonstrates the importance of processing the 
appropriate aspects of the stimulus structure that will later become important for 
the test.
In experiment 12, similar findings were demonstrated in a very different 
experimental context. Here, subjects only became sensitive to a sequence when 
they were given an opportunity to respond to the sequence. When the sequence 
was not response relevant, no sensitivity was demonstrated. This is similar to the 
situation in experiment 5 where successful test performance was only 
demonstrated when the training task correlated with invariant properties. The post 
task verbal reports from experiments 5 and 12 both indicate that when the training 
task directs subjects to the critical aspects of the training material, greater 
awareness of the structure is demonstrated. These findings are significant because 
they demonstrate that training task demands interact with conscious awareness.
Further evidence for the absence of learning in circumstances where the sequence 
was non response relevant was presented in experiments 13 and 14. In this task, 
the stimulus object moved between the squares of a grid according to a random 
sequence and a repeating sequence. Subjects responded to the movements of the 
square between the rows or columns of the grid, so that if one was relevant to the 
response the other was not. During training, the sequence always occurred on the
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stimulus dimension that was non response relevant. The only circumstances 
where sensitivity was revealed was where the subject responded directly to the 
sequence. Within twenty cycles of the sequence, a significant decrease in reaction 
time was observed in comparison to the adjacent random blocks. No such 
reduction was observed when the sequence occurred on the non response relevant 
dimension. A potential problem for this experiment was that the subject had 
already seen the sequence on the initial training trials where it was non response 
relevant. The obvious route by which to test whether this exposure made any 
difference to performance on the response relevant block could be to use a 
comparison group where the training trials were random on both dimensions.
Up to this point, the focus has been on how processing operations during training 
determine subsequent test performance. In chapter 3, the emphasis is reversed 
from how processing during training determines test performance, to determining 
how changed test processing demands influence performance. The point is made 
that the test should not be conceived as accessing some specific set of knowledge; 
instead the test accesses a pool of knowledge of the training stimuli. This view is 
taken from Wright and Whittlesea's (1998) interpretation of the knowledge 
acquired in the training phase as a set of resources that can be drawn upon for 
many purposes when interacting with the world. Thus, different tests should 
access distinct aspects of this pool of knowledge.
This view is supported by the findings of experiments 8 and 9. In these studies, 
subjects completed digit fragments in the test rather than choosing between 
exemplars in a forced choice test. Unlike the forced choice test, the completion
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test was not sensitive to a change in surface form between the training and test 
periods. This indicates that distinct knowledge bases are used in each test. The 
fact that performance on the completion test was sensitive to phonological 
suppression during training (experiment 8) would seem to point to the use of 
phonological information. The important point is that the training period yields 
different types of knowledge that can be applied in different ways according to 
the demands of the test task. The consistency between the test task demands and 
the processing that occurred during training determines success on the test of 
knowledge.
A further line of investigation in this thesis was to specify the type of information 
that is acquired in the invariant learning task. In experiment 4, it was shown that 
introducing a few negative items into the training period did not disrupt test 
performance. This indicates that no special or abstract knowledge of invariance is 
acquired. This finding was replicated in experiments 10 and 11, where 
completion of digit fragments was no more successful when the fragment was 
completed with the invariant from training or any other digit. Again, this implies 
that the invariant from training was not weighted above the other digits 
encountered during training. Taken together, these findings are good evidence 
against the McGeorge and Burton (1990) position that abstract knowledge of the 
invariant feature is acquired. Instead, it is more likely that knowledge of 
individual experiences is applied at test, as suggested by the episodic processing 
account. In chapter 4, it was put forward that subjects use memory for specific 
strings at test in the invariant learning task. These strings are not available to
208
conscious inspection because they are not directly represented. The strings seen 
in training correlate with the computations carried out on them, and subjects 
report computations most often as their strategy in the test. So it is likely that 
using explicit memory for these computations allows above chance performance 
on this test.
It is important to note that the episodic account predicts that while this conclusion 
is possible with this particular induction task, another induction task may result in 
alternative information used in the test. For example, in experiment 5 subjects 
were asked to search for the highest or lowest digit in the string. When the 
invariant was high and the training task induced subjects to search for high 
numbers, performance was maximal. An important secondary finding was that 
subjects' verbal reports consistently and accurately reported the invariant as the 
most frequent digit. It is possible to speculate that, at test, subjects were using 
some strategy of searching for high numbers, or indeed the invariant. Using this 
induction task in place of computation, a different pattern of performance may be 
expected in experiments 10 and 11, with the invariant being produced most often 
in the digit fragments.
In this thesis, several predictions of the episodic account of implicit learning were 
tested. First, the episodic processing account predicts that the subject must 
perform some active task on the training stimuli for learning to occur, and this 
was reflected in the experimental data reported in this thesis. Secondly, the 
processing carried out on stimuli during the training and test periods must be
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consistent for successful performance at test. This prediction was also confirmed 
by the experimental data reported within this thesis.
In contrast, none of the experiments appear to provide evidence for automatic 
acquisition of knowledge. Learning does not proceed in an automatic manner 
where the structure of the stimulus environment is "absorbed" without 
supervision, as some authors suggest (e.g. Lewicki and Hill, 1989). Furthermore, 
the findings of experiments 4, 10 and 11 do not support the acquisition of abstract 
knowledge in the invariant learning task. Instead, it appears more likely that 
episodic knowledge underlies performance on this task. This conclusion is in line 
with the majority of findings with the artificial grammar learning task (e.g Vokey 
and Brooks, 1992; Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993; Johnstone and Shanks, 2000).
In sum, converging evidence from several sources indicates that the episodic 
processing account (Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993) provides the best available 
explanation of implicit learning. This view of implicit learning is not, however, 
free of problems. It was suggested in chapter 1 that the evidence cited in its 
support is taken only from classification or recognition studies. Indeed, the phrase 
"episodic processing" does not appear appropriate for the sequence learning task 
as the emphasis it places on the events does not map onto the experimental 
demonstration of sequence learning. In sequence learning, the increasing efficacy 
of learning is noticeable as a gradual decrease in response time. This type of 
learning is more akin to the predictions of the Kolers and Roediger (1984) 
procedural view of learning. Within this framework, learning is perceived as an 
accumulation of procedures over time. This build up of procedural knowledge is
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tied strongly to the processing that conducted on the stimuli during training; a 
prediction that is very close to those made by the episodic processing account of 
implicit learning. Indeed, it may be better to consider these types of models under 
the umbrella term of processing accounts of implicit learning, rather than 
"episodic" processing. This is quite reasonable since they share the fundamental 
principle of processing consistency. Using this broader interpretation of 
processing consistency, the wider experimental context of implicit learning 
research (i.e. classification, generation or reaction time tasks) can be 
encompassed by this account.
Broadening the theoretical context of implicit learning research in this way does 
not come without its costs. The chief concern is that the underlying mechanisms 
of the processing account are rather hard to pin down. Processing based terms 
that have been used frequently in this thesis, such as the "consistency of 
processing" or "training task demands", are not easily specified.
This difficulty with specifying the mechanism of processing type frameworks has 
been highlighted previously. For example, Baddeley, (1978) suggested that the 
levels of processing framework for memory could only be described as "a useful 
rule of thumb for predicting the outcome of certain types of experiments" (pl48). 
Furthermore, in a critique of Kolers and Smythe's (1984) procedural approach to 
cognition, Allport (1984) asked the question "how should we specify the 
dependence of skills on circumstances" (p323), to which he claimed Kolers and 
Smythe (1984) "offer no hint of an answer" (p323). These points are no doubt 
valid criticisms of the processing account in general, but in the case of implicit
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learning, the alternative structural account lacks supporting evidence (see chapter 
1). In comparison, the processing view of implicit learning provides a simple 
interpretation of implicit learning, which can integrate new findings such as the 
response of the completion test to various training task manipulations 
(experiments 8 and 9). The parallel system view is not flexible enough to provide 
an explanation of these types of effects.
From this we must conclude that, while the processing account provides the best 
account of implicit learning, one aim of future research should be to specify 
further the mechanism of aspects of the processing account such as "consistency" 
or "fluency". Fortunately, some progress on this problem has been made by 
Whittlesea and Leboe (2000). As reported in chapter 3, they suggest that 
classification decisions can be based on the use of heuristics. Although there is 
no space to consider their work in detail, suffice it to say that this work specifies 
the mechanism of the processing account in more detail than previous analysis.
This processing view of memory and learning is a general view of these functions 
of the mind, which can provide an explanation of learning in standard 
circumstances, as well as those in implicit learning experiments. If so, why 
should there be a demarcation point between learning that occurs in so called 
implicit learning experiments from other more standard explicit learning 
contexts? In terms of the cognitive structures that underlie these tasks there is no 
distinction. However, the experimental finding that people have difficulty 
verbalising the knowledge they use in implicit learning experiments is 
unequivocal, so there must be some distinction. This distinction lies in the task
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demands of implicit learning and explicit learning contexts rather than knowledge 
structures that are proposed to underlie them. Implicit learning represents 
circumstances when there is an indeterminate relationship between the explicitly 
held knowledge acquired during training and the way this knowledge is used at 
test (as argued by Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993). This indeterminacy does not 
arise, however, from some specific function of the mind, it results from the 
incidental task demands of implicit learning experiments. In more typical 
laboratory learning situations, it is the aim of the experimenter to make the 
structure of the stimuli unambiguous in order to maximise learning effects, hence 
subjects can better verbalise the underlying rules.
This interpretation is subtly distinct from processing views proposed elsewhere 
(e.g. Whittlesea and Dorken, 1997), as it pays attention to the content of verbal 
reports. In the past, proponents of the processing view have suggested that verbal 
reports should be abandoned, and research should solely focus on processing 
manipulations. More generally, Kolers and Roediger (1984) make the point that 
cognitive processes should be described by what they can do rather than what 
they know. This position is made untenable by the fact that verbal reports can 
reveal useful information under certain circumstances. For example, in 
experiments 5 and 12 the training task focused on the critical aspects of the 
stimulus structure, resulting in high performance at test and significantly, 
reasonably accurate verbal reports. These findings are in line with those of 
Johnstone and Shanks (2000) (see sect 1.8) where subjects directed to the rule
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structure of biconditional artificial grammars showed both sensitivity at test and 
good awareness of the rules.
These demonstrations of conditions where verbal report is accurate may point 
towards a new research strategy in implicit learning research. Experiments where 
learning is seen to occur in the absence of verbal report should be contrasted with 
demonstrations of learning where verbal report was accurate. Examining the main 
differences in the training task demands in each case will lead to a better 
understanding of how training task demands interact with verbal reports. Hence, 
conditions where learning can occur without verbal report can be specified more 
accurately.
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